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Non-Technical Summary
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the relationship between the real economy and the financial
sector which gives rise to various amplification mechanisms known as financial
accelerators. Historically, those channels are known to be in the roots of the
world’s largest crises such as the 2008 Great Recession. In its aftermath, policy-
makers have undertaken various reforms that introduce macroprudential policy
which focuses on the stability of the financial system as a whole. This thesis studies
different financial amplification channels and the ability of macroprudential policy
to mitigate their impact on the real economy in three chapters.
The first chapter introduces different macroprudential tools into a macroeco-
nomic framework with financial frictions and analyses their ability to mitigate the
impact of a crisis originating from the financial sector to the real economy. The
main finding of the paper is that sector specific tools can be effective if applied
before the occurrence of the crisis, however, broader tools are much more effective
once the crisis has spread to the economy.
The second chapter expands the framework of the previous one, in order to
provide a realistic representation of the current regulatory setting for capital re-
quirements - the Internal Rating Based approach. The paper then studies the abil-
ity of the regulation to lead to procyclical capital requirements and thus amplify
the business cycle and reduce social welfare. In order to avoid these consequences,
an alternative policy rule is proposed which is able to mitigate the amplification
effects.
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The third chapter focuses on the founding theory behind the current regula-
tory framework - the portfolio loss distribution (Vasicek, 2002) and expands it by
introducing macroeconomic amplification mechanisms known as financial acceler-
ators. The resulting portfolio distribution shows large losses to be substantially
more likely which increases the fragility of the financial system and the amount
of capital necessary to maintain its stability.
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The Reach of Macroprudential Policy
The Great Recession which started with the burst of the US housing market
bubble established financial stability at the forefront of policy discussions. Prior
to the crisis, the general view was that responding to fluctuations in asset prices or
other financial variables was potentially harmful due to the difficulty in detecting
asset price bubbles in real time. However, a growing amount of empirical work has
found that large movements in a number of observable variables such as credit
and residential investment are reliable advance indicators of house price busts,
which in turn are typically associated with substantial falls in output.1 These
observations signal that a countercyclical policy that reacts to such indicators
could mitigate the impact of the crisis or even prevent its occurrence. But what
is the right policy tool for this purpose?
Macroprudential policy has the objective to limit the accumulation of financial
risks, in order to reduce the probability and to mitigate the impact of a potential
financial crash and to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector. Thus,
purely by its objective, macroprudential policy should be the right approach to
lean against the credit cycle. However, because of the recent availability of these
tools, the theoretical research which should suggest the appropriate use of them
seems not yet fully developed.2 Moreover, due to the large set of macroprudential
tools, the different propagation mechanisms of the different instruments are even
less researched.
Following the lessons of the Great Recession, this paper aims to contribute to
the debate over the right policy tool to lean against the credit cycle by investi-
gating the role of different types of macroprudential instruments. In particular,
whether some macroprudential instruments can be too blunt to address problems
in a specific financial sector while others are more appropriate for this purpose.
The motivation of this approach is based on the understanding that different
policy instruments have different broadness of impact, depending on the level at
which they enter the economy. For example, as the capital-asset requirement en-
ters the economy at the bank level, a tighter requirement will most likely tighten
1See Kannan et al. (2011), Borio and Lowe (2004) and IMF (2009).
2See Angelini et al. (2014).
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lending for all types of loans. On the other hand, a loan-to-value requirement
restricts the maximum borrowing amount for a given collateral value and thus
can be imposed on a specific type of lending such as mortgages. Therefore, in
a scenario of a housing market overheating, while capital-asset requirements can
lead to higher borrowing costs thus reducing mortgage lending, the instrument
would also reduce lending to firms. On the other hand, a tighter LTV limit can
be imposed only on mortgages and thus have a more sophisticated direct effect
without impeding corporate lending.
For answering the research question a general equilibrium model is employed.
The possibility to represent different levels of impact of macroprudential policies
is achieved by a detailed banking sector with two types of lending. The banking
sector is set-up extending defaulting loans to both households and firms against
housing and capital collateral. In addition, while banks are subject to capital
requirement at their wholesale level, each sector specific loan type is subject to a
LTV requirement. We simulate the crisis as an unexpected increase in the default
rate of mortgages which leads to bank capital destruction and transmission of the
crisis to the entire banking system and consequently the real economy. The two
macroprudential instruments are compared firstly as being permanently tighter
prior to the crisis, and secondly as optimized dynamic rules which react after the
occurrence of the crisis.
We find that, prior to the crisis, a tighter LTV limit reduces the vulnerability
of the banking sector to higher loan defaults but it does so at the cost of lower
output. At the same time, a permanently tighter capital-asset requirement seems
incapable of mitigating the impact of the financial shock. However, in the crisis
aftermath, once we consider optimal dynamic policy setting in terms of social
welfare, we find that an optimized capital-asset requirement can be successful in
improving welfare and attenuate the transmission of the crisis to the real sector.
Apart from being less successful in improving welfare, the dynamic LTV limit is
also incapable of reducing the impact of the shock after its occurrence. These
results follow from the fact that once the shock has occurred and bank capital
is destroyed the crisis is already transmitted to the whole banking system and
hence the instrument which operates at this level - the capital asset requirement,
7
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is more effective. Alternatively, if the shock could be anticipated, a tightening of
the sector specific instrument - the LTV limit to mortgages, could significantly
attenuate the impact of the shock.
The conducted research highlights the important feature of macroprudential
instruments of having different level of impact ranging from more general to more
sector specific. This property allows macroprudential regulators to intervene in
a specific type of lending, such as mortgages, without disturbing directly lending
to firms. Thus, while an anticipatory use of the more sector specific instrument
can be very effective at mitigating the impact of the crisis before its occurrence,
the reactive use of the more general instrument can be effective in attenuating the
transmission of the crisis after its impact. Hence, a crucial factor in determining
the appropriate policy response is the ability of regulators to anticipate and iden-
tify the housing market overheating on time and respond to it with tighter LTV
limit to mortgages. If such anticipation is not possible a reactive use of the more
general - capital asset instrument would mitigate the transmission of financial
shocks.
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Sectoral Risk-Weights and
Macroprudential Policy
This chapter of the doctoral thesis builds on the macroeconomic framework de-
veloped in the first chapter and its research findings. The main motivation of
the paper is to provide a realistic representation of the existing macroprudential
regulation and assess its impact on the financial system in crisis scenarios.
The macroprudential tool under focus is the capital-asset requirements. With
the introduction of the Basel II regulatory framework, from 2004 onwards, a major
emphasis was put on risk sensitivity - the idea that capital requirements should
depend on the type of assets that a bank holds and in particular, that banks with
riskier assets should hold larger amount of capital to ensure their solvency. A key
aspect of this regulation is the way of measuring the riskiness of banks’ assets.
While in Basel I, assets’ risk was evaluated with the Standardized Approach (SA)
- through external fixed ratings, Basel II introduced the Internal Ratings-Based
(IRB) approach in which banks can use internal models to estimate their portfolio
riskiness which in turn would determine the required regulatory capital to be held.
In practise, the risk sensitive requirements are implemented through assigning
risk-weights to different assets and then computing a capital over risk-weighted
assets ratio1 that has to comply with the regulatory requirement. While under
the SA, the risk-weights are fixed and depending on the asset class, under the
IRB approach banks are using their own models to calculate the risk-weights
dynamically.
However, in 2008 the Great Recession hit the world’s financial system even
before the Basel II regulation was fully introduced. As a result, a new regulation
was negotiated in the face of Basel III in which the lessons from the crisis were on
top of mind and more stringent standards were adopted including higher capital
requirements and various capital buffers such as the Countercyclical Capital Buffer
(CCB). Nevertheless, regardless of the higher requirements or the time varying
buffers, the newly imposed regulation remains highly dependent on the underlying
way of measuring risk that is the IRB approach. In empirical studies, the latter has
1In bank regulation, the capital over risk-weighted assets ratio is simply referred to as capital-
asset ratio, while the ratio of capital over non-weighted assets is referred to as the leverage ratio.
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often been criticised for procyclical capital charges that can amplify the financial
cycle.1
So far, the theoretical general equilibrium literature has analysed macropru-
dential policy and in particular, capital-asset requirements without introducing
the current risk-sensitive approach imposed by regulation. For example, Ger-
ali et al. (2010) introduce capital requirements but regard the assets as equally
weighted with a weight of one - thereby corresponding to a leverage ratio. An-
gelini et al. (2014) study the interaction between capital requirements and mone-
tary policy. However, the latter paper introduces asset risk-weights for the capital
requirements according to an ad-hoc rule.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to introduce the IRB
approach in a general equilibrium framework. It does so by employing the model
developed in the previous chapter that features risky and defaulting loans to
households and firms. The presence of defaulting loans allows for the calculation
of asset risk-weights according to the IRB approach which uses the probability of
default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) for a specific type of asset.
It is important to note that, as a component of the regulatory capital-asset
ratio, assets risk-weights lead to variability in the capital requirements and hence
the tightness of banking regulation and banks’ incentive to extend certain types of
lending. As a result, failure to represent asset risk-weights realistically, inevitably
leads to failure of capturing the relationship between capital requirements and the
real economy and hence the impact of macroprudential policy.
After incorporating the current regulatory standards, the paper then proceeds
to the policy analysis. The compared policy settings are the following. Risk inde-
pendent capital requirements that reflect the current approach in the literature2
in which all risk-weights are constant and equal to one, leading to a leverage ra-
tio requirement. The IRB approach in which the risk-weights for each asset type
depend on its PD and LGD, representing current regulation. And finally, an alter-
native countercyclical macroprudential setting is introduced that sets risk-weights
for each type of lending based on sector specific measure of leverage.
The employed macro model also allows for realistic crisis scenarios which orig-
1See Markus et al. (2014), Goodhart et al. (2004) and Borio et al. (2001).
2See Gerali et al. (2010)
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inate from mortgage lending and transmit to the real economy. Being exposed
to risky loans, a higher than the expected default proportion of the portfolio
with lower than expected collateral value can lead to endogenous bank capital
destruction. The lower capital then leads to larger spreads and reduced lending
in order to comply with regulatory requirements. The tighter lending and higher
spreads in turn further increase default rates and depress collateral prices closing
the financial accelerator cycle.
The model parameters are estimated with Euro Area data and a historical
variance decomposition identifies the period of the 2008 recession as being subject
to shocks from the mortgage lending market leading to larger defaults.
The different policy settings are assessed in terms of their ability to stabilize
the economy in two different crisis scenarios originating from the mortgage mar-
ket. The first scenario represents the bust phase of the crisis in which a higher
than expected mortgage defaults destroy bank capital and subsequently tighter
lending conditions suppress all types of lending and transmit to the wider econ-
omy. The second scenario consists of a simulated boom and bust cycle achieved
through unrealized news shocks in the mortgage market. In the latter scenario, a
positive shock expected 4 periods in the feature to mortgages risk, causes lenders
to expect lower default rates and higher collateral prices thereby relaxing lending
conditions and spreads. This in turn leads to increase in leverage and booming col-
lateral prices. However, at period 4 expectations do not materialize and a higher
proportion of loans default than expected leading to bank capital destruction and
a crisis which is driven entirely by agents’ expectations.
Our results show that in both boom and bust phases of the crisis, the IRB ap-
proach leads to procyclical capital requirements. In the boom phase, the approach
leads to looser capital requirements and thereby to lending conditions that rein-
force market exuberance. In the bust phase, higher PD estimates lead to higher
risk-weights and tighter capital requirements that depress bank lending and slow
down on economic activity. The IRB approach therefore reinforces the financial
cycle in the event of a crisis.
By contrast, our macroprudential approach to setting risk-weights leads to
countercyclicality in capital requirements in both the boom and bust phases of
11
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the crisis – thereby serving to attenuate the financial cycle. As a result, the
negative impact of the financial crash to the real economy is smaller and the
recovery happens faster.
Finally, the leverage ratio policy setting keeps constant risk-weights equal to
one and thus does not vary capital requirements with the business cycle leading
to static policy. As a result, the impulse responses in both crisis scenarios lay in
between those of the procyclical IRB setting and the countercyclical macropru-
dential rule.
In order to assess the policies in terms of various shocks and the business cycle,
we also compare the second moments of major macroeconomic indicators as well
as a measure of social welfare. We find that relatively to the static policy setting
of the leverage ratio, the IRB setting of the risk-weights leads to higher variation
in the macroeconomic variables and lower social welfare. On the other hand, the
macroprudential rule smoothens the business cycle by decreasing the variation
in the variables and as a result leads to higher social welfare. Finally, a welfare
optimization over the parameters of the macroprudential rule clearly indicates
that the countercyclical response to leverage is welfare improving.
The intuition behind these results can be found by reflecting on the purpose
of regulatory capital requirements. Bank capital requirements are enforced with a
view to ensure that banks hold enough capital to cover the potential Unexpected
Losses (UL) associated with their assets. Expected Losses (EL) are to be covered
by bank provisioning and credit pricing. While EL are seen as everyday risk costs
of lending, UL are rare and large portfolio losses that arise in crisis circumstances.
By applying the IRB approach, we estimate the UL of each asset using the same
parameters that are used for estimating the EL in bank provisioning - the PD
and LGD. The IRB approach therefore leads to a positive relationship between
estimates of the EL and UL – thereby leading to procyclical capital requirements.
In a situation characterised by optimism in lending markets – the EL will be low,
and likewise the IRB approach will tend to estimate lower UL, resulting in lower
capital requirements. Conversely, the macroprudential rule relates UL to sectoral
measures of leverage – which will tend to make the UL move in the opposite
direction of EL and lead to countercyclical regulation.
12
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Analysing further current regulation, Basel III introduces the countercyclical
capital buffer (CCB) that allows regulators to require additional amount of capital
relative to the risk-weighted assets depending on the phase of the business cycle.
However, if risk weights lead to procyclicality in requirements this can negate the
effect of the CCB and make it useless.
Another advantage of the suggested approach is related to the research finding
of the previous chapter regarding policy broadness. In situations in which a certain
type of lending is seen as excessive and risky by policy makers, a broad tool such
as the CCB would affect all types of lending and thus harm productive investment.
However, the countercyclical risk-weights which respond to sectoral leverage can
increase the risk weight for mortgages while reduce the one for firms. As a result,
banks will have to hold relatively larger amount of capital for mortgages than for
firm loans which will in turn alter their incentives and relative costs of lending.
Our findings tend to support the view that there is room for improvement in the
current design of risk-based capital requirements, in particular regarding the IRB
approach. As the design of the financial framework evolves, an emphasis on less
procyclical mechanisms would be potentially beneficial for the sake of mitigating
the banking sector’s tendency to exacerbate the real economy impact of financial
shocks. The non-risk-based leverage ratio setup could be an improvement in this
regard. A macroprudential approach, which encourages banks to continue lending
in a recession and discourages banks from lending excessively in the boom phase
may be better still.
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Underestimating Portfolio Losses
The third chapter further explores financial frictions amplification channels but
does so by employing a different approach. The previous two chapters rely on
large scale general equilibrium models which can analyse the feedbacks between
different markets and financial regulation. However, the size of these models
comes at the cost of a linearly approximated solutions around the steady state.
While this method can provide reasonable results for simulating small shocks and
fluctuations, financial crises are characterized by major deviations in the behaviour
of agents and macroeconomic indicators from the one that is observed in normal
times, leading to inherently nonlinear economic relationships.1 Furthermore, the
presence of financial accelerators between asset returns, banks’ balance sheets,
lending contitions, and the real economy further reinforce such effects (Borio,
2012). As a result, macroprudential policy which aims to prevent and mitigate
crisis situations cannot be thoroughly analysed in a linearised model.
Reflecting on these conclusions, this paper focuses on a partial equilibrium
model that allows for nonlinear solution but at the same time incorporates the
crucial for the policy analysis accelerator effects. It does so by starting from the
foundation model of the Basel capital regulation and extending it by developing
its economic structure at several steps. Namely, the asymptotic single risk factor
(ASRF) framework is expanded by incorporating rational behaviour of borrowers,
banks, and investors.
The ASRF framework developed by Merton (1974) and Vasicek (2002) presents
bank lending as subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. While the former
can be insured, banks remain prone to the latter which introduces endogenously
the need of capital buffers to guard against the remaining single risk factor. Fur-
thermore, the simplified structure of the model enables nonlinear solution and
derivation of the portfolio loss distribution. In addition, the structure also allows
for closed form analytical solution which is particularly appealing to regulators
and policymakers which is why the Vasicek model is still employed by the Basel
regulation for capital requirements.2 On the other hand, the structure that allows
1See Milne (2009).
2The Vasicek formula is the cornerstone of bank capital regulation and is used for the
calculation of asset risk-weights in capital requirements. See (BCBS, 2005) and EU Capital
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for analytical solution comes at the cost of ignoring important agent behaviour
that enables the financial accelerator amplification which is well known in the gen-
eral equilibrium literature. We argue that the financial accelerator mechanisms
are crucial in such environment as they can amplify portfolio losses and their dis-
tribution which in turn should be taken into account by bank regulation in order
to quantify and guard against bank losses.
This paper bridges the gap between the literature of financial frictions and
portfolio value theory. It expands the former with aggregate risk for the expense
of the general equilibrium solution and the latter with economic structure and
behaviour for the expense of analytical solution. The paper presents a framework
that has been specifically designed to analyse the central role of banks and the
interaction of their behaviour with the one of borrowers and investors. As a re-
sult, the model incorporates important financial accelerator mechanisms between
borrowers’ net worth, banks’ balance sheets and risk premia which are crucial for
the analysis of bank regulation. Our representative bank is exposed to a large
portfolio of loans with diversifiable idiosyncratic risk due to portfolio size and
non-diversifiable aggregate risk.
First, by analysing optimal borrowers’ default choice, we derive a positive
relationship between the default rate of the portfolio and the loss-given-default
of each loan. The relationship arises due to the fact that in adverse aggregate
scenarios, the reason for the larger default rate is the cheaper collateral which
borrowers prefer to give up rather than repay the loan. As a result, not only that
more loans default but banks repossess cheaper collateral which increases their
losses in adverse scenarios leading to the first financial accelerator of this paper.
Second, by analysing the process of insurance of idiosyncratic risk by banks, we
derive a spread setting behaviour of lenders which creates a negative relationship
between borrowing costs and the net worth of borrowers. The relationship arises
due to the property of banks to set larger spreads to riskier portfolios with higher
loan-to-value. The higher interest rates in turn increase borrowers’ owed amount
and loan-to-value and thus make them riskier for the bank, leading to the second
financial accelerator of this paper.
Requirement Regulation IV - 2013.
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Finally, by deriving the loss distribution of the bank’s portfolio we analyse
the required risk premia by the investors of the bank, which leads to a positive
relationship between the costs of funding for the bank and the riskiness of its
portfolio. This leads to the third financial accelerator of this paper which also
interacts with the other two channels. For example, an increase of the riskiness of
the bank’s portfolio leads to higher costs of funding to the bank. The latter are
passed on to the borrowers as higher interest rates which increases their chance
of default. As a result, portfolio riskiness increases as well.
We track how the introduction of each of the three amplification mechanisms
affect the portfolio loss distribution - taken independently or all together. Our
results illustrate how ignoring of these channels can underestimate portfolio losses
and lead to insufficient capital requirements.
In our baseline calibration, the introduction of the accelerator effects leads to
an underestimation of the probability of default of a bank of a magnitude between
1.3 and 5.2 times, compared to the bank default probability under the Vasicek
loss distribution. This means that the presence of reinforcement effects leads to
substantially higher probability of bank default for the same level of capital or
conversely if banks want to achieve a certain probability of solvency they would
have to hold larger amounts of capital than previously thought.
While the results have important implications for bank capital regulation.
They also provide insight into optimal risk management, provisioning and risk
pricing by private banks that is consistent with the developing regulatory frame-
work.
Taking into account the currently developing regulation, this paper contributes
to the literature by being the first one to summarize bank capital requirements,
risk cost provisioning and risk pricing in a single framework consistent with the
current regulatory environment.
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Chapter I
The Reach of Macroprudential
Policy
Abstract
This paper compares different macroprudential tools in their ability to mitigate the
impact of a financial crisis originating from the housing market. For this purpose,
a financial frictions model is set-up featuring defaulting loans to both households
and firms. While banks are subject to capital requirement at their wholesale level,
each sector specific loan type is subject to a loan-to-value requirement.
We find that once the crisis has occurred and spread to the whole banking
sector, a dynamic capital-asset requirement can attenuate the transmission of the
crisis to the real economy. Although a dynamic LTV rule is not successful in the
aftermath of the crisis, a lower LTV limit prior to its occurrence can limit the
losses of mortgage lending before they spread to the whole banking system and
the real economy. In terms of welfare analysis, we find that an optimised capital-
asset rule is welfare improving, while the LTV setting is not.
JEL classifications: C68, E44, E58, E61, G21.
Keywords: macroprudential policy, banks, capital requirements, loan-to-value limits.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession which started with the burst of the US housing market
bubble established financial stability at the forefront of policy discussions. Over
optimism in the housing market lead to persistent increase in house prices which
induced relaxed lending standards by banks and substantial increase in subprime
mortgages that reinforced housing demand and prices. When the optimistic price
expectations failed to materialize and the bubble burst, many households faced a
situation in which their mortgages were larger than the value of the houses against
which they were underwritten. As a result, the rate of seriously delinquent mort-
gages1 increased from 2 percent in the third quarter of 2006 to 10 percent by the
first quarter of 2010. As a consequence, banks experienced increasing mortgage
default rates that led to higher collateral repossession rates with collateral values
much lower than the ones expected when the loans were made. This ultimately
lead to severe bank losses in the form of write downs of billions of dollars in
bad mortgages. These losses together with the high degree of interconnectedness
among financial institutions triggered severe liquidity crisis in the interbank mar-
ket. Apart from the default of several banks, interbank lending rates increased
which ultimately led to reduced access to credit by both households and firms.
At this stage, the crisis that started from the mortgage market spread to the
real sector where tightened credit conditions and falling house prices forced many
borrowers to deleverage and cut consumption and housing purchases.
Although the story of the crisis is complex and involves more than one type
of self-reinforcing mechanisms, at the core of the events above was a price bubble
and extensive lending in a specific market of the economy. Furthermore, the pe-
riod prior to the crisis and observed aftermath correspond to a strong empirical
evidence of extensive lending and high exposure to risk in the upswing of the busi-
ness cycle and a downturn characterized by high risk aversion and deleveraging.2
These movements of leverage often identified as the ”leverage cycle”3 involve a
well-known self-reinforcing channel between credit and asset prices. The collateral
1According to the National Delinquency Survey of the Mortgage Bankers Association, seri-
ously delinquent mortgages are those more than ninety days past due or in foreclosure.
2See Kannan et al. (2011), Borio and Lowe (2004) and IMF (2009).
3See Geanakoplos (2010).
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channel can be briefly described as an increase of individual’s ability to borrow
against collateral, following a rise in the collateral value. The increased ability
to borrow further increases the asset demand and price, closing the loop of the
channel. The risks of the cycle arise because after the credit expansion even a
small decrease in the asset price or in the default rate of borrowers can lead to a
reversal of the cycle and economy wide distress. ”Equity buffers might then prove
insufficient to absorb losses and banks may be forced to deleverage. The resulting
collective contraction in the supply of credit increases the likelihood of borrower
distress, potentially affecting the real economy adversely and amplifying banking
sector losses further.”(Bank of England, 2011). Moreover, the symptoms above
appear to be in the core of many financial crises: ”Excessive credit expansion,
often in the real estate sector, has characterised the build- up to most financial
crises in the past, from the Great Depression, to emerging market crises in Latin
America and East Asia, to recent crises in developed countries.”(Bank of England,
2011).
Perhaps this is why the crisis restated the debate over the detection of price
bubbles, the vulnerability of the financial sector, and the potential policy tools
that can lean against the financial cycles. Prior to the 2008 crisis, the general view
was that responding to fluctuations in asset prices or other financial variables was
potentially harmful due to the difficulty in detecting asset price bubbles in real
time (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001). Very often the difficulties with the identifica-
tion of a price bubble involve the ”emergence of seemingly plausible fundamental
arguments that seek to justify the dramatic rise in asset prices.” (Gelain et al.,
2013). Indeed, in a July 1, 2005 media interview, Ben Bernanke, argued that fun-
damental factors such as strong growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates,
demographics, and restricted supply were supporting U.S. house prices. In the
same interview, Bernanke stated his view that a substantial nationwide decline in
house prices was ”a pretty unlikely possibility” (Jurgilas and Lansing, 2013).
However, a growing amount of empirical work has found that large movements
in a number of observable variables such as credit, residential investment shares,
and current account deficits are reliable indicators of house price busts, which in
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turn are typically associated with substantial falls in output.1 These observations
signal that perhaps a countercyclical policy that reacts to such indicators could
mitigate the impact of the crisis or even prevent its occurrence. But what is the
right policy tool for this purpose?
The question of whether or not monetary policy should respond to financial
indicators such as asset prices has been numerously investigated and often received
opposite answers.2 There are two main criticisms of this approach. The first one
involves the ”broadness” of monetary policy, i.e. the concern that MP is too
blunt to address imbalances within the financial sector or overheating in a single
sector of the economy (housing market).3 The second caveat is the violation of the
Tinbergen principle, stating that: ”for each policy objective, at least one policy
instrument is needed” (Tinbergen, 1952), i.e. that having a single policy tool to be
responsible for more than one objective could lead to policy conflicts. In practise,
policymakers have rarely used MP for reacting to asset prices. As an exceptional
example, could be seen the case of Sweeden which in 2010 raised its interest rate
due to the concern of rapidly raising house prices, at the same time inflation
was already low which meant that the Riskbank was not responding to its main
objective. The impact of the policy was the triggering of deflation which had bad
consequences for the economy and for which the bank was heavily criticised.
Apart from the use of traditional policies, the nature of the Great Recession
has led major countries to carry out reforms in the financial regulatory bodies.
These reforms gave regulators mandate over financial stability with specific em-
phasis on systemic risk by using a set of Macroprudential tools. Amongst various
definitions, the main objective of macroprudential policy can be summarized as
to limit the accumulation of financial risks, in order to reduce the probability
and to mitigate the impact of a potential financial crash and to strengthen the
resilience of the financial system. Thus, purely by its objective, macroprudential
policy should be the right approach to lean against the credit cycles. However,
because of their recent availability the theoretical research which should suggest
the appropriate use of these new tools seems not yet developed: ”Analysis of the
1See Kannan et al. (2011), Borio and Lowe (2004) and IMF (2009).
2See Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Iacoviello (2005), Kannan
et al. (2009).
3See Quint and Rabanal (2014), Kohn (2013).
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proposals on macroprudential policies has generally lacked the sort of consistent
framework that would allow a structured approach. As a result, the process of
institutional reform is well ahead of its theoretical and practical underpinning,
and faces important challenges.” Angelini et al. (2014). Moreover, due to the
large set of macroprudential tools, the different propagation mechanisms of the
different instruments are even less researched. Thus, most of the existing papers
that feature such policy in a general equilibrium framework, focus on a single
macroprudential instrument.
Following the lessons of the Great Recession, and the urge for macroprudential
policy research by financial regulators, this paper aims to contribute to the debate
over the right policy tool to lean against the credit cycle by investigating the role of
different types of macroprudential instruments. The motivation of this approach
arises from the understanding that different policy tools have different broadness
of impact, depending on the level at which they enter the economy. An example of
this can be the central bank interest rate as a monetary policy tool which affects
the savings and borrowing returns/costs of the entire economy. On the other hand,
a macroprudential instrument such as the capital-asset requirement, enters the
economy at the level of the banking sector and hence is a more sophisticated tool
for responding to financial distress. This understanding is what usually supports
the claim that monetary policy is too blunt to address imbalances within the
financial sector or overheating in a single sector of the economy.
Taking the same concept further, we investigate whether some macroprudential
instruments can be too blunt to address problems in a specific financial sector
while others are more appropriate for this purpose. For example, as the capital-
asset requirement enters the economy at the bank level, a tighter requirement
will most likely tighten lending for all types of loans. On the other hand, a
loan-to-value requirement restricts the maximum borrowing amount for a given
collateral value and thus can be imposed on a specific type of lending such as
mortgages. Therefore, in a scenario of a housing market overheating, similar to
the one in Sweden, while monetary policy can decrease house prices it can also
deflate the entire economy. Alternatively, capital-asset requirements can lead to
higher borrowing costs thus reducing mortgage lending, but at the same time
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reducing lending to firms. Lastly, a tighter LTV limit can be imposed only on
mortgages and thus have even more sophisticated and direct effect.
Investigating the reach of different policies, the main question of this paper
is the following: If monetary policy is too blunt to address financial sector over-
heating then are certain macroprudential instruments too blunt to address a sin-
gle sector overheating? Or more specifically: If mortgages lending is increasing
rapidly should we use capital asset requirement which has the risk of affecting
lending to firms, or instead use a LTV requirement to mortgages specifically?
For answering this question a new Keynesian DSGE model is employed. As
we will see in the model section, the possibility to represent different levels of
impact of macroprudential policies requires a detailed banking sector with two
types of lending. The banking sector is set-up extending defaulting loans to both
households and firms against housing and capital collateral. In addition, while
banks are subject to capital requirement at their wholesale level, each sector spe-
cific loan type is subject to a LTV requirement. Apart from the model structure,
of equal importance is the origin of the financial distress that the policies will
aim to address. It is common in the literature that the crisis is represented as
an exogenous destruction of bank capital without modelling defaulting loans and
hence the source of destruction of bank capital. To enable a better representation
of bank crises and their origins our model employs defaulting loans set-up similar
to Quint and Rabanal (2014). We then simulate the main crisis scenario as an
exogenous increase in mortgage delinquencies which leads to a larger than the
expected default rate of mortgages and bank losses that are absorbed by bank
capital.
In order to investigate how the two macroprudential instruments affect the
transmission of the crisis, we first analyse the effects of the latter in three cases of
static requirements including a benchmark and permanently tighter capital-asset
and LTV requirement cases. Then we analyse the ability of dynamic policy rules
of the two instruments to improve welfare under various shocks.
Thus, apart from investigating whether an active setting of the policy instru-
ments can mitigate the consequence of the crisis scenario, we can also investigate
if a permanently tighter policies can reduce the impact of the crisis before its
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occurrence.
Our results show that although a tighter LTV limit prior to the crisis reduces
the exposure of the banking sector to higher loan defaults, it does so at the cost
of lower output. At the same time, a permanently tighter capital-asset require-
ment seems incapable of mitigating the impact of the financial distress. However,
once we consider optimal dynamic policy setting in terms of social welfare, we
find that an optimized capital-asset requirement can be successful in improving
welfare under various shocks and attenuate the transmission of the crisis to the
real sector in its aftermath. Apart from being less successful in improving welfare,
the dynamic LTV limit is also incapable of reducing the impact of the shock after
its occurrence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature and section 3 presents the model and its basic relationships. Section
4 compares the effects of permanently tighter static policies and then conducts
welfare analysis of dynamic policy rules. The final section concludes.
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2 Related Literature
The importance of the financial sector in economic models and its ability to am-
plify the business cycle has been well known since the seminal Bernanke et al.
(1999) ”financial accelerator” - BGG paper, featuring defaulting loans. An alter-
native approach to modelling financial frictions is the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
paper which instead of modelling defaulting loans explicitly, introduces a collateral
constraint that represents the relationship between collateral value and maximum
borrowing amount. The collateral constraint concept is then incorporated by Ia-
coviello (2005) where the collateral is housing which also enters the utility function
of households. The latter is also one of the papers that analyses the question if
monetary policy should respond to house prices finding only marginal and some-
what insignificant benefits of such policy setting. A similar result of interest rates
responding to asset prices is also obtained by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002).
Kannan et al. (2009), however, find that optimal monetary policy includes
reaction to asset prices or credit, this is also one of the first papers to include
macroprudential policy represented by a capital-asset requirement to banks, find-
ing that response of the instrument to credit growth can improve welfare.
Another closely related paper which analyses macroprudential policy is Quint
and Rabanal (2014) in which the authors use a BGG type of model featuring
defaulting loans and also extend their analysis to the open economy. The key
departure from Bernanke et al. (1999) is that the lending rate is predetermined
which makes lenders exposed to gains/losses from unexpected changes in collateral
prices or default rates. This feature is also employed in our model allowing the
transmission of unexpected occurrences in a specific type of lending to the whole
banking sector. The authors find that macroprudential policy using capital-asset
requirement has the potential to stabilize the economy above the reach of mone-
tary policy depending on the type of shock hitting the economy.
A similar paper featuring defaulting loans is the one by Forlati and Lambertini
(2011) who analyse how aggregate shocks affect the rate of default on mortgages
and how an increase in the rate of default on mortgages transmits to the rest of
the economy, emphasizing the role of this relationship in the core of the Great
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Recession.
In terms of structure of the banking sector, our model stands close to Ger-
ali et al. (2010) who employ a two-layer banking sector. The wholesale layer
maintains the capital position of the banking sector subject to a capital-asset re-
quirement and extends loans to the retail branches. At the retail level, each branch
carries out specific type of lending to households and firms against housing and
capital collateral.
Angelini et al. (2014) study the interaction between capital requirements and
monetary policy using the Gerali et al. (2010) model. The operational objectives of
macroprudential policy are introduced through an assumed loss function which the
policy rule aims to minimize. The authors find that the capital requirement setting
becomes beneficial when the economy is hit by financial rather than supply shocks
while the lack of cooperation between the two policies could lead to excessive
volatility of the instruments.
Lambertini et al. (2013) is one of the fewer papers that focus on LTV re-
quirement as a macroprudential instrument in a model with expectations-driven
business cycles. They find that by itself, monetary policy response to credit ag-
gregates improves welfare of all agents. On the other hand, when implementing
LTV policy, the optimal setting for borrowers and savers differ.
In a paper not employing general equilibrium analysis, Geanakoplos (2010)
illustrates how the equilibrium supply and demand of credit can determine the
collateral level (the reciprocal of the LTV) together with the interest rate. The
author argues that while interest rates have been viewed as the main variable
affecting borrowing, it is the collateral level required by lenders, which is of equal
if not greater importance (especially in times of crisis) than the cost of borrowing.
Furthermore, the author claims that if policymakers want to temper the devas-
tating consequences in the downturn of the leverage cycle it is the collateral level
that they should be managing and not the interest rate.
From the above papers, ours stands closest to Gerali et al. (2010) regarding
the structure of the banking sector. The main and crucial departure, however, is
that while in the former, the individual loan spreads arise due to interest rates
stickiness in our model they are present due to defaulting loans and the specific
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expected default rate of each type of loan. Furthermore, we employ predeter-
mined interest rates which make lenders exposed to gains/losses from unexpected
changes in collateral prices or default rates, allowing the transmission of unex-
pected occurrences in a specific type of lending to the whole banking sector.
As we will see, this structure allows for modelling of the crisis as originating
from the mortgage market, transmitting to the banking sector and then the rest
of the economy. Moreover, it allows for analysis of policy tools that enter the
economy at a different level of the transmission path of the crisis and assess their
ability to mitigate its impact. This to the best of our knowledge, makes the paper
one of the first to compare capital-asset and LTV requirements in model in which
bank capital is destroyed endogenously due to loan defaults. The next section
explains the model structure in detail.
3 The Model
3.1 Banks
The description starts from the banking sector as it is the one that includes the
most important features of the model. That is, a wholesale branch that obtains
deposits at the policy rate and then lends funds to retail branches as in Gerali
et al. (2010). The spread between the wholesale lending rate and deposit rate
arises due to the fact that the wholesale branch also manages the capital position
of the banking sector, while facing a quadratic cost for deviating from a capital-
asset macroprudential requirement. In addition, bank capital is accumulated out
of retained earnings and is used together with deposits to fund loans. At the
retail branch level, there are two branches that extend funds to households and
firms against housing and capital collateral respectively. In doing so, they use
a participation constraint as in Quint and Rabanal (2014) and require that the
expected average repossession and repayment amount of a loan equals the cost
of funds from the wholesale branch. Due to predetermined lending rates, retail
bankers have zero ex-ante profits, but it is possible that ex-post they may re-
alize profits/losses which are added/deducted from the wholesale bank capital.
In addition, retail branches face a macroprudential LTV limit which defines the
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maximum amount they can lend for a given collateral value. The mechanisms
which are created by the chosen model structure are analysed in the process.
3.2 The wholesale branch
The wholesale branch collects deposits D at the gross policy rate R which together
with the accumulated bank capital Kb is used to fund its loans B, leading to a
balance sheet identity:
Bt = Dt +K
b
t (3.1)
where the two sources of funding are perfect substitutes from the point of view
of the balance sheet. Bank capital is accumulated out of retained earnings:
Kbt = (1− δb)Kbt−1 + Πt (3.2)
where δb represents resources used up in managing bank capital and Πt is
the realized overall profits of all branches, including wholesale and the two retail
branches profits:
Πt = Π
ws
t + Π
h
t + Π
f
t (3.3)
The loans Bt are extended to the two retail branches at a gross interest rate
of Rb. The wholesale branch maximises profits taking into account a quadratic
cost whenever the capital-asset ratio Kbt /Bt deviates from an exogenous level νt
which represents regulatory capital requirement.1 Thus, the wholesale branch
maximizes:
maxE0
∞∑
i=0
Λ0,t
[
(Rbt − 1)Bt − (Rt − 1)Dt −
κb
2
(Kbt
Bt
− νb
)2
Kbt
]
(3.4)
by taking Rbt and Rt as given and choosing Dt and Bt, subject to the balance
sheet identity, leading to the following FOC:
1”The optimal leverage ratio in this context can be thought of as capturing the trade-offs
that would arise in the decision of how much own resources to hold, or alternatively as a simple
shortcut for studying the implications and costs of regulatory capital requirements.” (Gerali
et al., 2010)
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Rbt −Rt = κb
(
νb − K
b
t
Bt
)(Kbt
Bt
)2
(3.5)
which links the wholesale spread to the degree of leverage Bt/K
b
t , showing the
role of bank capital in determining loan supply conditions.
The LHS of the above equation represents the marginal benefit from increasing
lending (an increase in profits equal to the spread), while the RHS is the marginal
cost from doing so (an increase in the costs for deviating from νb). Therefore, the
wholesale branch chooses a level of loans which, at the margin, equalizes costs and
benefits of reducing the capital-assets ratio. In addition, equation (3.5) creates a
positive relationship between the wholesale spread and leverage. If we consider a
lower capital-asset ratio than the requirement
Kbt
Bt
< νb, it would be associated with
a higher amount of loans Bt for a given level of bank capital K
b
t and increased
costs for deviating from νb, hence a positive RHS of the equation above. The
branch would be willing to keep that level of Bt only as long as its marginal profit
increases by the same amount as the marginal cost, leading to positive LHS and
wholesale spread.
Equations (3.1) to (3.5) complete the wholesale branch. It is worth noting
at this stage the mechanisms which are incorporated with the equations so far.
Since bank capital is accumulated out of retained earnings, the model features
a feedback from the real to the financial side of the economy. If macroeconomic
conditions deteriorate and bank profits are negatively hit, this would also decrease
bank capital and hence, decrease the capital-asset ratio bellow the target, which
in turn would lead to higher lending rates and reduced lending that can further
worsen economic conditions. ”The model can thus potentially account for the type
of ”credit cycle” typically observed in recent recession episodes, with a weakening
real economy, a reduction of bank profits, a weakening of banks’ capital position
and the ensuing credit restriction.” (Gerali et al., 2010).
So far, the banking sector up to the wholesale branch is identical to Gerali
et al. (2010), in the next section, however, we will see that incorporating Quint
and Rabanal (2014) type of spreads for the two retail branches, introduces the
possibility for ex-post realized profits/losses of each branch based on unexpected
collateral price movements and leading to a loan default rate different than the one
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expected by retail branch. This would enable unexpected events in the markets
of the goods used as collateral to be passed from retail branch profits to aggregate
bank profits and to the capital position of the banking sector, which is very similar
to the role of the housing market at the beginning of the Great Recession.
This is a cruicial departure from Gerali et al. (2010) as in the latter the main
crisis scenario is represented by an exogenous destruction of bank capital at the
wholesale level. Our framework, however, allows for endogenous bank capital
destruction which originates from the individual loan markets due to larger than
expected loan default rate.
At this point it is also possible to note the different effect of monetary and
macroprudential capital-asset requirement. While restrictive monetary policy will
simply lead to an increase in the wholesale lending rate Rbt through equation (3.5),
the capital-asset requirement can actually affect the spread between the two rates.
3.3 The retail branches
The retail branches face endogenous loan defaults due to idiosyncratic shock to
the collateral value. This feature creates a good motivation for the existence and
operation of the retail branches. Since, when issuing loans to households and
firms, each branch takes into account the expected return in the events of default
and non-default of the loan. We can say that unlike the wholesale branch, each
retail branch has the specific expertise for each type of lending in evaluating the
relevant collateral and its expected price.
The operation of the two branches is identical with the difference that one
of them extends loans to impatient households against housing collateral and the
other to firms/entrepreneurs against capital collateral. Hence, if we denote lending
to household variables with I superscript and to firms with E, it would be the only
difference between the equations describing the lending by each branch, that is we
can express them in general form using j = {I, E} superscript. The exceptions
from this notation is that loans to households are against housing collateral so
that: hIt ≡ HIt at price qIt ≡ qht , and loans to firms are against capital collateral so
that: hEt ≡ KEt at price qEt ≡ qkt . Ex-ante expected and ex-post realized variables
are denoted with a and p superscripts respectively.
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The interest rate spread derivation is based on the original BGG financial
accelerator and more specifically on the Quint and Rabanal (2014) version of it
which has the main differences that:
• there are no agency problems or asymmetric information in the model
• borrowers will only default if they find themselves underwater (if the collat-
eral value is less than the loan repayment amount)
• the one-period lending rate is predetermined and does not depend on the
state of the economy
The predetermined interest rate is a realistic assumption due to the fact that
many of the loans (mortgages) are with fixed rates.1 An additional feature that
is common in the literature is that loan contracts are set in nominal terms and
thus higher inflation would deflate the real amount that borrowers repay.
An important feature of the BGG accelerator is the presence of loan default
risk due to the idiosyncratic shock ωt to the value of the collateral. The shock
is log-normally distributed with CDF F (ω), PDF f(ω) and mean E(ωt) = 1,
2 so
that there is idiosyncratic but not aggregate risk due to its presence. Because of
the specified default condition of borrowers (if underwater), the shock can lead
to mortgage defaults with its realization being known at the end of the period.
At period t, high enough realizations of ωt−1 will induce the borrower to repay
his loan in full: rjt−1B
j
t−1/pit, where r
j is the gross borrowing rate and Bj the
quantity borrowed. Low enough realizations will cause the borrower to default
and give up his collateral after the realization of the shock: ωjt−1q
j
th
j
t−1, where q
j
is the collateral price and hj is its stock. Thus the default condition for borrowers
becomes, repay loan if: rjt−1B
j
t−1/pit ≤ ωjt−1qjthjt−1 and default in the opposite case
(being underwater).
Then in period t, the cut-off value of ω¯jt−1, i.e. the ex-post realized threshold
value ω¯pt that separates borrowers that default and those that do not can be
expressed as: ω¯jt−1 ≡ ω¯pt = r
j
t−1B
j
t−1
qjth
j
t−1pit
.
1See Quint and Rabanal (2014).
2This implies that the log of ω is normally distributed: log(ωt) ∼ N(−σ
2
ω
2 , σ
2
ω).
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At period t, the retail branch extends loans at a fixed rate rjt without knowing
the exact value of the default threshold since it will also depend on period t + 1
collateral price qjt+1 and next period inflation, hence, it forms its ex-ante expected
threshold ω¯j,at value as:
ω¯j,at =
rjtB
j
t
E(pit+1q
j
t+1)h
j
t
(3.6)
which is also the expected LTV ratio by the retail branch for loan type j.
Unlike the wholesale branch, when granting credit, retail branches do not
maximize profits1 but simply require that the expected return from a unit of
credit equals the cost of funds (the rate at which the funds are obtained from the
wholesale branch rate Rb) , leading to the participation constraint:
Rbt = (1− µ)G(ω¯j,at , σjω)
Et(pit+1q
j
t+1)h
j
t
Bjt
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at , σjω))rjt (3.7)
where the two terms on the RHS of the constraint are respectively the expected
return in the case of default as the repossessed collateral and the expected return
in the case of non-default, as the repayment of the loan. The term G(ω¯j,at , σ
j
ω) =∫ ω¯j,at
0
ωdF (ω, σjω) is the expected value of the shock, conditional on the shock being
less than ω¯j,at ; and 1 − F (ω¯j,at , σjω) =
∫∞
ω¯j,at
f(ω, σjω)dω is the probability that the
shock exceeds the ex-ante threshold ω¯j,at , i.e. the probability of non-default.
2
Banks can repossess only 1 − µ of the collateral as the remainder is paid as a
collateral repossession costs which are then transferred to savers who own these
repossession agencies.
It is important to note that when granting credit and determining its rate rjt ,
the retail branch is concerned about the future value of the collateral as in the
case of default it is the one that will be repossessed. In addition, the formula
above leads to the possibility that although the branch has zero expected ex-ante
profits, ex-post it may realize profit or loss for a given unexpected collateral price
change, as we will see later.
1Although the retail branches do not maximize profits, since we consider each bank as
composed of one wholesale and two retail branches we can say that each bank operates under
monopolistic competition with profit maximization occurring at the wholesale level.
2For a shorthand the G and F ex-ante and ex-post functions of loan type j can be denoted
as: Ga,jt , G
p,j
t , F
a,j
t , F
a,j
t
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The next equation is the collateral constraint following Iacoviello (2005) which
restricts the maximum amount that the agent can borrow (principal plus interest)
for a given expected future collateral value qjt+1:
rjtB
j
t
pit+1
= mjtq
j
t+1h
j
t (3.8)
where, mjt is the macroprudential LTV requirement. The intuition behind this
constraint however differs from its standard interpretation in the literature.
Firstly, Iacoviello (2005) motivates the constraint as due to the lender’s ability
to reposes only mjt of the collateral value in the event of default, paying the
remaining (1−mt) of it as transaction costs. Hence, the lender would not lend a
higher amount of funds than mjt . However, in our model the amount repossessed
by banks in the event of default is 1−µ of the collateral and is not necessarily equal
to mt. Instead, when adding the collateral constraint to the BGG interest rate
spread, we can think of it as macroprudential policy rule imposed by policymakers
and thus mt is the LTV limit - the maximum amount that the agent can borrow
for a given future collateral value.
In other words, in the original motivation of the collateral constraint the LTV
limit mjt serves as a proxy of default risk when loans defaults are modelled im-
plicitly. Hence, once we model loan defaults explicitly, the original form of the
constraint loses its original meaning. While in the Iacoviello scenario, the lender
would not lend more than mjt due to some default risk and repossession costs,
our participation constraint tells us that the lender would be willing to lend more
in return for a higher lending rate. Instead what limits borrowing in our case is
exogenous macroprudential requirement in the form of a borrowing limit.1
It is assumed that due to the high impatience to consume, hence incentive
to borrow by borrowers, the collateral constraint will always bind and hold with
equality.
1The form of the constraint in 3.8 involves the assumption that when restricting borrowing
for a future collateral value, regulators are able to form rational expectations of the latter. As
alternative, we relaxed this assumption by using a current value constraint. This however lead
to instability unless the mjt is set as to take into account future price movements, which is
essentially equivalent to the future form of the constraint.
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3.4 Equations Summary
Before continuing with the rest of the model it would be beneficial to summarize
the relationship behind the above lending structure. Firstly, the ex-ante expected
default threshold (3.6) and the participation constraint (3.7) create a relationship
for the interest rate spread for the j loan type wrt. the wholesale lending rate in
the form:
rjt
Rbt
=
1
(1−µ)G(ω¯j,at ,σjω)
ω¯j,at
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at , σjω))
(3.9)
Then, due to the properties of the log-normal distribution when Et(ω) = 1,
it can be shown that the denominator of the RHS is a decreasing function of the
ex-ante threshold ω¯j,at and hence, the spread becomes an increasing function of
it.1
rjt
Rbt
= f(ω¯j,at ) (3.10)
where f ′(ωat ) > 0. The intuition behind this relationship is that for a larger
expected LTV ratio (RHS of equation (3.6)) due to the default condition of bor-
rowers (if underwater), a larger proportion of them is expected to default, and
hence the ex-ante threshold increases (LHS of equation (3.6)). Then since the
threshold separates the defaulting from non-defaulting loans, the bank would ex-
pect a larger default area and smaller non-default area given by (1−F (ω¯at , σω)). In
order to compensate for the larger expected defaults, the retail branches increase
the loan rate rjt , which is their payoff in the non-default case.
In addition, the collateral constraint fixes the expected ex-ante threshold at
the level of the LTV limit:
ω¯j,at = m
j
t (3.11)
hence a higher LTV requirement (increased amount of borrowing for a given
expected future collateral value - looser policy) would cause the expected default
threshold to increase. The intuition here is that since the collateral constraint is
1See appendix 6.1
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always binding, the borrowers would always borrow up to the maximum amount
allowed by the LTV limit mjt . Hence a larger m
j
t would increase the amount
of borrowing bjt for a given future expected collateral value q
j
t . Everything else
equal, the larger borrowing would lead to higher expected default threshold as
larger proportion of the possible ω realizations would lead to borrowers being
under water and default.
Moreover, from equation (3.10) it follows that this relationship will be passed
on to the spread, leading to:
rjt
Rbt
= f
(
mjt
)
, f ′
(
mjt
)
> 0 (3.12)
In summary, a higher LTV limit (looser macroprudential policy) would cause
the expected default threshold to increase, leading to an increased expected default
area to which the retail branches will respond by increasing their spread.
This also means that by being able to set mjt the macroprudential regulator
has perfect control over the loan type j spread from the wholesale lending rate Rbt .
Thus, just like the capital-asset requirement has control over the spread between
deposits and wholesale loans Rbt − Rt, the LTV requirement of loan type j has
control over the spread between the final loan rate rjt and the wholesale one R
b
t .
It is important to emphasize that unlike the capital-asset requirement which
affects directly only the wholesale spread, the LTV limit is a borrowing constraint
which affects directly borrowers’ consumption and housing/capital investment de-
cisions. Interestingly, if we focus solely on the effect of the LTV on retail spreads,
the negative relationship implies that if the regulators want to increase the spread
they have to allow banks to lend at higher LTV. Our experiments show that the
effect of the LTV constraint on households is much stronger than the one on the
spread. Hence a tighter LTV would reduce borrowing although it would also lead
to lower spread. In that case, we may think of the relationship of equation (3.12)
as illustrating that apart from restricting lending to households, a lower LTV
would also cause a lower spread.
In terms of broadness of the two macroprudential instruments, we can now see
that, a change in the capital-asset requirement, ceteris paribus, would lead to a
change of both loan rates, while a change in the LTV requirement of loan type j,
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mjt can target and affect only its lending rate r
j
t and the borrowing constraint of
agent type j.
In period t, as current collateral prices qjt become known, the ex-post realized
default threshold ω¯j,pt becomes known as well:
ω¯j,pt =
rjt−1B
j
t−1
pitq
j
th
j
t−1
(3.13)
As long as the expectations of the present collateral price from the last period
are equal to its present price Et−1(q
j
t ) = q
j
t , from equations (3.6) and (3.13), it
follows that the ex-ante expected threshold from the last period will be equal to
the realized ex-post threshold of the current period ω¯j,at−1 = ω¯
j,p
t , leading to equal
ex-ante and ex-post G and F functions and zero profits guaranteed by the par-
ticipation constraint. In other words, as long as the collateral prices are the ones
expected, the realized threshold separating the defaulting from non-defaulting
loans would be the one expected in the previous period by the bank when setting
its lending rate. And in turn, the realized loan default rate and value of repos-
sessed collateral will also be equal to the ones expected in the previous period. For
any unexpected collateral price change the equality between all ex-ante variables
from last period and the realized ex-post variables from the current period would
not hold and the branch j profits will be given by:
Πjt = (1− µ)G(ω¯j,pt , σjωj)qjthjt−1pit + (1− F (ω¯j,pt , σjωj))rjt−1Bjt−1 −Rbt−1Bjt−1 (3.14)
calculated as the average repossession value of collateral for the defaulted loans,
plus the loan repayment of non-defaulted loans, minus the cost of funds for the
bank. In fact, it can be shown that the profits of each branch are a function
of the difference between last period’s ex-ante expected and current period’s ex-
post realized thresholds,1 such that when the two thresholds are equal, profits are
zero and when the ex-post is smaller (smaller proportion of loans default than
expected) profits are positive:
1See appendix 6.2
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Πjt = f(ω¯
j,a
t−1 − ω¯j,pt ), f ′() > 0 (3.15)
Retail branches’ profits/losses are then added/subtracted to the wholesale
bank capital which in turn affects the wholesale lending rate. This creates a
propagation mechanism from unexpected collateral price movements in a specific
loan type to the capital position of the whole banking sector. The latter also allows
for spillover effects between the two loan markets. For example, if house prices de-
cline and increase household defaults, the household lending branch would realize
losses which would decrease the wholesale bank capital. This in turn would cause
the wholesale capital-asset ratio to deviate from the requirement for which the
wholesale branch would respond by increasing its lending rate through equation
(3.5) that will ultimately increase the borrowing costs for firms.
Moreover, by using equation (3.11) for ωj,at−1 then expressing similarly ω
j,p
t it
can be shown that bank profits depend on the LTV limit:1
Πjt = f
(
mjt−1
(
qjt − Et−1qjt
qjt
))
, f ′() > 0 (3.16)
Therefore, for a given lower collateral price than expected qjt < Et−1q
j
t and
hence larger default threshold, the loss that the retail branch would suffer would
be higher for a higher LTV requirement. This could be explained with the fact
that while profits can be represented as the difference between the expected default
threshold and the realized one, the LTV requirement has the ability to limit both
thresholds and hence the difference between expectations and reality in the event
of a shock. Moreover, this feature shows that apart from being able to affect loan
specific spreads and borrowing constraint, the LTV requirement can also affect
the exposure of a retail branch to unexpected events in the collateral market. We
will see later in the simulations section that the capital-asset requirement does
not have this feature.
1In fact, differences between expected and realized inflation also enters (3.16) and can lead
to non-zero profits. In addition, changes of the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock
can also lead to losses due to higher than the expected defaults.
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3.5 Savers
Each saver (or patient household) i maximizes expected lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βP )t
[
(1−αp)εct log(CPt (i)−αPCPt−1)+εht log(HPt (i))−
(LPt (i))
1+φ
1 + φ
]
(3.17)
which depends on current individual (and lagged aggregate) consumption CPt ,
housing HPt and hours worked L
P
t . Pre-multiplying by the habit coefficient α
P
offsets the impact of the external habits on the steady-state marginal utility of
consumption. The last term is labour disutility where φ denotes the inverse elas-
ticity of labour supply. There are two preference shocks εct affecting the marginal
utility of consumption, and εht the marginal utility of housing.
Budget constraint in real terms:
CPt (i) + q
h
t ∆H
P
t (i) +Dt(i) = W
P
t L
P
t (i) +
Rt−1Dt−1(i)
pit
+ Tt(i) (3.18)
which includes current consumption, accumulation of housing (with real house
price qht ), and real deposits Dt. The income side consist of wage earnings WtL
P
t
(where Wt is the real wage), gross interest income from last period deposits
Rt−1Dt−1/pit (where pit = Pt/Pt−1 is gross inflation and Rt−1 is the gross interest
rate on deposits), and transfers Tt which include profits from intermediate goods
producers, and from debt repossession agencies.
3.6 Borrowers
Borrowers (or impatient households) differ from savers in several aspects. Firstly,
their discount factor is smaller than the one of savers (βI < βP ) which means that
they are more impatient to consume. In particular, due to their impatience, in
equilibrium, savers are willing to accumulate assets as deposits, and borrowers are
willing to offer their housing wealth as collateral to obtain credit. Second, they
don’t earn profits from goods producers and debt repossession agencies. Lastly,
they are subject to a quality ωj shock to the value of their housing stock which
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leads to loan default for some of them (explained in detail in the banking sector).
Analogously from savers each borrower i, maximizes expected lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t
[
(1−αI)εct log(CIt (i)−αICIt−1) + εht log(HIt (i))−
(LIt (i))
1+φ
1 + φ
]
(3.19)
where all variables and parameters with the superscript I denote that they are
specific to borrowers.
The budget constraint for borrowers differs among those who default and those
who repay their loans in full. Hence, aggregating borrowers’ budget constraints
and dropping the i superscripts, we obtain the following:
CIt +q
h
t ∆H
I
t +q
h
tH
I
t−1G(ω¯
p,I
t , σ
I
ω)+
(1− F (ω¯p,It , σIω))rIt−1BIt−1
pit
= BIt +W
I
t L
I
t (3.20)
ω¯p,It =
rIt−1B
I
t−1
qhtH
I
t−1
(3.21)
where the last to terms on the LHS are average repossessed value of collateral
of those who default, and repayment of credit of those who don’t default.1 The
latter terms are calculated using the ex-post realized threshold separating default-
ing from non-defaulting households ω¯p,It . When obtaining mortgages, borrowers
are subject to a collateral constraint which is imposed by the macroprudential au-
thority and limits the amount of funds they can borrow for a given future expected
collateral value according to a LTV requirement:
rItB
I
t
pit+1
≤ mht qht+1HIt (3.22)
The constraint does not have the purpose to ensure that expected value of
housing stock can guarantee repayment of debt and interest. In our case the
1Since those terms arise from the aggregated budget constraint and not from the individual
one, we assume that the individual agent does not take into account the probability of not
repaying the loan tomorrow when borrowing today. Similarly we assume that the agent does
not consider the probability to default tomorrow when choosing collateral stock today. This is
represented by not differentiating those terms wrt. BI and HI in the FOC. A similar assumption
is made for entrepreneurs. See appendix 6.3
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repayment is guaranteed by the retail banks participation constraint. Thus, the
purpose of our constraint is solely regulatory limitation on borrowing.
3.7 Enterpreneurs
Or firm (i) is concerned only about deviations of his own consumption CEt (i) from
aggregate lagged group habits (parameterized by αE) and maximizes the sum of
utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t
[
(1− αE)log(CEt (i)− αECEt−1)
]
(3.23)
by choosing consumption CEt , physical capital K
E
t , loans from banks B
E
t ,
degree of capital utilization, and labour inputs from patient and impatient house-
holds LPt , L
I
t . Just like borrower households, entrepreneurs also have higher impa-
tience to consume which makes them net borrowers willing to pledge the capital
used for production as a collateral. Since their budget constraint differs between
those that default and those that do not, by aggregating over them and dropping
the individual subscript we obtain the following budget constraint:
CEt +W
P
t L
P
t +W
I
t L
I
t +
(1− F (ω¯E,pt , σEωE))rEt−1BEt−1
pit
+
qkt [K
E
t − (1− δ)KEt−1] + qktKEt−1G(ω¯E,pt , σEωE) =
Y Et
Xt
+BEt
(3.24)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, qkt is the price of capital and
PWt /Pt = 1/Xt is the relative competitive price of wholesale good Y
E
t produced
according to the technology.
Y Et = A
E
t K
E
t−1
α
LEt
1−α
(3.25)
with AEt being stochastic productivity shock. Aggregate labour L
E
t is combined
from the labour of both types of households: LEt = (L
E,P
t )
ν(LE,It )
1−ν where ν
measures the labour income share of patient households.1
Due to their high impatience, entrepreneurs also become net borrowers, how-
1See Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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ever, they use capital as a collateral. Hence the LTV limit imposed on firm loans
by the macroprudential authority restricts the borrowed amount for a given ex-
pected future capital collateral value:
rEt B
E
t
pit+1
≤ mft qkt+1KEt (3.26)
where mft is the LTV limit set on loans to firms.
3.8 Capital Producers
Capital producers are simply a modelling device used to derive the price of cap-
ital. Being perfectly competitive, they buy last-period undepreciated capital
(1 − δ)Kt−1 at price Qkt (nominal price of capital) from entrepreneurs (owners
of these firms) and It units of final goods from retailers at price Pt. With these
inputs the accumulation of capital can be expressed as: ∆x¯t = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1.
The new stock of effective capital x¯t is sold back to entrepreneurs at price Q
k
t .
In addition, the transformation of the final good into new capital is subject to
adjustment costs. Thus capital producers choose x¯t and It to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛE0,t(q
k
t ∆x¯t − It) (3.27)
subject to the following constraint:
x¯t = x¯t−1 +
[
1− κi
2
(
Itε
qk
t
It−1
− 1
)2]
It (3.28)
where κi is the adjustment cost of capital transformation, ε
qk
t is a shock to the
efficiency of investment, and qkt =
Qkt
Pt
is the real price of capital.
3.9 Retailers
We follow Bernanke et al. (1999) regarding the structure of the retail goods mar-
ket which is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Retail prices are sticky
and being indexed to a combination of past and steady-state inflation, with rel-
ative weights parameterized by ıp. If retailers want to change prices beyond this
indexation allowance, they face a quadratic adjustment cost parametrised by κp.
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Thus retailer i chooses Pt(i) to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
[
Pt(i)Yt(i)− PWt Yt(i)−
κp
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− piipt−1pi1−ip
)2
PtYt
]
(3.29)
where, pi is steady state inflation, subject to the demand derived from con-
sumers’ maximization: Yt(i) = (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
y
t Yt, where ε
y
t is a stochastic demand price
elasticity.
3.10 Monetary Policy and market clearing
We assume that the central bank sets the deposit interest rate according to the
following Taylor rule:
Rt = (R)
(1−φR)(Rt−1)φR
(pit
pi
)φpi(1−φR)( Yt
Yt−1
)φY (1−φR)
εrt (3.30)
where φpi and φY are the weights to inflation and output, R is the steady state
policy rate and εr is the monetary policy shock.
Finally, employing housing market clearing with fixed supply implies:
H¯t = H
P
t +H
I
t (3.31)
3.11 Macroprudential Policy
Following Angelini et al. (2014), we assume that macroprudential regulators set
dynamically the capital-asset requirement for the banking sector according to the
following rule:
νbt = (ν¯
b)(1−ρν)(νbt−1)
ρν
(
Bt/Yt
B¯/Y¯
)(1−ρν)χν
(3.32)
where ν¯b is the steady state value of νb. We assume that the regulator adjusts
the requirements only in response to movements in the loans-to-output ratio,
which is in line with the prescriptions of the Basel III regulation. Hence, a positive
χν corresponds to a leaning-against-the-wind policy, i.e. when leverage is above
its steady-state capital requirements are increased to temper the financial cycle.
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LTV limits, on the other hand, are present in much fewer models than the
capital-asset requirements. Hence, in defining the measures to which this policy
is responding, we focus on market specific indicators which are usually associ-
ated with credit fuelled price bubbles. Similarly to the capital-asset requirement
and following the LTV setting in Lambertini et al. (2013), we assume that the
macroprudential regulator sets the LTV of loan type j according to:
mjt = (m¯
j)(1−ρm)(mjt−1)
ρm
(
xjt
xjt−1
)(1−ρm)χx
(3.33)
where m¯j is the steady-state LTV and for the variable xj = {qj, Bj} we in-
vestigate two possibilities in which the rule responds to either collateral prices
or leverage of the specific loan type j. The motivation behind the response of
this requirement to specific loan type j indicators reflects the more sophisticated
purpose and reach of this tool. Hence, a LTV requirement for mortgages would
respond to changes of house prices or mortgage lending relative to output, where
a negative χx coefficient represents a countercyclical LTV setting.
3.12 Calibration
Since the goal of our model is mainly qualitative, we calibrate it in line with
the existing literature and the models with closest set-up: Gerali et al. (2010)
and Quint and Rabanal (2014) which are calibrated and estimated in-line with
the Euro area data. Table (3.1) reports the values of the model parameters. The
model is calibrated so that a time period represents a quarter. We set the discount
factor of patient households to 0.9943 which pins down a quarterly steady-state
deposit (policy) interest rate of 0.57 percent (or 2.3 percent annualized). For
impatient households, we set the discount factor to 0.975 as in Iacoviello (2005).
For the LTV steady-state ratios, we set the one to households mh to 0.7 and to
firms mf to 0.35 as in Gerali et al. (2010). In the steady-state, the later two
values together with the standard deviations of the idiosyncratic shock σ¯jω, pin
down the default rates of loan type j i.e. loans to households and firms. Hence,
similarly to Quint and Rabanal (2014), we set the standard deviations in order to
match the average default rates of the two types of loans for the Euro area. Thus
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a σ¯hω = 0.17 gives a default rate of mortgages of 2.5 percent and σ¯
f
ω = 0.50 gives a
default rate of firm loans of 3.3 percent. Since the LTV’s are also the steady state
default thresholds, following the participation constraint (3.7), the chosen values
so far give us the quarterly borrowing rates of households and firms of rI = 1.2
and rI = 1.7 percent respectively (4.9 and 7 percent annualized). The collateral
repossession fees µ are set to 0.2 of the collateral value.
Table 3.1: Callibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
βP patient households discount factor 0.9943
βI , βE impatient households and firms discount factor 0.975
φ inverse Frisch elasticity 1
α capital share in the production function 0.25
δ capital depreciation rate 0.025
Y 
Y
Y −1 markup in the goods market 6
mI households LTV ratio 0.7
mE firms LTV ratio 0.35
σIω stdev of households’ idiosyncratic shock 0.17
σEω stdev of households’ idiosyncratic shock 0.50
δb bank capital depreciation rate 0.0057
µ collateral repossession cost 0.2
νb capital-asset requirement 0.09
κb bank capital adjustment cost 10
κi investment adjustment cost 4.1417
κp retail price adjustment cost 33.1332
φR TR AR coefficient on R 0.9331
φpi TR responsiveness to inflation 2
φY TR responsiveness to output 0.24
We set the physical capital share in the production function α to be 0.25 with
a depreciation rate δ of 0.025 and the wage share of patient households ν to 0.8 .
At the wholesale bank level, we set the bank capital depreciation rate δb = 0.0057
such as to ensure a steady-state capital-asset ratio of 9 percent according to the
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Basel accords.
Regarding the shock processes in our model we follow Gerali et al. (2010) by
assuming AR(1) forms for all of them except for the monetary shock, using the
coefficients and standard deviations of the shocks estimated by the authors.
Table 3.2: Shock Processes
Parameter Description Value
ρy retail price mark-up 0.306
σy retail price mark-up 0.634
ρk capital quality shock 0.543
σk capital quality shock 0.019
ρh housing preferences 0.917
σh housing preferences 0.039
ρc consumption preference 0.396
σc consumption preference 0.027
ρA technology 0.936
σA technology 0.004
σr monetary policy 0.0057
σσh shock to std of idiosyncratic shock to households 0.11
ρσh shock to std of idiosyncratic shock to households 0.3
σσe shock to std of idiosyncratic shock to firms 0.11
ρσe shock to std of idiosyncratic shock to firms 0.3
4 Simulations
4.1 Banking sector vulnerability
Before considering optimal policy, it is useful to see if the two macroprudential
instruments have indeed the ability to influence the economy in the event of a crisis
and observe their transmission channels. The main crisis scenario is an increase of
the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock in the mortgage lending market
as in Forlati and Lambertini (2011), which can be thought as representing entering
of sub-prime mortgages into the market.
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For the same crisis scenario, we will compare a static benchmark with two
different static macroprudential policies, that is a tighter LTV requirement for
lending to households and a tighter capital-asset requirement for the whole bank-
ing sector. Although these policies are static and the amount of tightening of each
instrument is arbitrary, the comparison can serve as an example of the different
transmission channels and effects of the two. Firstly, as a benchmark we will con-
sider a LTV limit of mortgages of m¯h = 0.7 which is consistent as the EU averages
prior to the crisis and a capital-asset requirement of ν¯b = 0.09 which is consistent
with the Basel requirements. Then the two alternative policies would represent a
tighter LTV limit m¯h = 0.65 for the same capital requirement and a larger capital
requirement ν¯b = 0.11 for the same LTV limit. In the former case, households
would be less leveraged while in the latter the whole banking sector. For all three
cases, we will consider an increase from the steady state of the standard deviation
of the idiosyncratic shock to mortgages. The size of the shock is chosen as to
ensure an increase of the default rate of mortgages from 2.5% to 10.5% which is
consistent with the increase of mortgage defaults in the US with the start of the
crisis. In all simulations we keep the LTV to firms fixed at m¯f = 0.35.
Before comparing the three cases, figure 4.1 presents the responses to the shock
in the benchmark setting: m¯h = 0.7, ν¯b = 0.09. An increase in the standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic shock, essentially fattens the tails of the log-normal
distribution, thus for the same default threshold ωp a higher standard deviation
implies higher cumulative distribution function and therefore higher default rates
on mortgages.
The lower row of the figure presents the starting point of the crisis scenario.
On the impact of the shock, the default rate on mortgages increases rapidly to
8% above its steady state. The predetermined lending rates lead to bank losses,
since the retail bank which lends to households suffers higher default rates than
the ones expected when the interest rate was determined. Even though the shock
continues to propagate and the default rate reduces slowly, due to the rational
expectations employed, the retail bank now expects this and raises the interest
rate to households. As a consequence, the bank does not suffer losses in any other
period apart from the surprise moment of the shock. However, the aftermath of the
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bank losses continues for much longer. As the losses are absorbed by bank capital,
the latter falls immediately. The crisis is now transmitted to the wholesale level of
the banking sector. There, the endogenous destruction of bank capital reduces the
capital-asset ratio above the requirement. As we saw from equation (3.5), to the
former event the wholesale branch responds by increasing the wholesale lending
rate Rb in attempt to decrease assets and recapitalize to meet the requirement.
As both retail spreads are imposed on top of the wholesale spread, both interest
rates to households and firms increase sharply. As a result, aggregate borrowing
falls together with investment and consumption by both impatient households and
firms leading to a persistent fall in output. Thus, the shock which originated from
the mortgage lending propagated though the banking sector tightening borrowing
conditions to all types of lending and finally reached the real sector.
What we fail to represent here is the magnitude of the contraction in output
and the observed counterfactual initial increase in consumption. Several factors
are responsible for this. Firstly, under the assumptions of our model no collateral
is lost due to default. In fact, the big winners from the higher defaults are savers
as they own the collateral repossession agencies. Due to this the latter experience
an income effect with the higher defaults to which they respond by higher saving,
consumption and housing demand. The increase in consumption by savers and
gradual decrease in consumption by borrowers prevents aggregate consumption
from falling initially which also leads to inflation. Due to this, our recession
becomes mainly disinvestment driven. A second factor is the assumption that
after default the borrowers keep the collateral and simply make a transaction
of its amount. This prevents from observing the fire sales effect after higher
sales of repossessed collateral which would put downward pressure on its price.
Both of these assumptions are inherited from Quint and Rabanal (2014) and
we decided to keep them for the sake of simplicity and comparability with the
related literature. Nevertheless, the ultimate effect of these features on the model
is an underestimation of the cost of defaults for borrowers and relaxing those
assumptions would be a good direction of future research.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse response to an AR shock to σhω
All variables are in percentage deviation from the steady-state except from those that are already in percent. One period
corresponds to one quarter. The shock follows an AR(1) process in logs with coefficient of 0.3
We should also note that the magnitude of our results is very sensitive to the
parametrisation of the model, nevertheless the direction of the responses and the
transmission channels remain robust. Therefore, although the model may not
be able to represent quantitatively realistic scenario, it can still fulfil its main
goal to qualitatively compare the different transmission mechanisms of the two
macroprudential instruments.
Figure 4.2 compares the same scenario of our benchmark static policy setting
from above with a tighter LTV limit m¯h = 0.65 for the same capital requirement
and a larger capital requirement ν¯b = 0.11 for the same LTV limit.
Before reporting the results, we should note that the lower LTV limit leads to
lower steady-states of the default threshold and hence the default rate of house-
holds. The latter also leads to lower steady-states of the interest rate on mortgages
and lower output, due to the tighter lending requirement. The higher capital-asset
requirement leads to higher steady-state bank capital. These differences in the
steady-states force us to report the results in absolute values and levels (not in
deviation from steady-state).
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Figure 4.2: Impulse response to an AR shock to σhω
All variables are in absolute values and levels. One period corresponds to one quarter. The shock follows an AR(1) process in
logs with coefficient of 0.3
In comparison of the two LTV settings (black and red lines), we notice the
following. The bottom row of the figure reveals what became evident in equation
(3.16). Apart from the fact that the lower LTV leads to lower steady-state default
threshold and hence default rate, it also leads to lower exposure of the banking
system to unexpected increases in the default rate. This can be seen in the bottom
left corner, as the mh = 0.65 LTV not only leads to 1% steady-state default rate,
but the jump in the latter due to the shock is approximately from 1% to 5%. At
the same time, regardless of the capital-asset requirement in both mh = 0.7 LTV
cases the default rate jumps from 2.5% to 10.5% approximately. In the lower
middle graph, we can see that these larger increases in the default rate of the
higher LTV cases also lead to higher losses which then lead to larger amount of
bank capital destroyed. As the low LTV case gives lowest bank capital destruction,
in that setting the increase in the wholesale lending rate and consequently retail
rates are the lowest observed. This is turn leads to much lower disturbance of
output consumption and investment from their steady-state. However, the ability
of the lower LTV to mitigate the impact of the crisis does not come at no cost.
Indeed, in that setting both consumption and investment steady-states are lower
which in turn leads to lower output. Hence, tighter LTV faces a trade-off between
lower output volatility and permanently lower output in the event of a financial
shock.
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In comparison of the two asset-requirement settings (black and green lines),
we notice the following. In the higher capital-asset requirement setting there are
no differences in the steady states of the reported variables with the benchmark
case apart from the higher bank capital. Consequently, the increase in default
rates and the amount of bank losses are identical, hence leading to equal amount
of bank capital destroyed. This in turn leads to equal decrease of the capital-asset
ratio but bellow different values of the requirement. Hence from equation (3.5),
it follows that in case of stricter capital-asset requirement the banking sector will
face higher quadratic costs for the same amount of deviation. To this the sector
responds by higher wholesale lending rate. The higher wholesale rate increases
the borrowing rates for both types of loans and worsen the economic contraction
further. Of course, this result is highly sensitive to the assumed quadratic costs for
deviating from the requirement. Nevertheless, this does not change the inability
of higher capital requirements to mitigate the impact of the crisis.
These results also give us a clue of the potential dynamic policy rules that
can attenuate the financial shock. For example, once the crisis has reached the
wholesale banking sector a reduction of the capital-asset requirement would lead
to lower increase of the wholesale lending rate and contraction of output. But
how should these policy rules be chosen? This is what we investigate next.
4.2 Optimal Policy
So far, we saw that different static settings of the macroprudential instruments
can have influence on the impact and transmission of a financial shock. Now we
consider a dynamic setting of these instruments according to the proposed rules
(3.33). Regarding the objective of such rules, the related literature employs two
different approaches. The first one assumes ad-hoc loss function including the
variances of the instrument and variables such as output and debt. Then the
parameters of the policy rules are set such as to minimize the chosen function.
The main caveat of this approach is the lack of derivation of the loss function and
the weights of the different variances in it. Furthermore, the chosen optimization
is conditional on a specific type of shock.
Therefore, we chose the alternative approach of welfare optimization. In doing
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so, we follow the standard approach in the DSGE literature. The welfare of each
agent j = {P, I, E} is given by the expected discounted sum of lifetime utility:
Ωjt = maxEt
[ ∞∑
i=0
(βj)iU(Cjt+i, H
j
t+i, L
j
t+i)
]
(4.1)
which at the optimum has the following Bellman form:
Ωjt = U(C
j
t , H
j
t , L
j
t) + β
jΩjt+1 (4.2)
Thus, we set the coefficients of the macroprudential policy rules so as to max-
imize the sum of welfares of the agents in our model. In doing so, we study the
ex-ante optimal simple rules based on the second-order approximate solution of
the model. We also compute the welfare implied by the different policy rules
conditional on the initial state being the deterministic steady-state.
The rules that maximize social welfare are compared both in terms of levels of
welfare and consumption-equivalent measure calculated as the percentage increase
in steady-state consumption that would make welfare under the benchmark static
policy setting equal to welfare under the optimized rule. Table 4.3 reports the
results of the optimization.
Table 4.3: Optimal Policy
Optimal Policy Welfare CE
Optimal LTV: ρm = 0.326 χq = −0.252 -435.0019 0.00031
Optimal CA: ρν = 0.0942 χν = 4.998 -432.7923 0.82422
LTV+CA: ρm = 0.647 χq = −0.609; ρν = 0.171 χν = 4.902 -432.7884 0.82565
The results suggest that by itself a dynamic LTV setting responding to house
prices has little impact on welfare. On the contrary, dynamic capital-asset re-
quirement setting improves welfare significantly and finally, optimizing using both
active policies leads to a marginal improvement relatively to the capital-asset re-
quirement alone.
The figure below presents impulse responses to a shock to the standard devi-
ation of the idiosyncratic shock and compares the different policy settings.
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Figure 4.3: Impulse response to an AR shock to σhω
All variables are in percentage deviation from the steady-state except from those that are already in percent. One period
corresponds to one quarter. The shock follows an AR(1) process in logs with coefficient of 0.3
The four cases overlap in two pairs since, as we saw from table 4.3, the opti-
mal LTV setting improves the benchmark case with static policy insignificantly
and the optimal capital-asset requirement by very little. Thus, the only major
improvement arises from optimizing over the capital-asset requirement rule.
The success of the countercyclical requirement arises from relaxation of the
requirement in the periods after the shock. This leads to a lower increase in the
wholesale lending rate and hence retail rates, since banks are not forced to return
to the requirement as fast as before. The lower retail rates are less noticeable for
households, as in their case the initial increase is due not only to higher wholesale
rate but due to the higher defaults to which the mortgage lending branch responds
by increasing its interest rate. Nevertheless, the attenuation of interest rates leads
to lower decline in borrowing, investment and output.
In the first two graphs, at the bottom row, we see that none of the dynamic
policies can affect the impact of the crisis and the amount of bank capital de-
stroyed. This is simply because in our model banks losses and gains can occur
only due to expectations mismatch that arise from shocks. In that setting, we can
only analyse the ability of the instruments to mitigate the impact once the crisis
has happened. This is why the LTV setting has so little impact. Once the shock
has happened and bank-capital is destroyed, the crisis has already reached the
wholesale level of the banking sector at which stage a sector specific requirement
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such as the LTV is insufficient to lean against the crisis.
Nevertheless, we saw from figure 4.2 that a lower LTV prior to the shock can in
fact attenuate the destruction of bank capital. Unfortunately, we cannot capture
this quality of LTV requirements in our optimal policy analysis in the absence of
news shocks or a mechanism for gradually build-up of the crisis to which the LTV
can respond.
In a final note regarding the robustness of the results above, we should say that
our optimal welfare analysis using second order approximation is sensitive to the
parameters of the exogenous shock processes which we did not estimate. Inter-
estingly, in a preliminary version of this model we experimented with alternative
approach in which the policy rules aim to minimize a loss function as in Angelini
et al. (2014). Those results also suggested that the capital-asset requirement is
much more effective in dealing with the crisis once it has occurred.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presented a financial frictions model with a detailed banking sector
featuring collaterized defaulting loans. The employed framework allowed us to
represent different levels of reach of two macroprudential instruments: capital-
asset and LTV requirements, and analyse their potential to mitigate the impact
of a crisis originating from the housing market. In particular, we found that while
the capital-asset requirement affects the whole banking sector and hence has a
broader impact on the economy, the LTV limit can be imposed on a specific type
of lending and thus be more precise in its effect. Moreover, we found that the
LTV limit has the ability to affect the exposure to losses of a particular type of
lending to unexpected increase in loan defaults.
The crisis scenario is an increase of the default rate of mortgages, leading to
banks’ losses which are transmitted from the particular type of lending to the
whole banking sector and finally to the real side of the economy. Our static policy
analysis of the two instruments showed that a permanently tighter LTV limit,
prior to the crisis, can significantly reduce the realized bank losses and hence the
following output contraction, this however came at the cost of permanently lower
output due to the tighter borrowing limit. A permanently tighter capital-asset
requirement, on the other hand, proved to be incapable of mitigating the impact
of the shock while in some cases it could even worsen the crisis by forcing banks
to recapitalize and reduce assets faster.
Our analysis continued with dynamic policy rules for the two macroprudential
instruments. The coefficients of the rules were chosen such as to maximize the
social welfare of the agents in the economy. Although the structure of our model
did not allow for endogenous build up of the crisis and anticipatory response of
the instruments, we were able to analyse the ability of the optimized rules to
mitigate the effect of the crisis after its occurrence. In this scenario, we found
that the optimized countercyclical capital-asset requirement rule can significantly
improve welfare under various shocks and also attenuate the tightening of credit
conditions by banks after suffering losses. On the other hand, the optimized LTV
limit was incapable of improving welfare and mitigate the aftermath of the crisis
once it has hit the economy and banks had suffered losses.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Spread expression
Given the spread equation (3.9) we have that the denominator is the following
function of the ex-ante threshold ω¯j,a :
X(ω¯j,a) =
(1− µ)G(ω¯j,at , σjω)
ω¯j,at
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at , σjω)) (6.1)
or expressed with integrals:
X(ω¯j,a) =
(1− µ) ∫ ω¯j,at
0
ωf(ω)dω
ω¯j,at
+ 1− F (ω¯j,a) (6.2)
where f(ω) is the PDF and F (ω) is the CDF of the log-normal distribution.
In fact, the second therm in the RHS which is the probability of non-default,
expressed as 1 - the probability of default, where the latter is just the CDF
evaluated at ω¯j,a. Then it is straightforward to see that as the CDF is increasing
function in ω¯j,a then:
d(1− F (ω¯j,a))
dω¯j,a
< 0 (6.3)
is a decreasing function in ω¯j,a. Then calculating the derivative of the of
X(ω¯j,a) wrt ω¯j,a we obtain:
dX(ω¯j,a)
dω¯j,a
=
(1− µ)
ω¯j,a
ω¯j,af(ω¯j,a)− f(ω¯j,a)−
(1− µ) ∫ ω¯j,a
0
ωf(ω)dω
(ω¯j,a)2
+
d(1− F (ω¯j,a))
dω¯j,a
(6.4)
which simplifies to:
dX(ω¯j,a)
dω¯j,a
= −µf(ω¯j,a)− (1− µ)
∫ ω¯j,a
0
ωf(ω)dω
(ω¯j,a)2
+
d(1− F (ω¯j,a))
dω¯j,a
(6.5)
which is negative, meaning that X(ω¯j,a) is decreasing fuction of the ex-ante
threshold ω¯j,a. Then as we have from equation (3.9) the spread is:
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rjt
Rbt
=
1
(1−µ)G(ω¯j,at ,σjω)
ω¯j,at
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at , σjω))
=
1
X(ω¯j,a)
(6.6)
meaning that the spread is an increasing function of the ex-ante threshold such
that:
rjt
Rbt
= f(ω¯j,a), f ′() > 0 (6.7)
which is equation (3.10).
6.2 Profits expression
Starting from the equation (3.13) of profits, dividing by the borrowing quantity
bjt−1 and substituting the ex-post threshold (3.14), we obtain profits per unit of
loans as:
Πjt
bjt−1
= (1− µ)G(ω¯j,pt , σjωj)
rjt−1
ω¯j,pt
+ (1− F (ω¯j,pt , σjωj))rjt−1 −Rbt−1 (6.8)
then from evaluating the participation constraint (3.7) in period t − 1 and
substituting the ex-ante threshold (3.6) in period t− 1, ω¯j,at−1 in it we have that:
Rbt−1 = (1− µ)G(ω¯j,at−1, σjω)
rjt−1
ω¯j,at−1
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at−1, σjω))rjt−1 (6.9)
which can be substituted in (6.8) leading to:
Πjt
bjt−1
= rjt−1
[
(1− µ)G(ω¯j,pt , σjωj)
ω¯j,pt
+ (1− F (ω¯j,pt , σjωj))−(
(1− µ)G(ω¯j,at−1, σjω)
ω¯j,at−1
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at−1, σjω))
)] (6.10)
Then using the formulation of X(ω¯j,a) in (6.1), the last equation becomes:
Πjt = b
j
t−1r
j
t−1
[
−
(
X(ω¯j,at )−X(ω¯j,pt−1)
)]
(6.11)
And since we have showed in 6.1 that X(ω¯j,a) is a decreasing function in
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ω¯j,a, then for any ω¯j,at−1 = ω¯
j,p
t the above expression would be zero, and for any
ω¯j,at−1 > ω¯
j,p
t we would have that X(ω¯
j,p
t ) > X(ω¯
j,a
t−1) and that Π
j
t > 0 leading to:
Πjt = f(ω¯
j,a
t−1 − ω¯j,pt ), f ′() > 0 (6.12)
6.3 Model first order conditions
Patient households (Savers)
PHHs choose: CPt , H
P
t , and L
P
t to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βP )tUt = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βP )t
[
(1− αp)εct log(CPt (j)− αPCPt−1)+
εht log(H
P
t (j))−
(LPt (j))
1+φ
1 + φ
] (6.13)
subject to:
CPt (j) + q
h
t ∆H
P
t (j) +Dt(j) = WtL
P
t (j) +
Rt−1Dt−1(j)
pit
+ Tt(j) (6.14)
If we denote marginal utility of consumption with:
UCPt = Λ
P
t =
(1− αp)εct
CPt − αpCPt−1
(6.15)
then substituting eq(31) for Ct and Ct+1 into eq(30) and differentiating wrt.
Dt we obtain the following Euler equation:
ΛPt = β
PΛPt+1
Rt
pit+1
(6.16)
Then differentiating the infinite sum of discounted utility wrt. HPt gives the
demand for housing:
ΛPt q
h
t =
εht
HPt
+ βPΛPt+1q
h
t+1 (6.17)
Finally differentiating wrt. leisure LPt , we obtain the labour supply:
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ΛPt =
(LPt )
φ
W Pt
(6.18)
Impatient households (Borrowers)
IHHs choose: CIt , H
I
t , and L
I
t to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)tUt = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t
[
(1− αI)εct log(CIt (i)− αICIt−1)+
εht log(H
I
t (i))−
(LIt (i))
1+φ
1 + φ
] (6.19)
subject to the budget constraint:
CIt + q
h
t ∆H
I
t +
(1− F pt )rIt−1BIt−1
pit
+ qhtH
I
t−1G
p
t = B
I
t +WtL
I
t (6.20)
and collateral constraint:
rItB
I
t /pit+1 = m
h
t q
h
t+1H
I
t (6.21)
If we denote marginal utility of consumption with:
UCIt = Λ
I
t =
(1− αI)εct
CIt − αICIt−1
(6.22)
By constructing a Lagrangian with the collateral constraint and SIt being its
shadow value we obtain:
LI = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t[Ut + S
I
t (m
h
t q
h
t+1H
I
t −
rItB
I
t
pit+1
)] (6.23)
substituting the budget constraint for CIt and C
I
t+1 and differentiating wrt. B
I
t
we obtain the following Euler equation:
ΛIt =
βIΛIt+1r
I
t
pit+1
+
SIt r
I
t
pit+1
(6.24)
Differetiating wrt Ht gives the following housing demand:
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ΛIt q
h
t = β
IΛIt+1q
h
t+1 +
εh
HIt
+ SImht q
h
t (6.25)
Lastly, labour supply:
ΛIt =
(LIt )
φ
W It
(6.26)
Entrepreneurs
Choose consumption CEt , physical capital K
E
t , loans from banks B
E
t , degree
of capital utilization, and labour inputs from patient and impatient households
LPt , L
I
t to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtI
[
(1− αE)log(CEt (i)− αECEt−1)
]
(6.27)
subject to:
CEt +W
P
t L
P
t +W
I
t L
I
t +
(1− F p,Et )rEt−1BEt−1(i)
pit
+ qkt [K
E
t − (1− δ)KEt−1]+
qktK
E
t−1G
p,E
t =
Y Et
Xt
+BEt
(6.28)
with production function:
Y Et (i) = A
E
t K
E
t−1(i)
αLEt (i)
1−α (6.29)
where: LEt = (L
P
t )
ν(LIt )
1−ν , subject to a budget constraint:
rEt B
E
t /pit+1 ≤ mft qkt+1KEt (6.30)
Denoting marginal utility of consumption as:
ΛEt =
(1− αe)
CEt − αeCEt−1
(6.31)
Constructing Lagrangian with SE being the shadow value of the collateral
constraint, then differentiating wrt. KEt leads to:
58
Chapter I. The Reach of Macroprudential Policy 6. Appendix
ΛEt q
k
t = Λ
E
t+1β
E
(
qkt+1(1− δ) + rkt+1
)
+ SEmft q
k
t+1 (6.32)
where rkt is the rental rate of capital: r
k
t =
αY Et
KEt−1
1
Xt
For labour demand we have MP of each labour type equal to its MC:
W Pt =
ν(1− α)Y Et
LPt Xt
W It =
(1− ν)(1− α)Y Et
LItXt
(6.33)
Finally the Euler equation is:
ΛEt =
ΛEt+1β
ErEt
pit+1
+
SErEt
pit+1
(6.34)
Capital Producers
Using the discount factor of entrepreneurs (as being owned by them), capital
producers maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛEt (β
E)t
[
qkt ∆xt − It
]
(6.35)
by choosing ∆xt and It subject to the following constraint:
∆xt =
[
1− κi
2
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)2]
It (6.36)
Where, ∆xt = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1. Differentiating wrt. It we obtain:
ΛEt
[
qkt
∂∆xt
∂It
− 1
]
+ ΛEt+1β
E
[
qkt+1
∂∆xt+1
∂It
]
= 0 (6.37)
for the partial derivatives we obtain:
∂∆xt
∂It
= 1− κi
2
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)2
− κi
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)
Itε
k
t
It−1
(6.38)
∂∆xt+1
∂It
= κi
(
It+1ε
k
t+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
εkt+1 (6.39)
substituting the last two into 52 we obtain the optimality condition:
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1 = qkt
[
1− κi
2
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)2
− κi
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)
Itε
k
t
It−1
]
+
βEEt
[
ΛEt+1q
k
t+1ε
k
t+1
ΛEt
κi
(
It+1ε
k
t+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2] (6.40)
Retailers
Thus retailers choose Pt(j) to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
[
Pt(j)Yt(j)− PWt Yt(j)−
κp
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− piipt−1pi1−ip
)2
PtYt
]
(6.41)
subject to: Yt(j) = (
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
y
t Yt.
Thus the part of the infinite sum that includes Pt(j) is:
R∑
= ΛPt
[
Yt(j)(Pt(j)− PWt )−
κp
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− piipt−1pi1−ip
)2
PtYt
]
+
ΛPt+1β
P
[
Yt+1(j)(Pt+1(j)− PWt+1)−
κp
2
(
Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)
− piipt pi1−ip
)2
Pt+1Yt+1
] (6.42)
Differentiating wrt. Pt(j) and imposing Pt(j) = Pt leads to:
ΛPt
[
− ytYt +
ytYt
Xt
+ Yt − κp(pit − piipt−1pi1−ip)PtYt
1
Pt−1(j)
]
+
ΛPt+1β
P
[
κp(pit+1 − piipt pi1−ip)Pt+1Yt+1
Pt+1(j)
P 2t (j)
]
= 0
(6.43)
which after dividing by Yt and Λ
P
t simplifies to:
1−yt +
yt
Xt
−κp(pit−piipt−1pi1−ip)pit+
ΛPt+1β
P
ΛPt
κp(pit+1−piipt pi1−ip)
Yt+1
Yt
pi2t+1 = 0 (6.44)
where we use that 1/X = PWt /Pt and pit = Pt/Pt−1
The profits of retailers that are transferred back to savers are:
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JRt = Yt(1−
1
Xt
)− κp(pit − piipt−1pi1−ip)2 (6.45)
6.4 Steady Sate
Patient Households
Steady state inflation is set to zero. The discount factor βP is exogenously set
and then the deposit rate is set to R = 1/βP
Budget constraint:
CP +D = W PLp +RD + J (6.46)
Housing demand:
qh
Cp
=
1
HP
+
βP qh
CP
(6.47)
Labour supply:
1
CP
=
(LP )φ
W P
(6.48)
Impatient Households
The LTV limit mh pins down the steady state default threshold ω¯I which in
turn pins down the steady state default rate and repossession value: F I and GI
functions. In addition, at the steady state all ex-ante and ex-post variables are
equal. As the F, G functions and threshold are known this also pins down the
borrowing rate rI through the participation constraint.
Euler equation:
1
CI
=
βIrI
CI
+ SIrI (6.49)
QR use the borrowing rate rI to endogenously determine the discount factor
βI through the Euler equation. However, this is not directly possible in our case
due to the collateral constraint which shadow value appears in the Euler equation.
Housing demand:
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qh
CI
=
βIqh
CI
+
1
HI
+ SImhqh (6.50)
Budget constraint:
CI + (1− F I)rIBI + qhHIGI = BI +W ILI (6.51)
Labour supply:
1/CI = (LI)φ/W I (6.52)
Collateral constraint:
rIBI = qhHImh (6.53)
Entrepreneurs
As with impatient households, the ss borrowing rate by entrepreneurs is pinned
down by the LTV limit mf . However, again due to the collateral constraint term
in the Euler equation, determining βE as in QR is not straightforward.
Euler equation:
1
CE
=
βErE
CE
+ SErE (6.54)
Budget constraint:
CE +W PLP +W ILI + (1− FE)rEBE + qkKE(δ +GE) = Y E/X +BE (6.55)
Production:
Y E = (KE)α((LP )ν(LI)1−ν)1−α (6.56)
Collateral constraint:
rEBE = qkKEmf (6.57)
Optimal choice of capital:
qk
CE
=
βE
CE
(qk(1− δ) + rk) + SEmfqk (6.58)
rk =
αY E
KEX
(6.59)
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Labour demand:
W P =
ν(1− α)Y E
LPX
; W I =
(1− ν)(1− α)Y E
LIX
(6.60)
Capital producers
In ss it follows that: KEδ = I and qk = 1
Retailers
X = εy/(εy − 1), where εy is stochastic demand price elasticity.
JR = Y E(1− 1/X)
Wholesale bank
Steady state capital asset ratio equal to requirement: Kb/B = νb.
Wholesale rate equal to policy rate: Rb = R
Balance sheet: B = BI +BE = D +Kb.
Profits: Kbδb = Πws = (R− 1)(B −D) = (R− 1)Kb so we set δb = Rb − 1
Market clearing
Housing market: 1 = HI +HP .
Aggregate output: Y E = CP + CI + CE + qkδKE + δbKb.
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Abstract
This paper introduces risk-weighted capital-asset requirements in a general equi-
librium model and analyses the implications of different risk-weighting methods
for financial distress in the event of a crisis. In particular, we compare a static
risk-weight setting with the use of Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB), and a
macroprudential setting of the risk-weights that responds to sectoral measures of
leverage. The different methods are compared in a crisis scenario originating from
the housing market and mortgages that affects the banking sector and transmits
to the wider economy. We aim to represent both boom and bust phases of the
crisis by simulating an unrealized news shock that leads to gradual build up and
rapid crash in the economy. Our results suggest that relatively to the static risk-
weights, the IRB model induces procyclicality of regulatory capital requirements
and thus amplifies both boom and bust phases of the financial cycle. On the other
hand, a macroprudential control over the risk-weights that responds to sector spe-
cific leverage, leads to countercyclicality of regulatory capital requirements and
thus attenuates the financial cycle and improves welfare.
JEL Classifications: C68, E44, E58, E61.
Keywords: macroprudential policy, risk-weights, countercyclical capital requirements, IRB ap-
proach, DSGE.
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1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the Basel II bank regulatory framework from 2004, a
major emphasis was put on risk-sensitivity - the idea that capital requirements
should depend on the type of assets that a bank holds and in particular that banks
with riskier assets should hold larger amount of capital to ensure their solvency. A
key aspect of this regulation is the way of measuring the riskiness of banks’ assets.
While in Basel I, assets’ risk was evaluated with the Standardized Approach (SA)
- through external fixed ratings, Basel II introduced the Internal Ratings-Based
(IRB) approach in which banks can use internal models to estimate their portfolio
riskiness which in turn would determine the required regulatory capital to be held.
In practice, the risk-sensitive requirements are implemented through assigning
risk-weights to different assets and then computing a capital over risk-weighted
assets ratio1 that has to comply with the regulatory requirement. While under
the SA, the risk-weights are fixed and depending on the asset class, under the
IRB approach, banks are using their own models to calculate the risk-weights
dynamically.
However, in 2008 the Great Recession hit the world’s financial system even
before the Basel II regulation was fully introduced. As a result, a new regula-
tion was negotiated in the face of Basel III in which the lessons from the crisis
were on top of mind and more stringent standards were adopted including higher
capital requirements and various capital buffers such as the Countercyclical Cap-
ital Buffer (CCB). Nevertheless, regardless of the higher requirements or the time
varying buffers, the newly imposed regulation remains highly dependent on the
underlying way of measuring risk that is the IRB approach. It is important to
note that, as a component of the regulatory capital-asset ratio, assets risk-weights
lead to variability in the capital requirements and hence the tightness of banking
regulation and banks’ incentive to extend certain types of lending. As a result,
failure to represent asset risk-weights realistically, inevitably leads to failure of
capturing the relationship between capital requirements and the real economy
and hence the impact of macroprudential policy.
1In bank regulation, the capital over risk-weighted assets ratio is simply referred to as capital-
asset ratio, while the ratio of capital over non-weighted assets is referred to as the leverage ratio.
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This paper analyses the implications of different methods of risk-weighting for
capital-asset requirements in terms of their ability to attenuate the business cycle.
Due to its wide application, the IRB approach has been extensively investigated
by empirical studies which often find it as the cause of procyclical capital charges
that can amplify the financial cycle.1 On the other hand, the theoretical gen-
eral equilibrium literature has analysed macroprudential policy and in particular
capital-asset requirements without introducing the current risk-sensitive approach
imposed by regulation. For example, Gerali et al. (2010) introduce capital require-
ments but regard the assets as equally weighted with a weight of one - thereby
corresponding to a leverage ratio. Angelini et al. (2014) study the interaction
between capital requirements and monetary policy. However, the latter paper
introduces asset risk-weights for the capital requirements according to an ad-hoc
rule.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to introduce the
IRB approach in a general equilibrium framework. It does so by employing a
New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with financial frictions of the type of
Bernanke et al. (1999), hereafter referred to as BGG. The main departure from
the BGG set-up is that interest rates are predetermined as in Quint and Rabanal
(2014). However, unlike the latter paper, our model includes a banking sector and
bank capital requirements. Concerning the basic structure of the banking sector,
our paper is closely related to Gerali et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2014).
However, we extend the banking sector by adding defaulting loans and asset risk-
weights in the bank capital requirements. The presence of defaulting loans allows
for the calculation of asset risk-weights according to the IRB approach which uses
the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) for a specific type of
asset. The employed macro model also allows for realistic crisis scenarios which
originate from mortgage lending and transmit to the real economy. Being exposed
to risky loans, a higher than the expected default proportion of the portfolio
with lower than expected collateral value can lead to endogenous bank capital
destruction. The lower capital then leads to larger spreads and reduced lending
in order to comply with regulatory requirements. The tighter lending and higher
1See Markus et al. (2014), Goodhart et al. (2004) and Borio et al. (2001).
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spreads in turn further increase default rates and depress collateral prices closing
the financial accelerator cycle.
After incorporating the current regulatory standards, the paper then proceeds
to the policy analysis. The compared policy settings are the following. Risk inde-
pendent capital requirements that reflect the current approach in the literature1
in which all risk-weights are constant and equal to one, leading to a leverage ra-
tio requirement. The IRB approach in which the risk-weights for each asset type
depend on its PD and LGD, representing current regulation. And finally, an alter-
native countercyclical macroprudential setting is introduced that sets risk-weights
for each type of lending based on sector specific measure of leverage.
The model parameters are estimated with Euro Area data and a historical
variance decomposition identifies the period of the 2008 recession as being subject
to shocks from the mortgage lending market leading to larger defaults.
The different policy settings are assessed in terms of their ability to stabilize the
economy in two different crisis scenarios originating from the mortgage market as
well as in terms of social welfare. The first scenario represents the bust phase of the
crisis in which a higher than expected mortgage defaults destroy bank capital and
subsequently tighter lending conditions suppress all types of lending and transmit
to the wider economy. The second scenario consists of a simulated boom and bust
cycle achieved through unrealized news shocks in the mortgage market. In the
latter scenario, a positive shock expected 4 periods in the feature to mortgages
risk, causes lenders to expect lower default rates and higher collateral prices,
thereby relaxing lending conditions and spreads. This in turn leads to increase in
leverage and booming collateral prices. However, at period 4 expectations do not
materialize and a higher proportion of loans default than expected leading to bank
capital destruction and a crisis which is driven entirely by agents’ expectations.
Our results show that in both boom and bust phases of the crisis the IRB
approach leads to procyclical capital requirements. In the boom phase, the IRB
approach leads to looser capital requirements and thereby to lending conditions
that reinforce market exuberance. In the bust phase, higher PD estimates lead to
higher risk-weights and tighter capital requirements that depress bank lending and
1See Gerali et al. (2010).
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slow down economic activity. The IRB approach therefore reinforces the financial
cycle in the event of a crisis.
By contrast, our macroprudential approach to setting risk-weights leads to
countercyclicality in capital requirements in both the boom and bust phases of
the crisis – thereby serving to attenuate the financial cycle. As a result, the
negative impact of the financial crash to the real economy is smaller and the
recovery happens faster.
Finally, the leverage ratio policy setting keeps constant risk-weights equal to
one and thus does not vary capital requirements with the business cycle leading
to static policy relative to the other two settings. As a result, the impulse re-
sponses in both crisis scenarios lay in between those of the procyclical IRB setting
and the countercyclical macroprudential rule. Our results are evident both in a
financial crisis scenario as well as measured by social welfare outlining the risks
of procyclical regulation.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model design, section 3
explains our approach to calibrating or estimating the model parameters, section
4 sets out our results and provides accompanying policy analysis, and the final
section concludes.
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2 Model
This paper employs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with finan-
cial frictions and a banking sector. The model is used as a laboratory for the
comparison of the IRB approach versus a macropudential asset risk-weight set-
ting rule in terms of their effect on the economy during recessions and general
business cycle dynamics. The model is populated by entrepreneurs, patient and
impatient households, and monopolistically competitive banks and firms. This
section describes the agents in the model as well as the direct impact of the differ-
ent policy settings. Due to their central role in the paper, we start with describing
the banking sector.
2.1 Banks
The banking sector consists of a wholesale branch and two retail branches. The
wholesale branch manages the capital-asset position of the bank as it accumulates
bank capital out of retained earnings and pays a quadratic cost whenever it de-
viates from a risk-weighted capital-asset requirement. As bank capital can only
be accumulated through retained earnings, the supply of credit is constrained as
imposed by the capital regulation. The two retail branches obtain funds from the
wholesale branch and lend them to households and firms respectively. The two
types of loans are non-recourse with pre-determined interest rates - this allows
for unexpected changes in the collateral prices to be transmitted to the loan de-
fault rates. These unexpected changes then lead to profits/losses that affect the
capital-asset position of the banking sector.
Wholesale branch
The wholesale branch collects deposits D at the gross policy rate R which together
with the accumulated bank capital Kb is used to fund its loans B, leading to a
balance sheet identity
Bt = Dt +K
b
t (2.1)
where the two sources of funding, Kb and B, are perfect substitutes. Bank capital
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is accumulated through retained earnings with law of motion given by:
Kbt = (1− δb)Kbt−1 + Πt
where δb is the depreciation rate of bank capital, and should be interpreted as the
costs of managing bank capital. Πt denotes the realized overall profits of all bank
branches, including the profits of the wholesale Πwst and the two retail branches
profits Πht and Π
f
t
Πt = Π
ws
t + Π
h
t + Π
f
t
The overall loans Bt in the economy consist of the loans B
I
t and B
E
t that the two
retail branches lend to households and firms, respectively. The retail branches
obtain the funds to lend from the wholesale branch at the gross interest rates Rb,I
and Rb,E respectively.
The wholesale branch maximizes profits taking into account a quadratic cost
QCt whenever the risk-weighted capital-asset ratio K
b
t /RWAt deviates from an
exogenous level νb which represents the regulatory capital requirement.1
QCt =
κb
2
( Kbt
RWAt
− νb
)2
Kbt
where RWAt denotes the risk-weighted assets and is given by the weighted sum
of each asset type. The asset specific weights wIt and w
E
t represent a regulatory
instrument that allows for adjusting the risk-weight of a specific asset class.
RWAt = w
I
tB
I
t + w
E
t B
E
t (2.2)
Thus the wholesale branch maximization problem is given by:
max
{Dt,BIt ,BEt }
E0
∞∑
i=0
Λ0,t
[
(Rb,It − 1)BIt + (Rb,Et − 1)BEt − (Rt − 1)Dt −QCt
]
s.t. Bt = Dt +K
b
t
1The quadratic cost for deviating from the regulatory requirement can be thought of as a
simple shortcut for studying the implications and costs of regulatory capital requirements as in
Gerali et al. (2010). In reality, similar trade-offs would arise from banks’ decision of how much
own resources to hold.
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As a result, the wholesale branch maximizes its profits subject to the balance
sheet identity (2.1) and the quadratic cost for deviation from the regulatory re-
quirements by taking Rb,It , R
b,E
t and Rt as given. Using the FOCs, we can write
Rb,jt −Rt = κb
(
νb − K
b
t
RWAt
)( Kbt
RWAt
)2
wjt for j ∈ {I, E} (2.3)
Equation (2.3) links the interest rate spread Rb,jt −Rt for each loan type j ∈ {I, E}
to the degree of deviation of the capital-asset ratio from its requirement νb, as
well as to the loan specific risk-weight wjt . The LHS of equation (2.3) represents
the marginal benefit from increasing lending of type j (an increase in profits equal
to the interest rate spread), while the RHS represents the marginal cost from
doing so (an increase in the costs for deviating from νb). Therefore, the wholesale
branch chooses a level of each type of lending j which, at the margin, equalizes
costs and benefits of changing the capital risk-weighted asset ratio.
The retail branches
The retail branches face endogenous loan defaults due to an idiosyncratic shock to
the collateral value of borrowers and the non-recourse contract with predetermined
interest rates. Unlike the wholesale branch, each retail branch has the necessary
and specialized expertise for it’s type of lending - that is to evaluate expected
collateral prices and default rates.
The operation of the two branches is identical with the difference that one
of them extends loans to impatient households against housing collateral and
the other to firms (entrepreneurs) against capital collateral. Hence, if we denote
lending to household variables with I superscript and to firms with E, it would be
the only difference between the equations describing the lending by each branch,
hence we can express them in general form using j = {I, E} superscript. The
exceptions from this notation is that loans to households are against housing
collateral so that: hIt ≡ HIt at price qIt ≡ qht , and loans to firms are against capital
collateral so that: hEt ≡ KEt at price qEt ≡ qkt . Ex-ante expected and ex-post
realized variables are denoted with a and p superscripts respectively.
The retail interest rate derivation is based on the original BGG financial accel-
erator and more specifically on the Quint and Rabanal (2014) version of it which
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has the main differences that interest rates are predetermined and there are no
agency problems or asymmetric information in the model. With these assump-
tions the problem that the retail branch faces is that knowing the rate at which
obtains funds from the wholesale branch Rb,j, it has to set interest rate on loans
rj such as to insure that it does not suffer losses, taking into account the expected
proportion of loans that will default.
The default decision is taken by the borrower after the realization of the id-
iosyncratic shock ωt to the value of his collateral. The latter is log-normally
distributed with CDF F (ω), PDF f(ω) and mean E(ωt) = 1,
1 so that there is
idiosyncratic but not aggregate risk due to its presence. Thus, after the realiza-
tion of the shock, the borrower will decide to default and give up the collateral or
repay the loan, depending on which of the two amounts is smaller. At period t,
high enough realizations of ωt−1 will induce the borrower to repay his loan in full:
rjt−1B
j
t−1/pit, where r
j is the gross borrowing rate and Bj the quantity borrowed.
Low enough realizations will cause the borrower to default and give up his collat-
eral after the realization of the shock: ωjt−1q
j
th
j
t−1, where q
j is the collateral price
and hj is its stock. Thus, the default condition for borrowers becomes, repay loan
if:
rjt−1B
j
t−1
pit
≤ ωjt−1qjthjt−1 (2.4)
and default in the opposite case (being underwater). Therefore, in period t, the
cut-off value of ω¯jt−1, i.e. the ex-post realized threshold value ω¯
j,p
t that separates
borrowers that default and those that do not can be expressed as:
ω¯jt−1 ≡ ω¯j,pt =
rjt−1B
j
t−1
qjth
j
t−1pit
At period t, the retail branch extends loans at a rate rjt without knowing the
exact value of the default threshold, since it will also depend on the period t+ 1
collateral price qjt+1 and next period inflation. Hence, the retail branch forms
ex-ante expections of ω¯j,at
1This implies that the log of ω is normally distributed: log(ωt) ∼ N(−σ
2
ω
2 , σ
2
ω).
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ω¯j,at =
rjtB
j
t
E(pit+1q
j
t+1)h
j
t
(2.5)
Note that ω¯j,at is also the retail branch’s expected LTV ratio of loan type j.
Unlike the wholesale branch, retail branches do not maximize profits1 but simply
require that the expected return from a unit of credit equals the cost of funds (the
rate at which the funds are obtained from the wholesale branch rate Rb,j). This
leads to the following participation constraint:
Rb,jt = (1− µ)Gj,at
Et(pit+1q
j
t+1)h
j
t
Bjt
+ (1− F j,at )rjt (2.6)
where the RHS of (2.6) consists of the expected return in the case of default (i.e.
the repossessed collateral) and the expected return in the case of non-default (i.e.
the repayment of the loan). Gj,at ≡ G(ω¯j,at , σjω,t) =
∫ ω¯j,at
0
ωdF (ω, σjω) denotes the
expected value of the idioscratic shock, conditional on the shock being less than
ω¯j,at ; and 1−F j,at ≡ 1−F (ω¯j,at , σjω,t) =
∫∞
ω¯j,at
f(ω, σjω)dω being the probability that
the shock exceeds the ex-ante threshold ω¯j,at , i.e. the probability of non-default.
Banks can repossess only a fraction 1 − µ of the collateral as the remainder is
assumed to be lost as a cost of default.
Rearranging the participation constraint (2.6) yields:
rjt
Rb,jt
=
1
(1−µ)Gj,at
ω¯j,at
+ (1− F j,at )
(2.7)
where the retail spread of each type of loan j ∈ {I, E} is expressed as a function
of the expected default threshold ω¯j,at . Due to the properties of the log-normal
distribution with Et(ω) = 1, it can be shown that the denominator of the RHS of
(2.7) is a decreasing function in the ex-ante threshold ω¯j,at , and hence, the interest
rate spread becomes an increasing function of ω¯j,at .
2
rjt
Rbt
= f(ω¯j,at ); f
′(ω¯j,at ) > 0
1Although the retail branches do not maximize profits, since we consider each bank as
composed of one wholesale and two retail branches we can say that each bank operates under
monopolistic competition with profit maximization occurring at the wholesale level.
2See appendix 6.2
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The intuition behind this relationship is the following: For a larger expected LTV
ratio (RHS of equation (2.5)), a larger proportion of loans is expected to default,
and hence the ex-ante threshold ω¯j,at increases. Since the threshold separates the
defaulting from non-defaulting loans, the bank would expect a larger default area
and a smaller non-default area given by (1−F j,at ). In order to compensate for the
larger expected defaults, the retail branches increase the loan rate rjt .
Bank profits
The participation constraint (2.6) ensures that retail branches make zero profits
in expectation terms. However, due to the predetermined interest rate and as a
consequence of shocks, the participation constraint does not always hold ex-post.
This can occur due to the aggregate risk that cannot be insured by the retail
branches. For example, an unexpected increase of the collateral price would lead
to lower ex-post threshold than the one expected last period when the loan was
issued: ω¯j,pt < ω¯
j,a
t−1. Hence, a smaller fraction of borrowers would be below the
threshold and default. The decrease in the default rate and the price increase of
the repossessed collateral would lead to positive profits for the respective retail
branch and these profits would be accumulated as bank capital.
Thus ex-post profits of loan type j are given by:
Πjt = (1− µ)Gj,pt qjthjt−1pit + (1− F j,pt )rjt−1Bjt−1 −Rj,bt−1Bjt−1
that is, the sum of the average repossession value of collateral for the defaulted
loans and the loan repayment of non-defaulted loans, minus the cost of funds for
the bank.
It can be shown that the profit of each branch is a function of the differ-
ence between last period’s ex-ante expected and current period’s ex-post realized
thresholds.1 Whenever the two thresholds are equal, profits are zero. When the
ex-post threshold is smaller than expected (i.e. a smaller proportion of loans
default than expected) profits are positive.
Πjt = f(ω¯
j,a
t−1 − ω¯j,pt ), f ′() > 0
1See appendix 6.3
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At this stage our banking sector is completed and we can see the structure
of the spreads that occur and the factors that affect them. While the wholesale
spreads: Rb−R and Rb,I−Rb, Rb,E−Rb are affected by the capital-asset position
of the banking sector relative to the regulatory requirements and composition of
the loan portfolio. The two retail spreads: rI − Rb,I and rE − Rb,E are mainly
affected by the expected collateral values of each type of loan. The figure below
illustrates the spreads structure.
Figure 2.1: Interest rate spreads structure
In terms of policy we can distinguish the following direct effects:
• Monetary Policy: Changes policy rate R which affects all interest rates
(even those to deposits) without affecting any of the spreads.
• Macroprudential Capital-Asset requirement: Changes the wholesale
spread Rb −R which affects all lending rates.
• Macroprudential Risk-Weight setting: Changes the individual spread
of a specific type of loan, e.g. Rb,I −Rb while having a smaller effect on the
other spread Rb,E −Rb, thus changing the relative costs of borrowing of the
two loan types.
The above two-level representation of spreads can also be interpreted from the
perspective of the Basel capital regulation. While the retail level spread arises due
to provisioning of expected losses by retail branches, the wholesale level spread
arises due to capital regulation which aims to address the possibility of unexpected
losses which are covered by bank capital.
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2.2 Households
Savers
Each saver (or patient household) i maximizes expected lifetime utility subject
to the budget constraint
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(βP )t
[
(1− αp)εct log(CPt (i)− αPCPt−1) + εht log(HPt (i))−
(LPt (i))
1+φ
1 + φ
]
s.t. CPt + q
h
t ∆H
P
t +Dt = W
P
t L
P
t +
Rt−1Dt−1
pit
+ Tt
Expected lifetime utility depends on current individual (and lagged aggregate)
consumption CPt , housing H
P
t and hours worked L
P
t .
1 The last term is labour
disutility where φ denotes the inverse elasticity of labour supply. There are two
preference shocks present, εct affects the marginal utility of consumption, and ε
h
t
the marginal utility of housing.
The patient household spends his income on current consumption, accumu-
lation of housing (with qht denoting real house prices), and on saving via real
deposits Dt. The income side consists of wage earnings WtL
P
t (where Wt is the
real wage), and gross interest income from last period deposits Rt−1Dt−1/pit, where
pit = Pt/Pt−1 is gross inflation and Rt−1 denotes the gross interest rate on deposits.
The term Tt represents transactions including profits from intermediate goods pro-
ducers and from debt repossession agencies.
Borrowers
Borrowers (or impatient households) differ from savers in several aspects. First,
their discount factor is smaller than the one of savers (βI < βP ) which means that
they are more impatient to consume. Due to their impatience, in equilibrium,
savers are willing to accumulate assets as deposits, and borrowers are willing to
offer their housing wealth as collateral to obtain loans. Second, the borrowers
don’t earn profits from goods producers. And third, borrowers are subject to an
1Pre-multiplying by the habit coefficient αP offsets the impact of external habits on the
steady-state marginal utility of consumption.
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idiosyncratic quality shock ωj to the value of their housing stock which leads to
loan default for some of them.
Analogously to savers, each borrower i, maximizes expected lifetime utility subject
to the budget and collateral constraints1
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t
[
(1− αI)εct log(CIt (i)− αICIt−1) + εht log(HIt (i))−
(LIt (i))
1+φ
1 + φ
]
s.t. CIt + q
h
t ∆H
I
t + q
h
tH
I
t−1G
I,p
t +
(1− F I,pt )rIt−1BIt−1
pit
= BIt +W
I
t L
I
t (2.8)
ω¯p,It =
rIt−1B
I
t−1
qhtH
I
t−1
The budget constraint for borrowers differs among those who default and those
who repay their loans. Aggregating borrowers’ budget constraints2 and dropping
the i superscripts, yields (2.8).
2.3 Firm sector
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs maximize the sum of expected lifetime utility subject the budget
constraint, production function and the collateral constraint
max
{CEt ,KEt ,BEt ,LPt ,LIt }
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t
[
(1− αE)log(CEt (i)− αECEt−1)
]
s.t. CEt +W
P
t L
P
t +W
I
t L
I
t +
(1− FE,pt )rEt−1BEt−1
pit
+ qkt [K
E
t − (1− δ)KEt−1]
+ qktK
E
t−1G
E,p
t =
Y Et
Xt
+BEt (2.9)
Y Et = A
E
t K
E
t−1
α
LEt
1−α
(2.10)
The entrepreneur i’s utility depends on the deviations of his consumption CEt (i)
from the aggregated lagged level.3 The entrepreneur chooses consumption CEt ,
1All variables and parameters with the superscript I indicate that they are specific to bor-
rowers.
2We make the assumption that the households are members of a dynasty and insure them-
selves after the realization of the shock, thus becoming ex-post identical ensuring representative
agent solution.
3Group habits are parameterized by αE .
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physical capital KEt , loans from banks B
E
t , and labour (L
P
t , L
I
t ). Entrepreneurs
have the same discount factor as borrower households, such that entrepreneurs
become net borrowers in equilibrium, willing to pledge capital used for produc-
tion as a collateral.
The depreciation rate of capital is denoted by δ, qkt denotes the price of capital
and PWt /Pt = 1/Xt is the relative competitive price of the wholesale good Y
E
t
that is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas production technology (2.10),
where AEt denotes a stochastic productivity shock. Aggregate labour, denoted by
LEt , is given by L
E
t = (L
P
t )
ν(LIt )
1−ν , where ν measures the labour income share of
patient households.
Capital Producers
Capital producers are a modeling device to derive the price of capital. Capital
producers are perfectly competitive. To produce capital, capital producers buy
two inputs. First, last-period undepreciated capital (1− δ)Kt−1 at price Qkt (the
nominal price of capital) from entrepreneurs. Second, It units of the final con-
sumption good from retailers at price Pt. The accumulation of capital is given
by ∆x¯t = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1. The new stock of effective capital x¯t is sold back to
entrepreneurs at price Qkt . In addition, the transformation of the final good into
new capital is subject to adjustment costs κi. Capital producers maximization
problem is given by
max
{x¯t,It}
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛE0,t(q
k
t ∆x¯t − It)
s.t. x¯t = x¯t−1 +
[
1− κi
2
(
Itε
qk
t
It−1
− 1
)2]
It (2.11)
where εqkt denotes a shock to investment efficiency, and q
k
t ≡ Q
k
t
Pt
the real price of
capital.
Retailers
We follow Bernanke et al. (1999) regarding the structure of the retail good
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market. We assume monopolistic competition. Retail prices are sticky and are
indexed to a combination of past and steady-state inflation, with relative weights
parameterized by ıp. Whenever retailers want to change prices beyond this index-
ation allowance, they face a quadratic adjustment cost parameterized by κp.
Retailer i chooses Pt(i) to maximize subject to the consumers demand function
(2.12)
max
Pt(i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
[
Pt(i)Yt(i)− PWt Yt(i)−
κp
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− piipt−1pi1−ip
)2
PtYt
]
s.t. Yt(i) = (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
y
t Yt (2.12)
where pi denotes steady state inflation, and εyt the stochastic demand price elas-
ticity.
2.4 Policy
Monetary Policy
The central bank sets the deposit interest rate according to the following Taylor
rule:
Rt = (R)
(1−φR)(Rt−1)φR
(pit
pi
)φpi(1−φR)( Yt
Yt−1
)φY (1−φR)
εrt (2.13)
where φpi and φY denote the weights of inflation and output, R the steady state
policy rate and εr the monetary policy shock. Changes in policy rate Rt will
affect all interest rates equally, without affecting any of the interest rate spreads
as shown in Figure (2.1).
Macroprudential policy
Equation (2.3) allows the analysis of how different macroprudential instruments
impact the asset specific interest rate spreads. In turn, the asset specific interest
rate spreads determine the borrowing costs of households and firms and hence the
volumes of loans to different sectors of the economy. For convenience, equation
(2.3) is repeated here
Rb,jt −Rt = κb
(
νb − K
b
t
RWAt
)( Kbt
RWAt
)2
wjt for j ∈ {I, E}
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Keeping everything else constant, an increase of the capital-asset requirement νb
increases the interest rate spread Rb,j −R for all loan types j. The impact of this
instrument is not asset type specific, it affects the spread of both loan types alike.
This is because, νb changes the requirement for the capital-asset ratio without
changing the risk-weighting of the different types of lending that compose the
RWA denominator.
In contrast, an increase of the risk-weight wjt of a specific loan type j ∈ {I, E}
will have a stronger impact on interest rate spread (Rb,j −Rb) of the loan type j
relative to j′ 6= j. However, the interest rate spread of loan type j′ will also be
affected through an increase in the risk-weighted assets (RWA) defined by (2.2).
This creates the possibility for macroprudential policy to conduct tailored inter-
ventions in order to influence bank lending behaviour. For example, by increasing
the risk-weight on mortgages and maintaining or decreasing the risk-weight for
corporate loans, the macroprudential regulator can alter the relative cost of the
two types of lending.
Under our suggested macroprudential approach, the policy maker sets risk-
weight wjt for asset j according to a Taylor-type rule that responds to credit-
to-GDP measures. According to (ESRB, 2014), the credit-to-GDP ratio is an
empirically sound basis for designing macroprudential interventions. Fluctua-
tions in this ratio are historically associated with episodes of financial instability
whereby the banking sector can destabilise the real economy. In our setup, the
macroprudential Taylor-type rule takes the form
wjt = (w¯
j)(1−ρw)(wjt−1)
ρw
(Bjt /Yt
B¯j/Y¯
)χw(1−ρw)
The risk-weight of loans to households and firms are set according to the deviation
of the loan-specific measure of leverage (Bjt /Yt) from its steady state, where the
parameters χw and ρw represent the responsiveness of the instrument to the sec-
toral leverage measure and its autoregressive properties. In Section 4, we discuss
our macroprudential setting of risk-weights in further detail and compare its re-
sults to the leverage ratio capital requirements and the current regulatory setting
known as the Internal ratings-based approach - IRB.
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2.5 Market clearing and shock processes
The equilibrium in the goods market can be expressed by the resource constraint,
i.e. the aggregated budget constraint of the entrepreneurs, equation (2.9), where
Ct denotes aggregate consumption and is given by Ct = C
E
t + C
I
t + C
P
t , while
output is given by the production function Y E = AEt K
E
t−1L
E
t . The assumption
that the housing stock exists in fixed supply, H¯ = 1, leads to the house market
clearing condition:
H¯ = HPt +H
I
t (2.14)
Shock processes
The shock processes we employ, are specified in Table 3.3, and have an AR(1)
form. The scenario with news shocks is simulated by a negative shock to the
expected exogenous term four periods in the future. Then at period 4 a positive
shock is simulated and the two impulse responses are added.1 This cancels the
shock itself and the resulting responses of the variables are entirely due to changes
in expectations. In particular, the shock to idiosyncratic risk of mortgages takes
the form σit = σ¯
i + ρσ
i
(σit−1 − σ¯i)− σit−4 and σit+4 = σ¯i + ρσi(σit+3 − σ¯i) + σit+4.
1Adding up the impulse responses is possible due to the linear solution of the model.
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3 Calibration and Estimation
3.1 Calibration
Table (3.1) summarizes the calibration of the model parameters. Some model
parameters are calibrated to match data or have been taken directly from the
literature. The model is calibrated so that each period represents a quarter.
The discount factor of patient households is set to 0.9939 which pins down a
quarterly steady state policy (deposit) interest rate of 0.60 percent (2.5 percent
annualized), which is consistent with the policy rate average of our data sample.
Discount factors for impatient households and entrepreneurs are calibrated such
that we match steady state quarterly borrowing rates of 0.98 and 1.1 percent (4
and 4.5 percent annualized), respectively. These borrowing rates are consistent
with the average borrowing rates for mortgages and corporate loans in our data
sample.
For the calibration of the LTV steady-state ratios, we follow Gerali et al.
(2010). We set the LTV of households loans (i.e. mortgages) ω¯I to 0.7 and for
entrepreneurs ω¯E to 0.35. In the steady-state, the two LTVs together with the
standard deviations of the idiosyncratic shock σ¯jω pin down the default rates of
loan type j. Hence, similarly to Quint and Rabanal (2014), we set the standard
deviation of households’ idiosyncratic shock σ¯Iω such that we match the average
default rate of mortgages for the Euro area of 2.5 percent. For firms we calibrate
the standard deviation of entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic shock σ¯Eω to 0.47 to match
a default rate of 2.5 percent.1
The collateral repossession cost parameters of households and firms of (µI , µE)
are implied by the interest rates, LTV ratios and standard deviations of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. The calibration values for the capital share, frisch elasticity, de-
preciation rates, and mark-ups are taken from the literature. We follow Gerali
et al. (2010) and set the capital share to 0.25 and the depreciation rate to 0.025.
As common in the literature, we assume a mark-up of 20% in the good market,
and hence set Y to 6. For the calibration of the markup in the labor market, we
1Due to data availability, we cannot differentiate between default rates of mortgages and
corporate loans in the data. The average default rate of all types of loans is 2.5 percent for the
Euro area.
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follow Gerali et al. (2010) and set Y to 5, implying a mark-up of 15%.
The capital-asset requirement νb is set to 0.08, consistent with the the Basel II
regulation. The parameter δb, the bank capital depreciation rate, is set to 0.0061.1
Parameter Description Value
βP Patient households discount factor 0.9939
βI Impatient households discount factor 0.9902
βE Entrepreneurs discount factor 0.9890
φ Inverse Frisch elasticity 1
α Capital share in the production function 0.25
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
Y 
Y
Y −1 markup in the goods market 6
l 
l
l−1 markup in the labour market 5
ω¯I Households LTV ratio 0.7
ω¯E Firms LTV ratio 0.35
σ¯Iω Stdev of households’ idiosyncratic shock 0.17
σ¯Eω Stdev of households’ idiosyncratic shock 0.47
δb Bank capital depreciation rate 0.0061
µI Collateral repossession cost, households 0.093
µE Collateral repossession cost, firms 0.049
νb capital-asset requirement 0.08
Table 3.1: Calibration of model parameters
1In our model, banks make profits in the steady state and the depreciation rate δb is set
such that it consumes the steady state profits so that bank capital stays constant at the steady
state.
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3.2 Data
The dataset includes 12 variables for the Euro Area with quarterly frequency cov-
ering the time period 2000:1 to 2014:4. Data is collected on real consumption,
real investment, real house prices, real loans to households and firms, real de-
posits, real wages, inflation, interest rates to households and firms and the policy
(deposit) rate. Variables involving a trend component (i.e. consumption, invest-
ment, house prices, wages, borrowing of households and firms, and deposits) are
made stationary using the HP filter (smoothing parameter set to 1600) and are
transformed to log deviations from their HP-filtered trend. Interest rates and the
inflation rate are de-meaned.1 The time-series of the variables are shown in Figure
(3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Transformed data series
1A full description of the data is provided in Appendix 6.1
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3.3 Estimation (Metropolis-Hastings algorithm)
Model parameters that cannot be calibrated are estimated using Bayesian meth-
ods. The tables below report the estimation results, followed by the estimation
method.
Prior Distribution Posterior Dist.
Parameter Distribution Mean Stdev. Mean Mode
κb Bank capital adj. cost Gamma 10 5 0.79 0.78
κi Capital adj. cost Gamma 2.5 1 3.74 2.79
κp Retailers’ price adj. cost Gamma 50 20 38.51 39.20
ιp Retailers’ price index Beta 0.5 0.15 0.18 0.16
αh Habit coefficient Beta 0.5 0.1 0.49 0.49
φR TR AR coeff. Beta 0.75 0.1 0.70 0.71
φpi TR inflation coeff. Gamma 2 0.5 1.48 1.38
φY TR output coeff. Normal 0.1 0.15 0.08 0.14
Table 3.2: Estimated structural parameters
Prior Distribution Posterior Dist.
Parameter Distribution Mean Stdev. Mean Mode
ρc Cons. pref. Beta 0.8 0.1 0.97 0.98
ρh Housing. pref. Beta 0.8 0.1 0.73 0.75
ρk Capital adj. cost Beta 0.8 0.1 0.65 0.64
ρA Technology Beta 0.8 0.1 0.97 0.98
ρσi HHs idiosync. Beta 0.8 0.1 0.10 0.10
ρσe Es idiosync. Beta 0.8 0.1 0.93 0.93
σc Cons. pref. Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.007 0.007
σh Housing. pref. Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02
σk Capital adj. cost Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
σA Technology Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
σr Monetary Policy Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.001 0.0017
σσi HHs idiosync. Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.55 0.55
σσe Es idiosync. Inv. gamma 0.01 0.05 0.007 0.0067
Table 3.3: Estimated exogenous processes’ parameters
We are using a Monte-Carlo based optimization technique for computing the
mode with 10 parallel chains for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 20000
replications each. The scale parameter of the jumping distribution’s covariance
matrix is set to 0.4 which leads to an average acceptance ratio of 33%.
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3.4 Historical Variance Decomposition
After completing the model parametrisation we analyse its ability to represent and
identify the fluctuations in the historical data.1 Estimating the model with real
data allows the conduct of a historical variance decomposition that assesses the
importance of different shocks by determining the relative share of variance that
each structural shock contributes to the total variance of each variable. Figures
(3.3)-(3.7) visualize the variance decomposition for the following variables: real
consumption, interest rates charged on mortgages, real house prices, real invest-
ment, and interest rates charged for corporate loans.
In Figure (3.3), the variance decomposition of consumption shows that the
model identifies the productivity shock and the shock to idiosyncratic risk in
mortgage lending to be the main drivers of the build-up and fall in real consump-
tion during the Great Recession. The main channel through which the shock to
idiosyncratic risk of mortgages can have a procyclical effect on consumption is
through lending and house prices. Figure (3.4) demonstrates that this idiosyn-
cratic risk shock contributed negatively to mortgages interest rates in the build up
phase, and positively in the crash period, while figure (3.5) shows that the same
shock contributed positively to house prices in the build up phase, and negatively
in the crash period. The variance decomposition of investment indicates that the
dynamics of real investment can be well explained by shocks to idiosyncratic firm
default risk as seen in Figure (3.6). The channel works as follows: A lower firm
idiosyncratic default risk shock leads to lower expected default rates of firm loans,
and hence lower interest rates as shown in Figure (3.7). The Lower interest rates
in turn lead to higher investment.
In summary, the model is able to identify both the build up-phase and the
crash of the recent crisis as originating from mortgage and firm lending. In the
build up phase, lower mortgage risk leads to lower mortgage interest rates, higher
house prices and higher consumption. At the same time, a lower firm lending
risk leads to lower firm interest rates and higher investment. The 2008 crash is
explained as a rapid increase in the risk of both types of lending (mortgages and
1See Appendix 6.5 for comparison of the responses of the parametrized model to the related
models in the literature.
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firm loans) leading to higher interest rate spreads, and a decline in both types
of borrowing and house prices. As a result consumption, investment and output
all decline. The results of the variance decomposition motivate the comparison
of different policies in a crisis scenario. In particular we simulate the crisis as
originating from a shock to the idiosyncratic risk in the mortgage market.
Figure 3.3: Variance decomposition - Real consumption
Figure 3.4: Variance decomposition - Interest rate - Households
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Figure 3.5: Variance decomposition - Real house prices
Figure 3.6: Variance decomposition - Real investment
Figure 3.7: Variance decomposition - Interest rate - Firms
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4 Policy analysis
In this section, we analyse and compare three alternative risk-weight setting poli-
cies. First, the leverage ratio in subsection 4.1. Second the internal ratings-based
(IRB) approach which was introduced by Basel II in subsection 4.2. And finally,
a novel sectoral macroprudential risk-weight setting rule in subsection 4.3. The
impacts of the three policy instruments and their effectiveness in stabilizing the
economy are compared under two different scenarios, in subsections 4.4 and 4.5
respectively. The first scenario represents the crash phase of the crisis, and the
second consists of a simulated boom and bust cycle. Finally, we compare the
welfare and business cycle implications of each policy setting in section 4.6.
4.1 Leverage Ratio
The related literature that seeks to analyse the effects of macroprudential capital
requirements in general equilibrium models, often regards the regulatory capital
requirement as a leverage ratio, thereby abstracting from any risk-weighting of
assets.1 Such a setup is equivalent to a setting in which the risk-weights are
constant and equal to one, i.e. wIt = w
E
t = 1.
Hence in the case of the leverage ratio, the risk-weighted assets in equation (2.2)
equal the total assets of the bank, RWALRt = B
I
t +B
E
t . As a result, the wholesale
interest rate spreads are determined by the deviation of the capital-asset ratio
Kbt
BIt+B
E
t
from the requirement νb in equation (2.3).
4.2 Internal ratings-based (IRB) risk-weighting
While risk-weights are often not taken into account in the related literature, in
practice large banks (> EUR 100bn in assets) in general, calculate their risk-
weighted assets following the Internal ratings-based (IRB) approach.2 In contrast,
our model allows for risky defaulting loans and hence can be used as a means to
study the impact of the IRB approach on financial stability and the real economy.
1For example, see Angelini et al. (2014) and Gerali et al. (2010).
2The current Basel III reform introduces both, a leverage ratio and asset risk-weight based
constraints on bank capital.
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The purpose of the IRB framework is to guarantee financial stability by impos-
ing a bank capital requirement that is sufficient to absorb any unexpected losses
arising from the assets of a bank. The capital charge that the bank has to hold for
each loan type is proportional to the loan’s probability of incurring unexpected
losses. Below, we discuss the IRB approach in detail and then introduce it in our
theoretical model presented in section 3.
According to the IRB approach, expected losses (EL) should be covered by
bank provisions – and are entered on the bank’s balance sheet directly as a cost
associated with its lending. In our model, bank provisioning is represented by the
retail level of the banking system. As a result. retail bankers set the interest rate
spread by taking into account the probability of default. Unexpected losses (UL)
arise in exceptional circumstances, and hence are not taken into account by bank
provisioning at the retail branch level. In the model, the unexpected losses are
taken into account on the wholesale level of the banking system. The wholesale
branch makes sure that the capital-asset requirement is met, i.e. assets that are
riskier / more prone to generating unexpected losses require the bank to hold more
capital to absorb those unexpected losses through the setting of risk-weights.
The IRB framework allows banks to calculate the risk-weight of a specific loan
type in order to ensure it has enough capital to cover the unexpected loss region
shown in Figure (4.8). The expected loss (EL) per unit of a loan is defined as the
expected annual probability of default (PD) times the loss-given-default (LGD),
EL = PD · LGD. The expected total losses (TL = EL + UL) are rather higher
than the pure EL, as some unexpected losses (UL) are also likely to occur in some
scenarios – where systematic factors (e.g. large economy-wide recessions) make
the realised annual default rate higher than the expected PD. To model the UL,
and thereby derive capital requirements, one must therefore condition the PD and
LGD – to increase them beyond their simple historical average levels. In the IRB
approach, the conditioning of the PD is designed to increase the unconditioned
PD to the point where the bank is able to absorb the unexpected losses on its
assets in all but the absolute most severe (top 0.1%) negative scenarios that may
occur in the following year.
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Figure 4.8: Loss distribution of a loan portfolio
Hence, Unexpected losses can be expressed as:
UL = TL− EL = LGDc · PDc − PD · LGD (4.1)
where PDc denotes the conditional probability of default and LGDc the condi-
tional loss-given-default. Hence, the risk-weight that would ensure enough capital
to cover the unexpected losses of loan type j can be calculated as
wjt =
1
νb
ULjt (4.2)
where νb is the regulatory risk-weighted capital-asset ratio requirement. As a
result, the risk-weight of a particular loan type becomes a function of the respective
default probability PD and loss-given-default LGD.
In our theoretical model, we are able to use the true model values for the PD
and LGD, thus eliminating any estimation errors. In terms of our notation, the
PD is simply F j,at and the expected loss in the event of default of loan type j is
given by:
ELjt =
rjtF (ω¯
j,a
t , σ
j
ω)
pit+1
− (1− µ
j)G(ω¯j,at , σ
j
ω)q
j
t+1H
j
t
Bjt
(4.3)
The expected losses in (4.3) are expressed as the value of foregone interest minus
the value of repossessed collateral. We calculate the loss-given-default as LGD =
EL
PD
, and the conditional PDc, and LGDc values according to the Basel method-
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ology.1 Using the latter, we then calculate the total losses as TL = LGDc · PDc.
Finally, using equation (4.1), we compute the loan specific, time varying risk-
weight according to equation (4.2).
4.3 Macroprudential risk-weighting
In practice, the IRB risk-weight setting approach presented in the previous sec-
tion, could create a positive relationship between the risk-weight of a particular
type of loan and its probability of default which can make capital requirements
procyclical. For example, in the boom phase of the economy, asset prices are
high and lending conditions are lax, hence the default probability of loans de-
creases, leading to lower risk-weights. Similarly, in the downturn, asset prices are
low and lending conditions tighten, the default rate of loans increases leading to
higher risk-weights. In both phases of the credit cycle the IRB approach may lead
to risk-weights that reinforce economic fluctuations thereby increasing financial
fragility. This procyclicality of capital requirements is consistent with the empir-
ical evidence found by Markus et al. (2014) and Goodhart et al. (2004).
As an alternative policy setting we introduce macroprudential interventions
that aim to attenuate the business cycle and minimize its vulnerability to financial
distress.2 For this purpose we employ a Taylor-type rule that sets the risk-weight
of a loan type responding to an indicator. We have chosen the indicators follow-
ing the regulatory guidelines and set our instruments to respond to credit-to-GDP
measures (ESRB, 2014). Therefore, in our macroprudential setting we substitute
the risk-weights of equation (4.2) with the following Taylor-type rule:
wjt = (w¯
j)(1−ρw)(wjt−1)
ρw
(Bjt /Yt
B¯j/Y¯
)χw(1−ρw)
(4.4)
The risk-weight of loans to households and firms are set according to the devia-
tion of the loan-specific measure of leverage (Bjt /Yt) from its steady state, where
the parameters χw and ρw represent the responsiveness of the instrument to the
leverage measure and its autoregressive properties. In the following sections of
1See BCBS (2005), for the LDGc we use the unconditional LDG increased by 10% as a
downturn estimate.
2The Capital requirements regulation - CRR IV allows for regulatory setting of higher risk-
weights due to ”financial stability considerations”, see Article 124(4)(b).
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the crisis simulations, we use countercyclical1 values for the parameters governing
the responsitiveness of the macroprudential rule to leverage that lead to a realistic
response of policymakers to credit indicators.2 In the appendix (6.6), we present
the same responses with an optimal rule in which the parameters are set so as to
maximize social welfare.3 We refrain from using optimal MaP policy rule in our
main simulations, firstly because it leads to unrealistically volatile policy instru-
ments and second, since it has clear welfare advantage over the other settings that
represent static policy and policy pinned down by the IRB regulation. Moreover,
optimal policy in terms of social welfare is not the main goal of this paper which
focuses on comparing the current approach in the literature with the imposed
regulation and a proposed alternative setting of risk-weights.
With the end of this section we complete the description of the risk-weight
setting under the different policy regimes. In summary, under the leverage ra-
tio, there is no risk-weighting and as a results both risk-weights are constant and
equal to one (wIt = w
E
t = 1) hence the risk-weighted assets equal the total as-
sets of the bank and the lending spreads are determined by the deviation of the
capital-asset ratio from the requirement νb (equation 2.3). Alternatively, under
the IRB approach risk-weights are set according to equation 4.2. As a result,
each asset enters the capital requirement multiplied by its corresponding weight
which ultimately leads to asset specific spread (equation 2.3). Finally, under the
macroprudential setting that we propose, risk-weights for each asset type are set
according to equation 4.4 and respond to sectoral measure of leverage. In the next
section, we compare the different policy settings under a bust phase and then the
boom and bust cycle of a crisis scenario.
4.4 Analysis in the crisis scenario - Bust Phase
This scenario allows us to represent the crash phase of the crisis, and is therefore
suitable to assess different policies in terms of their effect in the aftermath of a
crisis. We study the impulse responses to an unexpected increase in the standard
1We refer to countercyclical setting in the sense of countercyclical capital requirements which
are achieved through procyclical risk-weights and a positive value for the parameter χw
2ρw = 0.1103 and χw = 1.9483
3Leading to values of: ρw = −0.2023 and χw = 4.9587.
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deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to mortgages. In Section 3.4., the variance
decomposition identified this shock to be a driving factor at the peak of the crisis.
The direct impact of this shock consists of increasing the proportion of loans below
the ex-ante default threshold. This leads to a larger default rate for mortgages
than was expected by the banks when the loans were issued. This in turn leads to
losses to banks and the destruction of bank capital – resulting in the capital-asset
ratio falling below the regulatory requirement.
Figures (4.9) and (4.10) highlight the differences in the impulse responses to the
shock due to the different policy settings of capital requirements.1 In the leverage
ratio (LR) case (static and equal risk-weights), the destruction of bank capital
reduces the capital-asset ratio and the capital to risk-weighted asset ratio below
the regulatory requirements. In order to adjust their balance sheet to ensure the
regulatory requirement is met, banks increase the wholesale interest rate spread,
thereby leading to higher interest rates on loans. The higher interest rates depress
economic activity and lead to a long recession.
In contrast to the leverage ratio case, the IRB approach increases the risk-
weights of mortgages as the estimate of default probability increases. The risk-
weights decrease following the process of household deleveraging (which results in
the default probability falling). The higher risk-weight on mortgages leads to a
higher value for the risk-weighted assets (RWAs). This in turn leads to a larger
decline in the Capital/RWA measure and hence to a higher increase in spreads
and interest rates. Ultimately, this results in a larger decline in investment and
output following the shock, and a slower recovery.
Finally, the macroprudential approach to setting risk-weights (MaP) has a
countercyclical effect – as it decreases the risk-weights on both types of lending
as a result of the de-risking effect of the lower sectoral leverage levels in the
bust phase of the crisis. This leads to lower risk-weighted assets (RWA) and a
higher Capital/RWA ratio, and thereby to a relatively lower increase in spreads
and interest rates on bank lending. Ultimately, this results in the stimulation of
investment and thereby to a relatively fast recovery.
1Figures (4.9) and (4.10) shows the responses of the variables in percentage deviation from
steady-state values except for the responses of variables denoted with *. These variables are plot-
ted as absolute responses due to different steady states or variables already being in percentage
form.
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Figure 4.9: IRF - unexpected shock to σi
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Figure 4.10: IRF - unexpected shock to σi
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4.5 Analysis in the crisis scenario - Boom and Bust
In this crisis scenario we aim to represent both the build-up and crash phases
of the crisis and thus to examine how the different policy approaches perform in
terms of their amplifying or attenuating effects on the full cycle. The scenario is
simulated as a positive news shock in the initial period whereby the agents in the
economy expect the default rate of mortgages 4 periods in the future to decrease.
This thereby leads to optimism and buoyancy in both lending and asset markets.
However, when period 4 arrives, the shock does not occur and agents’ expecta-
tions of lower default rates do not materialize. As a result, the default rate of
mortgages is higher than expected and banks realize losses – thereby leading to a
destruction of bank capital.
Figures (4.11) and (4.12) show the various impacts on agents’ behaviour asso-
ciated with the positive news shock. In the leverage ratio case (static and equal
risk-weights), optimism leads to higher borrowing and decreases in the capital-
assets and capital-risk-weighted-assets ratios. Banks respond to these decreased
regulatory capital ratios by increasing the wholesale spread in order to stay in
line with the regulatory requirement. However, the higher wholesale spread to
mortgages is not enough to offset the lower retail spread which is driven by the
lower default probability in the boom phase. As a result, mortgages face lower
interest rates and sectoral leverage is increased further.
Unlike the results of the leverage ratio approach, the IRB approach results in
decreases to the risk-weights on loans due to lower PD estimates in the optimistic
phase. As a result, risk-weighted assets (RWA) decline and the Capital/RWA
measure increases – leaving the impression that banks are better capitalised when,
in reality, the pure Capital/Asset measure has decreased. During this phase, IRB
banks decrease their wholesale spreads and further reinforce lower interest rates
and higher sectoral leverage.
As in the previous scenario, the macroprudential approach to setting risk-
weights has a countercyclical effect during the boom phase of the crisis – as it
increases risk-weights on both types of lending in response to the increases in
leverage in both sectors. This leads to higher risk-weighted assets (RWA) and a
lower Capital/RWA ratio - and hence to an increase in wholesale spreads, leading
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to higher interest rates and lower borrowing than is observed under the other
capital measurement approaches.
At period 4 the positive shock does not materialize, and the economy faces
less favourable financial conditions than expected. From that point forward, the
crisis proceeds in a similar way to the bust phase in section 4.3. The difference
between the scenarios is that the negative shock here is driven by unmaterialized
expectations rather than actual changes in financial outcomes.1
In the leverage ratio setting, the destruction of bank capital reduces the Capi-
tal/Assets and Capital/RWA ratios below the regulatory requirement. In order to
meet their regulatory requirement, banks increase wholesale spreads – resulting
in higher interest rates to loans. The higher rates depress economic activity and
lead to a relatively long recession.
Unlike the leverage ratio case, the IRB approach increases the risk-weight on
mortgages at the point where the negative shock arises – due to higher resulting
estimates of PDs. Subsequently, risk-weights then fall as households deleverage,
and PDs decline. The higher the risk-weight to mortgages leads to a larger measure
of risk-weighted assets which in turn leads to larger decline of the Capital/RWA
ratio and hence to a greater increase in spreads and interest rates on lending.
In the case of our macroprudential approach to setting risk-weights, lending
conditions are tight before the shock – due to the stricter capital requirements
that result from high risk-weights during the phase where sectoral leverage is
increasing. The destruction in bank capital is therefore lower when the shock
hits, and therefore the negative impacts of the shock are also lower. After the
shock, the economy faces relatively favourable credit conditions in comparison
to the IRB and leverage ratio regulatory cases - and the economic recovery is
therefore faster, as investment can be sustained through the cycle.
1Note that in the unrealized news shock (boom and bust) scenario the dynamics are entirely
driven by expectations while the impulse response of the shock remains flat.
97
Chapter II. Sectoral Risk-Weights and Macroprudential Policy 4. Policy analysis
Figure 4.11: IRF - unrealized news shock to σi at period 4
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Figure 4.12: IRF - unrealized news shock to σi at period 4
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4.6 Procyclicality and Welfare
In the previous sections, we compared the responses of the three different policy
settings in two different crisis scenarios. Although that the scenarios represent
closely the 2008 financial crisis, they cannot be used as a proof of procyclicality of
the existing regulation in terms of all possible shocks that can occur in a longer
simulation of the model. In order to represent the ability of the different settings
to smoothen or amplify the business cycle, we report the variation of the main
macroeconomic variables. In addition, we report the social welfare in terms of
lifetime utility and consumption equivalence in each of the settings.
The welfare of each agent j = {P, I, E} is given by the expected discounted
sum of lifetime utility:
Ωjt = maxEt
[ ∞∑
i=0
(βj)iU(Cjt+i, H
j
t+i, L
j
t+i)
]
(4.5)
which at the optimum has the following Bellman form:
Ωjt = U(C
j
t , H
j
t , L
j
t) + β
jΩjt+1 (4.6)
Finally, we also compute an optimal macroprudential rule by setting the coef-
ficients of the macroprudential policy rules so as to maximize the sum of welfares
of the agents in our model. In doing so we study the ex-ante optimal simple rules
based on the second-order approximate solution of the model. We also compute
the welfare implied by the different policy rules conditional on the initial state
being the deterministic steady-state. The policies are compared both in terms
of levels of welfare and consumption-equivalent (CE) measure calculated as the
percentage increase in steady-state consumption that would make welfare under
the leverage ratio (static policy setting) equal to welfare under each of the policy
settings. The table below reports the results.
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Table 4.4: Variation and Welfare
Risk-weight setting
Standard Deveation Welfare Con. Eq.
Income Cons. Invest. Borr. Wel CE
Leverage Ratio 0.1101 0.0901 0.0298 0.9615 -347.07 0%
IRB 0.1105 0.0903 0.0306 0.9602 -351.94 -1.98%
Macroprudential
ρw = 0.1103
χw = 1.9483
0.1096 0.0899 0.0276 0.8844 -345.62 0.59%
Optimal
Macroprudential
ρw = −0.2023
χw = 4.9587
0.1094 0.0897 0.0270 0.7662 -344.04 1.23%
As we can see, relatively to the static policy setting of the leverage ratio, the
IRB setting of the risk-weights leads to higher variation in the macroeconomic
variables and lower social welfare. On the other hand, the macroprudential rule
smoothens the business cycle by decreasing the variation in the variables and as
a result leads to higher social welfare. Finally, the optimal macroprudential rule
leads to higher responsiveness of the risk-weights to leverage: χw = 4.9587 than
the one in the non-optimal rule χw = 1.9483.
1
1The higher responsiveness leads to better smoothing and higher welfare, however, an ex-
tremely responsive setting of the risk-weights is unrealistic from the point of view of a policy
that is actually implementable. For this reason we use the macroprudential rule with the lower
responsiveness for our main simulations and report all the crisis scenarios repeated with the
optimal rule in appendix (6.6).
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5 Conclusion
Bank capital regulation has evolved through time to incorporate risk-sensitivity,
i.e. the idea that different asset classes contribute to credit risk to a different
degree and hence capital charges should be proportionate to the riskiness of each
asset class. This framework is incorporated by the introduction of risk-weights
in capital-asset requirements. However, there has been an ongoing debate on the
correct approach to measure the riskiness of assets that would allow for bank
regulation that attenuates the financial cycle.
While most studies on this topic rely on empirical evidence and economet-
ric models, we incorporate different methods to asset risk-weighting in a general
equilibrium macro model. This approach allows us to investigate the effect of
the different methods for setting risk-weights on the financial cycle, the macroe-
conomy, and on the resilience of the financial system in a crisis. We compare
two active policy approaches. The Internal Ratings Based approach (IRB) sets
risk-weights for each asset on the basis of estimates for PDs and LGDs. Alter-
natively, our macroprudential approach sets risk-weights for each asset type in
a countercyclical manner – linking risk-weights to measures of leverage in each
sector.
Our results show that in both boom and bust phases of the crisis the IRB
approach leads to procyclical capital requirements. In the boom phase, the IRB
approach leads to looser capital requirements and thereby to lending conditions
that reinforce market exuberance. In the bust phase, higher risk estimates lead
to higher risk-weights and tighter capital requirements that depress bank lending
and push down on economic activity. The IRB approach therefore reinforces the
financial cycle in the event of a crisis.
By contrast, our macroprudential approach to setting risk-weights leads to
countercyclicality in capital requirements in both the boom and bust phases of
the crisis – thereby serving to attenuate the financial cycle. The negative impact
of the financial crash to the real economy is smaller and the recovery happens
faster. These results are evident both in the specific crisis simulations as well
as social welfare analysis. In the latter, the IRB approach leads to decrease of
welfare due to amplifying the business cycle while our suggested setting leads to
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welfare improvement through attenuating economic fluctuations.
The intuition behind these results can be found by reflecting on the purpose
of regulatory capital requirements. Bank capital requirements are enforced with a
view to ensuring that banks hold enough capital to cover the potential Unexpected
Losses (UL) associated with their assets. Expected Losses (EL) are to be covered
by bank provisioning and credit pricing. In applying of the IRB approach we esti-
mate the UL of each asset using the same parameters that are used for estimating
the EL in bank provisioning - the PD and LGD. The IRB approach therefore leads
to a positive relationship between estimates of the EL and UL – thereby leading
to procyclical capital requirements. In a situation characterised by optimism in
lending markets – the EL will be low, and likewise the IRB approach will tend to
estimate lower UL, resulting in lower capital requirements.
Conversely, the macroprudential rule relates UL to sectoral measures of lever-
age – which will tend to make the UL move in the opposite direction of EL. Hence
in an optimistic scenario where lending conditions are loose, EL is low and lever-
age is growing - the macroprudential capital rule sets tighter capital requirements
to mitigate the potential boom situation.
Finally, our macroprudential approach to setting risk-weights is an alternative
means of adjusting capital requirements for the state of the financial cycle in com-
parison to the Countercyclical Capital Buffer approach that is set out within Basel
III. The macroprudential risk-weights we apply adjust to the sectoral financial cy-
cle – thereby providing a more precise tool for reacting to sector-specific bubbles
and credit booms. The sectoral risk-weights that we put forward in this analysis
could focus macroprudential controls over capital requirements on those sectors
that are experiencing booms, whilst avoiding unwarranted impacts on other non-
bubble sectors. This would potentially concentrate the impact of the tool where
it needs to be to stabilise capital flows, and reduce unintended spillover costs to
other sectors.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Data description
• Consumption: Household and NPISH final consumption expenditure, chain
linked volumes (2010), seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working
days. Transformation: log deviation from HP-filtered mean. Source: Euro-
stat.
• Investment: Gross fixed capital formation, chain linked volumes (2010),
seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days. Transformation:
log deviation from HP-filtered mean. Source: Eurostat.
• House prices: Residential Property Valuation, new and existing dwellings,
neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Transformation: deflated by
HICP inflation, log deviation from HP-filtered mean. Source: ECB.
• Wages: Labour cost index, whole economy excluding agriculture, fishing
and government sectors, working day and seasonally adjusted. Transfor-
mation: deflated by HICP inflation, log deviation from HP-filtered mean.
Source: Eurostat.
• Inflation: Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), seasonally ad-
justed, not working day adjusted. Transformation: deviation from mean.
Source: ECB.
• Policy Rate: Euribor 3-month - historical close, average of observations
through period. Transformation: in gross quarterly form, deviation from
mean. Source: ECB.
• Borrowing rate - households: Annualised agreed rate (AAR) / Narrowly
defined effective rate (NDER), Credit and other institutions (MFI except
MMFs and central banks), Lending for house purchase excluding revolving
loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, Up to 1
year initial rate fixation, New business coverage, Households and NPISH.
Transformation: in gross quarterly form, deviation from mean. Source:
ECB.
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• Borrowing rate - firms: Annualised agreed rate (AAR) / Narrowly de-
fined effective rate (NDER), Credit and other institutions (MFI except
MMFs and central banks) reporting sector - Loans other than revolving
loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, Up to 1
year initial rate fixation, Up to and including EUR 1 million amount, New
business coverage, Non-Financial corporations. Transformation: in gross
quarterly form, deviation from mean. Source: ECB.
• Borrowing volume - households: Lending for house purchase, house-
holds and NPISH, outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks),
neither seasonally nor working day adjusted .Transformation: deflated by
HICP inflation, log deviation from HP-filtered mean. Source: ECB.
• Borrowing volume - firms: Loans to non-financial corporations, out-
standing amounts at the end of the period (stocks), neither seasonally nor
working day adjusted. Transformation: deflated by HICP inflation, log de-
viation from HP-filtered mean. Source: ECB.
• Deposits: Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs
excluding ESCB reporting sector - Deposits with agreed maturity, Over 1
and up to 2 years maturity, All currencies combined - Euro area (changing
composition) counterpart, Households and NPISH, denominated in Euro,
neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Transformation: deflated by
HICP inflation, log deviation from HP-filtered mean. Source: ECB.
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6.2 Spread expression
Given the spread equation (2.7) we have that the denominator is the following
function of the ex-ante threshold ω¯j,a :
X(ω¯j,a) =
(1− µ)G(ω¯j,at , σjω)
ω¯j,at
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at , σjω)) (6.1)
or expressed with integrals:
X(ω¯j,a) =
(1− µ) ∫ ω¯j,at
0
ωf(ω)dω
ω¯j,at
+ 1− F (ω¯j,a) (6.2)
where f(ω) is the PDF and F (ω) is the CDF of the log-normal distribution.
In fact, the second therm in the RHS which is the probability of non-default,
expressed as 1 - the probability of default, where the latter is just the CDF
evaluated at ω¯j,a. Then it is straightforward to see that as the CDF is increasing
function in ω¯j,a then:
d(1− F (ω¯j,a))
dω¯j,a
< 0 (6.3)
is a decreasing function in ω¯j,a. Then calculating the derivative of the of X(ω¯j,a)
wrt ω¯j,a we obtain:
dX(ω¯j,a)
dω¯j,a
=
(1− µ)
ω¯j,a
ω¯j,af(ω¯j,a)− f(ω¯j,a)−
(1− µ) ∫ ω¯j,a
0
ωf(ω)dω
(ω¯j,a)2
+
d(1− F (ω¯j,a))
dω¯j,a
(6.4)
which simplifies to:
dX(ω¯j,a)
dω¯j,a
= −µf(ω¯j,a)− (1− µ)
∫ ω¯j,a
0
ωf(ω)dω
(ω¯j,a)2
+
d(1− F (ω¯j,a))
dω¯j,a
(6.5)
which is negative, meaning that X(ω¯j,a) is decreasing fuction of the ex-ante thresh-
old ω¯j,a. Then as we have from equation (2.7) the spread is:
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rjt
Rbt
=
1
(1−µ)G(ω¯j,at ,σjω)
ω¯j,at
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at , σjω))
=
1
X(ω¯j,a)
(6.6)
hence, the spread is an increasing function of the ex-ante threshold such that:
rjt
Rbt
= f(ω¯j,a), f ′() > 0 (6.7)
6.3 Profits expression
Starting from the equation of profits then dividing by the borrowing quantity bjt−1
and substituting the ex-post threshold, we obtain profits per unit of loans as:
Πjt
bjt−1
= (1− µ)G(ω¯j,pt , σjωj)
rjt−1
ω¯j,pt
+ (1− F (ω¯j,pt , σjωj))rjt−1 −Rbt−1 (6.8)
then from evaluating the participation constraint (2.6) in period t− 1 and substi-
tuting the ex-ante threshold (2.5) in period t− 1, ω¯j,at−1 in it we have that:
Rbt−1 = (1− µ)G(ω¯j,at−1, σjω)
rjt−1
ω¯j,at−1
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at−1, σjω))rjt−1 (6.9)
which can be substituted in (6.8) leading to:
Πjt
bjt−1
= rjt−1
[
(1− µ)G(ω¯j,pt , σjωj)
ω¯j,pt
+ (1− F (ω¯j,pt , σjωj))−(
(1− µ)G(ω¯j,at−1, σjω)
ω¯j,at−1
+ (1− F (ω¯j,at−1, σjω))
)] (6.10)
Then using the formulation of X(ω¯j,a) in (17), the last equation becomes:
Πjt = b
j
t−1r
j
t−1
[
−
(
X(ω¯j,at )−X(ω¯j,pt−1)
)]
(6.11)
And since we have showed in 6.2 that X(ω¯j,a) is a decreasing function in ω¯j,a, then
for any ω¯j,at−1 = ω¯
j,p
t the above expression would be zero, and for any ω¯
j,a
t−1 > ω¯
j,p
t
we would have that X(ω¯j,pt ) > X(ω¯
j,a
t−1) and that Π
j
t > 0 leading to:
Πjt = f(ω¯
j,a
t−1 − ω¯j,pt ), f ′() > 0 (6.12)
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6.4 Model first order conditions
Patient households (Savers)
PHHs choose: CPt , H
P
t , and L
P
t to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βP )tUt = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βP )t
[
(1− αp)εct log(CPt (j)− αPCPt−1)+
εht log(H
P
t (j))−
(LPt (j))
1+φ
1 + φ
] (6.13)
subject to:
CPt (j) + q
h
t ∆H
P
t (j) +Dt(j) = WtL
P
t (j) +
Rt−1Dt−1(j)
pit
+ Tt(j) (6.14)
If we denote marginal utility of consumption with:
UCPt = Λ
P
t =
(1− αp)εct
CPt − αpCPt−1
(6.15)
then substituting eq(31) for Ct and Ct+1 into lifetime utility and differentiating
wrt. Dt we obtain the following Euler equation:
ΛPt = β
PΛPt+1
Rt
pit+1
(6.16)
Then differentiating the infinite sum of discounted utility wrt. HPt gives the
demand for housing:
ΛPt q
h
t =
εht
HPt
+ βPΛPt+1q
h
t+1 (6.17)
Finally differentiating wrt. leisure LPt , we obtain the labour supply:
ΛPt =
(LPt )
φ
W Pt
(6.18)
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Impatient households (Borrowers)
IHHs choose: CIt , H
I
t , and L
I
t to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)tUt = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t
[
(1− αI)εct log(CIt (i)− αICIt−1)+
εht log(H
I
t (i))−
(LIt (i))
1+φ
1 + φ
] (6.19)
subject to the budget constraint:
CIt + q
h
t ∆H
I
t +
(1− F pt )rIt−1BIt−1
pit
+ qhtH
I
t−1G
p
t = B
I
t +WtL
I
t (6.20)
and collateral constraint:
rItB
I
t /pit+1 = m
h
t q
h
t+1H
I
t (6.21)
If we denote marginal utility of consumption with:
UCIt = Λ
I
t =
(1− αI)εct
CIt − αICIt−1
(6.22)
By constructing a Lagrangian with the collateral constraint and SIt being its
shadow value we obtain:
LI = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βI)t[Ut + S
I
t (m
h
t q
h
t+1H
I
t −
rItB
I
t
pit+1
)] (6.23)
substituting the budget constraint for CIt and C
I
t+1 and differentiating wrt. B
I
t we
obtain the following Euler equation:
ΛIt =
βIΛIt+1r
I
t
pit+1
+
SIt r
I
t
pit+1
(6.24)
Differetiating wrt Ht gives the following housing demand:
ΛIt q
h
t = β
IΛIt+1q
h
t+1 +
εh
HIt
+ SImht q
h
t (6.25)
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Lastly, labour supply:
ΛIt =
(LIt )
φ
W It
(6.26)
Entrepreneurs
Choose consumption CEt , physical capitalK
E
t , loans from banks B
E
t , degree of cap-
ital utilization, and labour inputs from patient and impatient households LPt , L
I
t
to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtI
[
(1− αE)log(CEt (i)− αECEt−1)
]
(6.27)
subject to:
CEt +W
P
t L
P
t +W
I
t L
I
t +
(1− F p,Et )rEt−1BEt−1(i)
pit
+ qkt [K
E
t − (1− δ)KEt−1]+
qktK
E
t−1G
p,E
t =
Y Et
Xt
+BEt
(6.28)
with production function:
Y Et (i) = A
E
t K
E
t−1(i)
αLEt (i)
1−α (6.29)
where: LEt = (L
P
t )
ν(LIt )
1−ν
subject to a budget constraint:
rEt B
E
t /pit+1 ≤ mft qkt+1KEt (6.30)
Denoting marginal utility of consumption as:
ΛEt =
(1− αe)
CEt − αeCEt−1
(6.31)
Constructing Lagrangian with SE being the shadow value of the collateral con-
straint, then differentiating wrt. KEt leads to:
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ΛEt q
k
t = Λ
E
t+1β
E
(
qkt+1(1− δ) + rkt+1
)
+ SEmft q
k
t+1 (6.32)
where rkt is the rental rate of capital: r
k
t =
αY Et
KEt−1
1
Xt
For labour demand we have MP of each labour type equal to its MC:
W Pt =
ν(1− α)Y Et
LPt Xt
W It =
(1− ν)(1− α)Y Et
LItXt
(6.33)
Finally the Euler equation is:
ΛEt =
ΛEt+1β
ErEt
pit+1
+
SErEt
pit+1
(6.34)
Capital Producers
Using the discount factor of entrepreneurs (as being owned by them), capital
producers maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛEt (β
E)t
[
qkt ∆xt − It
]
(6.35)
by choosing ∆xt and It subject to the following constraint:
∆xt =
[
1− κi
2
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)2]
It (6.36)
Where, ∆xt = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1. Differentiating wrt. It we obtain:
ΛEt
[
qkt
∂∆xt
∂It
− 1
]
+ ΛEt+1β
E
[
qkt+1
∂∆xt+1
∂It
]
= 0 (6.37)
for the partial derivatives we obtain:
∂∆xt
∂It
= 1− κi
2
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)2
− κi
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)
Itε
k
t
It−1
(6.38)
∂∆xt+1
∂It
= κi
(
It+1ε
k
t+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
εkt+1 (6.39)
substituting the last two into 52 we obtain the optimality condition:
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1 = qkt
[
1− κi
2
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)2
− κi
(
Itε
k
t
It−1
− 1
)
Itε
k
t
It−1
]
+
βEEt
[
ΛEt+1q
k
t+1ε
k
t+1
ΛEt
κi
(
It+1ε
k
t+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2]
Retailers
Thus retailers choose Pt(j) to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
[
Pt(j)Yt(j)− PWt Yt(j)−
κp
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− piipt−1pi1−ip
)2
PtYt
]
(6.40)
subject to: Yt(j) = (
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
y
t Yt.
Thus the part of the infinite sum that includes Pt(j) is:
R∑
= ΛPt
[
Yt(j)(Pt(j)− PWt )−
κp
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− piipt−1pi1−ip
)2
PtYt
]
+
ΛPt+1β
P
[
Yt+1(j)(Pt+1(j)− PWt+1)−
κp
2
(
Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)
− piipt pi1−ip
)2
Pt+1Yt+1
] (6.41)
Differentiating wrt. Pt(j) and imposing Pt(j) = Pt leads to:
ΛPt
[
− ytYt +
ytYt
Xt
+ Yt − κp(pit − piipt−1pi1−ip)PtYt
1
Pt−1(j)
]
+
ΛPt+1β
P
[
κp(pit+1 − piipt pi1−ip)Pt+1Yt+1
Pt+1(j)
P 2t (j)
]
= 0
(6.42)
which after dividing by Yt and Λ
P
t simplifies to:
1−yt +
yt
Xt
−κp(pit−piipt−1pi1−ip)pit+
ΛPt+1β
P
ΛPt
κp(pit+1−piipt pi1−ip)
Yt+1
Yt
pi2t+1 = 0 (6.43)
where we use that 1/X = PWt /Pt and pit = Pt/Pt−1
The profits of retailers that are transferred back to savers are:
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JRt = Yt(1−
1
Xt
)− κp(pit − piipt−1pi1−ip)2 (6.44)
6.5 Model responses to standard shocks
In this section, we report the behaviour of the estimated model in terms of re-
sponses to technology and monetary shocks. In doing so we compare our results
with Gerali et al. (2010) as a closely related model. The responses of our model
are closely related to the benchmark simulations - BK of Gerali et al. (2010).
However, a major difference arises due to the different structure of the models in
terms of bank capital. In Gerali et al. (2010), the interest rate setting at the retail
level is driven entirely by sticky prices, due to the absence of defaulting loans in
the model. On the other hand, our model features defaulting loans and hence
banks are facing not only a proportion of non-repaid loans but are exposed to the
value of the repossessed collateral. As a result, in our setting bank profits and
bank capital are driven not only by the interest rate margin but the proportion
of defaulted loans and the value of the repossessed collateral. Therefore, a lower
than expected default rate with higher than expected value of reposessed collat-
eral leads to positive profits by banks and higher capital1 - which can be seen in
the technology shock. On the contrary, for the same shock Gerali et al. (2010)
reports countercyclical bank capital which is counterfactual.
1See section 2.1 for bank profits equations.
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Figure 6.13: IRF - Technology shock
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Figure 6.14: IRF - Technology shock - (Gerali et al., 2010)
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Figure 6.15: IRF - Monetary Policy shock
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Figure 6.16: IRF - Monetary Policy shock - (Gerali et al., 2010)
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6.6 Optimal Macroprudential Rule
Figure 6.17: IRF - unexpected shock to σi
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Figure 6.18: IRF - unexpected shock to σi
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Figure 6.19: IRF - unrealized news shock to σi at period 4
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Figure 6.20: IRF - unrealized news shock to σi at period 4
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Chapter III
Underestimating Portfolio Losses
Abstract
This paper starts from the foundation model of the Basel capital regulation and
extends it by developing its economic structure at several steps. Namely, the
asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) framework is expanded by incorporating
rational behaviour of borrowers, banks, and investors. Each stage introduces a
specific feedback between the portfolio loss distribution and the behaviour of the
agents. First, the optimal default choice of borrowers, creates a positive rela-
tionship between the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD),
which are both related negatively to borrowers’ net worth. Second, the insurance
of risk by banks, creates a negative relationship between spreads and borrowers’
net worth. Third, the required risk premia by investors, creates a positive rela-
tionship between the riskiness of the credit portfolio of the bank and its funding
costs. Taken independently or together, each of these effects leads to a financial
accelerator that reinforces adverse shocks and their impact on the financial sys-
tem. Finally, the resulting framework is able to give insight into the relationship
between bank capital and cost of funds. In summary, our results are strongly
of favour of higher capital requirements. First, the illustrated financial acceler-
ators lead to much riskier financial system than previously thought and second
insufficient capital levels can incentivise bankers to engage in riskier lending. Our
results have implications for risk management practices of private banks as well
as for capital regulation by central banks
.
JEL classifications: C61, E44, E58, E61, G21, G28.
Keywords: ASRF, financial accelerators, macroprudential policy, capital requirements, credit
risk, portfolio loss.
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1 Introduction
Financial crises are characterized by major deviations in the behaviour of agents
and macroeconomic indicators from the one that is observed in normal times. As a
result, economic relationships become inherently nonlinear when subject to large
adverse shocks as emphasized by authors such as Milne (2009). Furthermore,
there can be powerful interactions between asset returns, banks’ balance sheets,
lending conditions, and the real economy that reinforce such effects (Borio, 2012).
Conventional linearized general-equilibrium models are not very suitable for
studying such unusual conditions and macroprudential policies aimed to address
them. First, because by being linearized they do not capture the effects of the
nonlinear relationships and second, because they underestimate the role of banks
and their behaviour in contributing to these nonlinearities. On the other hand,
the models that focus solely on banks and the value of their portfolio, abstract
from important economic interactions which play a key role in crisis scenarios.
In the class of general equilibrium models, the literature in financial frictions
is the one that focuses on banks and their interaction with the real economy. The
cornerstone of this literature is the so called ”financial accelerator” first illustrated
by Bernanke et al. (1999) - BGG and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and later de-
veloped by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). In simple words, the accelerator is a
reinforcement channel between the net worth of an agent and lending conditions
which can amplify the business cycle in both good and bad times. The literature
usually focuses on macroprudential policy that aims to mitigate the impact of
this amplification mechanism. However, due to their size as a general equilib-
rium frameworks, these models are usually victims of various simplifications that
enable their solution under rational expectations. For example, the absence of
risk in lending activity is present in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello
(2005) due to the presence of binding constraints that exclude the possibility of
defaulting loans. In Bernanke et al. (1999), lenders are not exposed to credit risk
as they can vary interest rates due to state-contingent contracts and thus guard
themselves from unexpected losses. On the other hand, the Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) class of models introduce financial crises as exogenous destruction of bank
capital which does not arise as a consequence of risky bank lending. A newer gen-
118
Chapter III. Underestimating Portfolio Losses 1. Introduction
eration of DSGE models by Quint and Rabanal (2014) and Forlati and Lambertini
(2011) amend the BGG framework with fixed interest contracts. In such environ-
ments, banks can diversify idiosyncratic risk through spreads, but become prone
to aggregate shocks due to the non-contingent contracts, and as a result banks’
profits/losses become endogenously determined by borrowers’ net worth and ag-
gregate risk. However, even in the latter models, the analysis of large aggregate
shocks is not possible due to the linearized solution methods. This prevents the
derivation of bank loss distribution which is crucial for analysing policies that aim
to cover bank losses in rare extreme scenarios, such as capital requirements.
Another strand of literature focuses solely on banks and portfolio value the-
ory. The framework developed by Merton (1974) and Vasicek (2002) presents bank
lending as subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. While the former can
be insured, banks remain prone to the latter which introduces endogenously the
need of capital buffers to guard against the remaining single risk factor. Fur-
thermore, the simplified structure of the model enables nonlinear solution and
derivation of the portfolio loss distribution. In addition, the structure also allows
for closed form analytical solution which is particularly appealing to regulators
and policymakers which is why the Vasicek model is still employed by the Basel
regulation for capital requirements.1 On the other hand, the structure that allows
for analytical solution comes at the cost of ignoring important agent behaviour
that enables the financial accelerator amplification which is well known in the gen-
eral equilibrium literature. We argue that the financial accelerator mechanisms
are crucial for the design of macroprudential policy, as they can amplify portfolio
losses and affect their distribution which in turn should be taken into account by
bank regulation, in order to quantify and guard against bank losses.
This paper bridges the gap between the literature of financial frictions and
portfolio value theory. It expands the former with aggregate risk for the expense
of the general equilibrium solution and the latter with economic structure and
behaviour for the expense of analytical solution. The paper presents a framework
that has been specifically designed to analyse the central role of banks and the
1The Vasicek formula is the cornerstone of bank capital regulation and is used for the
calculation of asset risk-weights in capital requirements. See (BCBS, 2005) and EU Capital
Requirement Regulation IV - 2013.
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interaction of their behaviour with the one of borrowers and investors. As a re-
sult, the model incorporates important financial accelerator mechanisms between
borrowers’ net worth, banks’ balance sheets and risk premia which are crucial for
the analysis of bank regulation. Our representative bank is exposed to a large
portfolio of loans with diversifiable idiosyncratic risk due to portfolio size and
non-diversifiable aggregate risk.
First, by analysing optimal borrowers’ default choice, we derive a positive
relationship between the default rate of the portfolio and the loss-given-default
of each loan. The relationship arises due to the fact that in adverse aggregate
scenarios, the reason for the larger default rate is the cheaper collateral which
borrowers prefer to give up rather than to repay the loan. As a result, not only
that more loans default but banks repossess cheaper collateral which increases
their losses in adverse scenarios, leading to the first financial accelerator of this
paper.
Second, by analysing the process of insurance of idiosyncratic risk by banks, we
derive a spread setting behaviour of lenders which creates a negative relationship
between borrowing costs and the net worth of borrowers. The relationship arises
due to the risk-pricing behaviour of banks to set larger spreads to riskier portfolios
with higher loan-to-value. The higher interest rates in turn increase borrowers’
owed amount and loan-to-value and thus make them riskier for the bank, leading
to the second financial accelerator of this paper.
Finally, by deriving the loss distribution of the bank’s portfolio we analyse
the required risk premia by the investors of the bank, which leads to a positive
relationship between the costs of funding for the bank and the riskiness of its
portfolio. This leads to the third financial accelerator of this paper which also
interacts with the other two channels. For example, an increase of the riskiness
of the bank’s portfolio leads to higher costs of funding for the bank. The latter
costs are passed on to the borrowers as higher interest rates which increases their
chance of default. As a result, portfolio riskiness increases as well, thus closing
the accelerator cycle.
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We track how the introduction of each of the three amplification mechanisms
affects the portfolio loss distribution - taken independently or all together. Our
results illustrate how ignoring of these channels can underestimate portfolio losses
and lead to insufficient capital regulation.
After calibration of the model to match key US banking sector statistics, we
find that non-recognizing the illustrated financial accelerators can lead to an un-
derestimation of the probability of default of a bank of a magnitude between 1.3
and 5.2 times for a given level of capital. And vice versa, if banks want to achieve
a certain probability of default corresponding to their target rating, they would
need higher amounts of capital.
Finally, we employ the developed framework for obtaining valuable insight
regarding the relationship of bank capital level and the risk-taking incentives for
the bank. Our observation is that, per se, the level of bank capital doesn’t affect
the underlying portfolio riskiness and hence, banks’ cost of funding. However,
bank capital affects the shares in which the underlying risk is borne between debt
holders and equity holders. As a result, under deposit insurance, banks have clear
incentives to engage in riskier lending when the level of capital is low and larger
proportion of the risk is taken by depositors while being priced as risk-free.
In summary, our results are strongly of favour of higher capital requirements.
First, the illustrated financial accelerators lead to much riskier financial sys-
tem than previously thought and second insufficient capital levels can incentivise
bankers to engage in riskier lending. While the results have important implica-
tions for bank regulation. They also provide insight into optimal risk management,
provisioning and risk pricing by private banks that is consistent with the existing
regulatory framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the starting point of the
model, namely the ASFR. The following sections 3,4 and 5 expand the model
by respectively introducing rational behaviour of borrowers, banks, and bank
investors. Finally, section 6 uses the developed framework to quantify the resulting
loss underestimation and analyse different approaches to bank provisioning and
the relationship between bank cost of funding and the level of capital.
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2 The ASRF and the financial accelerator
The ASRF - asymptotic single risk factor framework developed by Vasicek (2002)
is the conceptual foundation of the internal rating-based approach defined in Basel
II. The main implication of the model is that the default rate in a large homo-
geneous portfolio of non-contingent loans can be expressed as a result of a single
aggregate risk factor. While each individual default can be driven by a combina-
tion of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, on a portfolio level the idiosyncratic
risk can be diversified and thus the portfolio loss is determined solely by the real-
ization of the aggregate factor that cannot be diversified.
A representative bank holds a portfolio of one period, non-state contingent loans
extended to a large number of borrowers indexed by i = 1, ...n. The total size
of the portfolio Bt consists of the individual exposures b
i
t, where Bt =
∑
bit. At
period t, the bank and borrower i sign a contract and agree on the loan amount
bit, a non-contingent gross interest rate r
i
t and collateral r
i,k
t+1k
i
t - consisting of re-
turn ri,kt+1 and capital amount k
i
t. At the time of repayment t + 1, the return on
collateral is observed, after realization of aggregate zt+1 and idiosyncratic shocks
ωit+1 thus becoming r
i,k
t+1 = zt+1ω
i
t+1r
k
t .
1 Borrower i makes the rational choice of
defaulting and giving up the collateral after realization of its return zt+1ω
i
t+1r
k
t k
i
t,
or repaying the loan ritb
i
t, by choosing to give up the lesser amount. Hence, the
borrower would default if the realized return falls below a predetermined default
threshold:
zt+1ω
i
t+1 <
ritb
i
t
rkt k
i
t
= ltvit (2.1)
we can denote the RHS of the equation above as the loan-to-value of borrower i,
ltvit which is known at the time of signing the contract. After taking a logarithm of
both sides of equation (2.1), the default condition takes the discrete-time version
of Merton (1974):
ln zt+1 + lnω
i
t+1 < ln ltv
i
t (2.2)
1We assume that the return on capital after the realization of uncertainty rkt is known,
identical for all agents and exogenously determined by macroeconomic conditions.
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The distribution of the shocks zt+1 and ω
i
t+1 is assumed to be lognormal, hence
the logarithm of the shocks are normally distributed as following:
ln zt+1 = N(0, (ς
√
ρ)2) ; lnωit+1 = N(0, (ς
√
1− ρ)2) (2.3)
Thus, the overall individual risk factor Ωit+1 is distributed as:
Ωit+1 = lnzt+1 + lnω
i
t+1 = N(0, (ς)
2) (2.4)
where both ς > 0 and ρ > 0. The main implication of this risk structure is
that each pair of overal individual risk factors Ωit+1, Ω
j
t+1 (for all i 6= j) is cross-
correlated due to the pressence of the aggregate factor zt+1 and the coefficient
of correlation is ρ. The parameter ς determines the standard deviation of the
aggregate shock Ωit+1 or the overall riskiness of the environment. As we will see,
the non-zero cross-correlation of individual risk factors results in the inability of
banks to fully diversify risk.
The unconditional probability of individual default is the probability of the overal
risk factor Ωit+1 falling below the ln ltv
i
t threshold.
PDit = P (Ω
i
t+1 < ln ltv
i
t) = Φ
(
ln ltvit
ς
)
(2.5)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cdf.
The conditional probability of default is defined for a given realization of the
aggregate risk factor zt+1 and is calculated as the probability that the idiosyncratic
shock ωit falls below the LTV threshold for the given realization of the aggregate
factor zt+1.
PDit(zt+1) = P
(
lnωit < ln
( ltvit
zt+1
))
= Φ
(
Φ−1(PDit)ς − ln zt+1
ς
√
1− ρ
)
(2.6)
The conditional and unconditional probabilities of individual default are the
key elements for deriving the portfolio loss distribution, incorporated in Basel.
Under the assumptions of perfect granularity and equal probability of default
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(equal LTV for all loans) Vasicek shows that:
1) The unconditional expectation of the portfolio default rate equals the un-
conditional probability of individual default:
Et[DRt+1] = PD
i
t (2.7)
2) The realized ex-post default rate DRt+1 for a given state of the aggregate
risk factor zt+1 equals the conditional probability of individual default:
DRt+1|zt+1 = PDit(zt+1) (2.8)
Combining equation (2.8) and the distribution of the aggregate risk factor zt+1,
we can evaluate the probability of each realization of the aggregate shock and its
corresponding portfolio default rate.1 Thus, the CDF of the portfolio default rate
Πt, can be expressed as a function of the unconditional individual probability of
default PDit and the cross-correlation risk factor ρ.
Πt(x) = P (DRt+1 < x) = Φ
(
Φ−1(x)
√
1− ρ− Φ−1(PDt)√
ρ
)
(2.9)
Equation (2.9) is the one which is used for calculating capital requirements in
Basel II. It provides the distribution of portfolio losses, before collection of col-
lateral, for a large portfolio consisting of loans with similar PD. The distribution
is then used to calculate the necessary regulatory amount of capital k∗ in order
for the probability that the portfolio losses exceed k∗ to be less than 0.1%. The
figure below plots the corresponding probability density function.
1This is possible since the portfolio default rate is a function of the random variable zt+1
which distribution is known, as a result the default rate can also be expressed as a random
variable which distribution can be derived, see Vasicek (2002).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of the portfolio default rate (LTV = 0.7, ρ = 0.1 ,
ς = 0.18)
While the equation above provides the distribution of the default rate DRt+1,
i.e. loss rate before collection of collateral, it does not provide the distribution
of the portfolio losses Lt+1 that take into account collateral repossession and the
realized loss-given-default LGD for each of the defaulted loans such that: Lt+1 =
DRt+1LGDt+1.
1
The Basel documentation does not provide any theoretical framework for the
calculation of the LGD which is needed for measuring losses after collateral re-
possession Lt+1 and the necessary amount of capital to cover them. Instead, the
documentation specifies that banks can either use their own methodology for es-
timating the LGD of a portfolio (upon supervisory approval) or use a static LGD
value, e.g. 40%.
In the next section, we show that the assumptions made so far are sufficient
in order to derive the value of the repossessed collateral and hence the loss rate
Lt+1 of the portfolio and its distribution.
1For each defaulted loan the bank does not suffer a loss-given-default of the full amount of
the exposure as it repossesses the collateral after realization of its return and thus recovers part
of the loss.
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3 Borrowers - optimal default choice
It is important to note that the necessary component to derive the individual PD,
the portfolio DR, and its distribution is the loan-to-value ratio of the loans in the
portfolio. We can interpret it as a distance-to-default measure in the sense that
the lower value of the collateral backing an exposure (higher LTV) the wider range
of shocks combinations that could bring the borrower to default. This is also true
for every given aggregate state zt+1 as a wider range of idiosyncratic realizations
could bring the borrower to default.
The model so far considers the borrowers’ default choice only for the purposes
of calculating the proportion of borrowers that default. We continue forward by
evaluating the repossessed collateral that the bank recovers from each defaulted
loan which is necessary for deriving the portfolio loss rate.
Considering the expected return from lending to borrower i, conditional on the
aggregate state zt+1. We know that with probability 1− PDit(zt+1) the borrower
repays and the bank receives the contract interest rate rit, while with probability
PDit(zt+1) the borrower defaults and the bank receives the collateral after the
realization of the shocks. Hence the expected return becomes:
Returnit(zt+1) =
(
1− PDit(zt+1)
)
rit + PD
i
t(zt+1)
µzt+1Et
(
ωit+1|ωit+1 < ltv
i
t
zt+1
)
rkt k
i
t
bit
(3.1)
where the parameter µ < 1, represents costs that the bank pays associated
with the collateral repossession and sale. After substituting equation (2.1) for the
LTV ratio and rearranging, we can express expected return from lending as:
Returnit(zt+1) = r
i
t
[
1− PDit(zt+1)
(
1−
µzt+1Et
(
ωit+1|ωit+1 < ltv
i
t
zt+1
)
ltvit
)]
(3.2)
The term
µzt+1Et
(
ωit+1|ωit+1<
ltvit
zt+1
)
ltvit
is the expected value of the repossessed col-
lateral or simply the expected recovery rate. Hence, one minus the recovery rate
is the amount that the bank loses - the loss-given-default (LGD)1:
1We define both PD, LGD and all loss rates normalized by the assets size leading to per
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LGDit(zt+1) = 1−
µzt+1Et
(
ωit+1|ωit+1 < ltv
i
t
zt+1
)
ltvit
(3.3)
As a result, the conditional loss-given-default can also be expressed as a func-
tion of the LTV threshold. This implies that the PD and LGD are related through
the default threshold. We already know that the PD is increasing in the LTV but
how is the loss-given-default related to the default threshold?
As the LTV increases the bank starts to repossess more collateral but this col-
lateral is of lesser value relatively to the amount lent, leading to increase in both
the numerator and denominator of the recovery rate. It can be shown that the de-
terioration of collateral value dominates and the recovery rate decreases for higher
LTVs.1 As a result, for a given realization of the aggregate shock, the conditional
LGD is an increasing function of the LTV. The conditional statement regarding
the shock ωit+1 <
ltvit
zt+1
is crucial for this result as for a given aggregate state, the
bank repossess collateral only from individual borrowers with low enough realiza-
tions of the idiosyncratic shock that has made their collateral of lesser value than
the amount of the loan and induced them to default. This is possible due to the
fact that the liability of the borrower is limited only to the value of the collateral.
As a result, in adverse realizations of the risk factors, the borrower passes on its
loss on the investment project to the bank by giving up the cheap collateral.2
Finally, the loss rate is simply the probability of default times the loss given
default:
Lit(zt+1) = LGD
i
t(zt+1)PD
i
t(zt+1) (3.4)
In the previous section, we used the assumptions of large and homogeneous
portfolio to apply the law of large numbers and conclude that the conditional
probability of default of loan i for the aggregate state zt+1, PD
i
t(zt+1) is also the
realized aggregate portfolio default rate for the same aggregate state. Analogously,
unit of loan terms.
1See Appendix 8.1.
2In fact, the expression for the value of repossessed collateral is well known in the financial
accelerator literature. BGG uses it in order to calculate the expected return from lending and
derive a participation constraint for banks that set interest rates in a manner that ensures a
certain level of expected return.
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we conclude that the expected individual loss-given-default, LGDit(zt+1) is also the
realized aggregate portfolio LGD. Finally, we can say that the expected individual
loss rate, Lit(zt+1) is also the aggregate portfolio realized loss rate. Therefore, we
can drop the i superscripts and consider each of these individual characteristics ex-
pressed in expected terms as aggregate portfolio characteristics in realized terms.
The characteristics of each individual loan can also be considered aggregate due
to the homogeneity of the portfolio (rit = rt; ltv
i
t = ltvt).
Due to the derived relationships, if we fix the portfolio and its LTV and con-
sider different realizations of the aggregate shock. As the scenario becomes ad-
verse, not only that larger proportion of the loans default, but the LGD would
also increase as banks repossess cheaper collateral. Figure 3.2 plots the realized
default rate PDt(zt+1), loss given default LGDt(zt+1) and loss rate Lt(zt+1) for
different realizations of the aggregate risk factor zt+1.
Figure 3.2: Conditional PD, LGD and Loss rate (LTV = 0.7, ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 ,
µ = 0.7)
The explanation of this result lies in the contract between the bank and the
borrower. In adverse scenarios, more and more borrowers default, however, the
reason for their default is the losses that have been realized on their investment
projects which also increase. Due to the limited liability contract, the borrowers
pass those losses to the bank by giving up the deteriorated collateral.
As a result, both the default rate and loss given default increase, reinforcing
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each other, and leading to the first financial accelerator of this paper. This ac-
celerator is a positive relationship between the default rate of a portfolio and the
loss-given-default of each defaulted loan and is a result of the contract type and
the rational default choice of the borrower. Not taking this effect into account
and treating LGD as fixed (as it is allowed by the Basel standards) would lead to
underestimation of the portfolio losses especially for adverse scenarios.
Using the distribution of the aggregate shock zt+1, we can use the fact that
the realized portfolio loss rate is a function of it and compute the distribution of
the loss rate.
Figure 3.3 shows the distributions of portfolio losses after repossession of col-
lateral for the endogenous LGD derived above and a static LGD1.
Figure 3.3: Loss rate distribution (LTV = 0.7, ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 , µ = 0.7)
As we can see, using a static LGD can overestimate the likelihood of relatively
low losses and underestimate the likelihood of particularly high losses that occur in
the very bad scenarios. Such result would have significant implications for capital
requirements, since the required capital is calculated as the necessary amount k∗
in order for the probability that the portfolio losses exceed k∗ to be less than 0.1%,
i.e. P(bank default < 0.1%). That is the level that cuts the 0.1 percentile of the
1The chosen static LGD value of 30% is purely illustrative at this stage of the paper and
does not affect any of the main results. In the following sections the model is calibrated with
US banking data.
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right tail of the loss distribution - black area in the figure below.
Figure 3.4: Loss distribution of a loan portfolio, source: (BCBS, 2005)
To summarize, we saw that due to limited liability borrowers can transfer
risk from their investment projects to the bank. However, we have not analysed
the optimal behaviour of the bank in such circumstances. As we will see in the
next section, the borrowers would be charged for their riskiness by the bank and
moreover, this will further change their default incentives and the portfolio loss
distribution.
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4 Banks - risk insurance
So far, we showed that under a fixed interest rate contract with limited liability,
we can derive the probability distribution of the portfolio loss that consists of
default rate and loss-given-default as a function of the portfolio LTV. In that
process, we have completely ignored the behaviour of the bank. If idiosyncratic
risk is diversifiable how can the bank insure against it? Does bank behaviour for
risk insurance affect borrowers’ default incentives and the loss distribution? We
focus on these questions in this section.
Considering idiosyncratic risk, we know that a proportion of the borrowers
would default due to low realized return on their collateral. The borrowers receiv-
ing a higher return would simply repay the loan and thus the maximum return
that the bank can make from a loan is limited to the size of the interest rate
rit. Under these circumstances, the only way that the bank can compensate the
expenses from defaulting loans is by charging a spread over its cost of funds. The
insurance against idiosyncratic risk is well known in the financial frictions liter-
ature and we incorporate those mechanisms into the portfolio value theory.1 In
the previous section, from equations (3.2 - 3.4), we showed that the realized re-
turn from lending conditional on the aggregate state zt+1 can be expressed as the
contract rate r times one minus the loss rate Lt(zt+1).
Returnt(zt+1) = rt
[
1− PDt(zt+1)LGDt(zt+1)
]
= rt
[
1− Lt(zt+1)
]
(4.1)
We denote the cost of funds for the bank is rb and we regard it as fixed for
now. Then for each aggregate state zt+1, the net loss for the bank would be the
excess of rb over the return from lending:
Losst(zt+1) = r
b − rt
[
1− Lt(zt+1)
]
(4.2)
1Under a variable interest rate contract, BGG introduces a participation constraint in which
banks charge a spread that would give them expected return from lending equal to their cost of
funds. The BGG constraint holds in both expectation and realized terms as the bank can vary
the interest rate after the signing of the contract. Quint and Rabanal (2014) and Forlati and
Lambertini (2011) introduce a participation constraint for fixed interest contract which holds
only in expectation terms. The latter approach is closest to the one analysed here.
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We further assume perfect competition in the banking sector, which implies
that the bank operates under zero profits and that any interest rate above the one
sufficient to insure against risk would exclude the bank from the market. This
translates into interest rate setting of the lending rate rt such that the return from
lending covers the cost of funds rb = rt(1 − LAt ) for a provisioned loss rate from
defaults LAt :
rt =
rb
1− LAt
(4.3)
Substituting the lending rate setting into the net loss we obtain:
Losst(zt+1) = r
b −
rb
[
1− Lt(zt+1)
]
1− LAt
= rb
[
1− 1− Lt(zt+1)
1− LAt
]
(4.4)
From equation (4.4), we can see that for any realized loss rate higher than the
one provisioned Lt(zt+1) > L
A
t , the bank would realize net losses that are absorbed
by capital. On the other hand, a lower than provisioned loss rate would lead to
profits to equity holders. But what loss rate should the banks provision?
While capital requirements are very heavily regulated and supervised, the
provisioning practices of banks are regarded as accounting standards and are not
defined in the Basel framework.1 According to Basel, provisioning should cover
losses in ”normal” times.
For now, let’s assume that the bank provisions loss rate of amount LAt =
Lt(1) for the most likely state of the world E[zt+1] = 1. This is equivalent to
considering and insuring against solely idiosyncratic risk and completely ignoring
aggregate risk at the stage of provisioning. In that setting, the responsibilities
of provisioning and bank capital are completely separated with each taking care
of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk respectively. The above provisioning practice
implies the following interest rate setting:
rt =
rb
1− Lt(1) (4.5)
As a result, the bank would charge a spread over its cost of funds rb that
1This is about to change with the introduction of the International Financial Reporting
Standard (IFRS) 9 from 2018, in which loss provisioning should be forward looking and consider
possible macroeconomic developments.
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depends on the provisioned loss rate. As we know from the previous sections,
the loss rate Lt(1) can be expressed as PD times LGD which in turn depend on
the LTV ratio. Hence, the spread over the cost of funds rb is also determined
by the LTV of the portfolio and is an increasing function of it. The intuition
is that a higher LTV increases the proportion of defaulting loans and collateral
repossession. To compensate for this and ensure covering of its funding costs, the
bank has to charge more the fewer loans that are being repaid. Figure 4.5 plots
the spread ri − rb, LTV curve.
Figure 4.5: Spread-LTV curve (ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 , µ = 0.7)
For no aggregate risk: zt+1 = 1, due to the full insurance against idiosyncratic
risk during the provisioning and setting of rt stage, the expected net loss becomes
zero. However, for any aggregate shock, the bank would experience profits or
losses. Figure 4.6 shows the expected loss of a loan for a given range of LTV’s and
adverse realizations of the aggregate shock z, before realization of the idiosyncratic
shocks.
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Figure 4.6: Expected Loss (ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 , µ = 0.7)
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Here we observe that for low LTV loans, even very adverse realizations of the
aggregate shock do not lead to expected losses. On the other hand, for high LTV
loans, even slightly adverse realizations lead to large expected losses. Although
that are insured by higher spread, the bank would also need to hold higher amount
of capital for high LTV loans in order to cover potential losses. This is in line with
the risk-sensitive framework introduced in the Basel II capital regulation which
sets higher risk-weights to riskier loans and hence lead to higher capital charge
for the bank.
Now we have considered bank behaviour in interest rate setting, but not con-
sidered how this behaviour interacts with the borrowers’ default choice. While the
LTV has been regarded as constant for the interest rate setting in equation (4.3),
in fact it depends on the interest rate itself as ltvt =
rtbt
rkt kt
. This is because the
LTV that would affect the default decision of the borrower is the one including
loan amount plus interest. This means that as the bank charges higher LTV with
a higher interest rate, the LTV itself increases. The intuition is that the insurance
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of idiosyncratic risk leads to an additional cost for borrowers which in turn makes
them riskier for the bank.
This reinforcing cycle is the second financial accelerator of this paper. It arises
due to the effect of interest rate setting by banks on borrowers’ default behaviour.
As we will see, the presence of this accelerator has also an effect on the portfolio
loss distribution.
If we define lvt =
bt
rkt kt
as the loan-to-value before interest, then ltvit = r
i
tlv
i
t
and the interest rate setting becomes:
r∗t =
rb
1− ∫ lvtr∗t
0
f(ω)dω +
µ
∫ lvtr∗t
0 ωf(ω)dω
lvtr∗t
(4.6)
The above expression is an implicit equation for the interest rate as a function
of the LTV before interest lvit, that takes into account the effect of interest rate
setting on borrowers and their default incentives. For every LTV before interest
- lvit there exists an interest rate r
i∗ that satisfies the above equation and leads
to a borrower LTV: ltvi∗ = lvitr
i∗. Figure 4.7 shows the spread with and without
the financial accelerator,ri∗ and ri for different values of lv and the resulting ltv∗
that is consistent with the interest rate setting behaviour of the bank.
Figure 4.7: Risk pricing accelerator (ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 , µ = 0.7)
As we can see for every lv, the rate that takes into account its own effect on
the borrower’s default incentive r∗(red line) is higher than the one that does not
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ri (blue line). As a result the ltv∗ is also higher than the lv. In summary, once
the bank prices adequately borrower’s risk, both the risk itself and its price end
up higher than the initial level.
Moreover, this reinforcement channel has impact on the loss distribution that
works through leverage. As banks set higher rates to high LTV loans, this increases
borrowers’ leverage and their incentives to default, thus increasing portfolio losses
for every aggregate state. Figure 4.8 adds the loss rate distribution resulting from
the interest rate setting behaviour of banks to the ones with static LGD and en-
dogenous LGD.
Figure 4.8: Loss rate distribution(lv = 0.7, ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 , µ = 0.7)
As we can see, once we add the financial accelerator resulting from bank be-
haviour, to the one due to borrowers’ default choice, the resulting distribution
shows that larger losses are more likely and smaller losses less likely compared
to the distributions that do not include those reinforcement channels. As we
will see later, this underestimation of large losses can lead to insufficient capital
requirements to the banking sector.
It is worth noting that the endogenously obtained accelerator is similar to the
ones in the financial frictions literature e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Ia-
coviello (2005). However, while these papers impose an ad-hoc constraint limiting
the LTV at which banks are willing to lend, in our case banks are willing to lend
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to riskier loans but for a higher price. Furthermore, this risk pricing by banks
results in additional amplification which is not present in the papers above.
5 Investors - risk premia
So far, we have assumed that the cost of funds for the bank rb is fixed. In practice,
this cost would equal the weighted sum of the cost of equity re and cost of debt rd
for the bank. Assuming that the bank funds its loans Bt with debt Dt and equity
(bank capital) Kbt , we obtain a balance sheet identity.
Bt = K
b
t +Dt (5.1)
Thus, the cost of funds for the bank rbt can be expressed as:
rbt = kr
e
t + (1− k)rdt (5.2)
where k denotes the capital per unit of assets or the capital-asset ratio
Kbt
Bt
.
In addition, we make the further assumption that in the state in which the
realized loss rate equals the provisioned one L(zt+1) = Lt(1), the obtained return
from lending is fully used to pay the required returns to equity and debt holders,
while the level of capital remains constant. However, away from this state the
riskiness of the portfolio is passed on to the providers of funds to the bank. The
equity holders will bear the Profits/Losses of the portfolio of loans, while debt
holders would receive decreased returns, in case that the amount of realized net
loss is greater than the amount of capital k and the bank defaults. As we showed
in the previous section, the net loss Losst+1(zt+1) can be expressed as funding cost
minus return from lending, where the return is the loan rate rt times one minus
the interest forgone due to the realized loss rate Lt.
Losst+1(zt+1) = r
b
t − rt
[
1− Lt(zt+1)
]
(5.3)
where the contract lending rate rt is set as to ensure zero loss in the determin-
istic steady state zt+1 = 1 according to the provisioned loss rate Lt(1):
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rt =
rb
1− Lt(1) (5.4)
Having the conditional net loss for any realization of the aggregate shock, we
can derive the net loss PDF - f(Loss). Then using the net loss distribution, we
can evaluate the required risk premia by equity holders and debt holders, taking
into account the respective risk that they take by investing into the bank. For
that purpose, we assume risk neutral investors and as such they perceive as risk
only the expected return from investing and not its higher moments.
Starting from the equity holders, we assume that they require a rate of return
ret which net of the expected loss in the events of: profit, loss and default for the
bank, ensures them the risk-free rate rf :
ret −
∫
kre
rb−r
Losst+1f(Loss)dz + kr
e
∫
rb
kre
f(Loss)dz
k
= rf (5.5)
Thus, for a fixed level of capital, for any increase in the riskiness of the credit
portfolio, the equity holders would require a higher risk premium. Note that the
loss that equity holders can bear is limited to the amount of capital they have
invested.
Debt holders, on the other hand, bear much lesser risk from lending to the
bank. Their return would only deviate from the required rate rd, if the losses are
so large that the amount of capital is not enough to absorb them and the bank
defaults. Hence, they would require a rate of return which net of the expected
loss in the event of bank default ensures them the risk-free rate:
rdt −
∫
rb
kre
(Losst+1 − kre)f(Loss)dz
1− k = r
f (5.6)
The loss that debt holders can bear is limited to the amount of debt plus
interest. In addition, for a fixed level of capital a riskier credit portfolio would
lead to a higher required risk premium for debt.
In summary, equations (5.5) and (5.6) show that under the assumption of
risk insurance by investors, both sources of funding become more costly as the
credit portfolio becomes riskier. As a result, the cost of funding for the bank rbt
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is increasing in the riskiness of the portfolio.
The required returns of debt and capital also give us valuable intuition for the
relevance of the capital structure of the bank to its cost of funding. In theory, we
can use the above equations to track how the cost of debt and equity change with
the amount of capital k. However, given the set of assumptions made so far,1 the
Modiliagni-Miler theorem holds and as a result, the weighted sum of the costs of
equity and debt gives us a cost of funds for the bank rb which is independent of
the level of capital:
rbt = kr
e
t + (1− k)rdt = rf +
∫ rb
rb−r
Losst+1f(Loss)dz (5.7)
Combining the interest setting rule rt =
rbt
1−Lt(1) that provisions loss rate of
Lt(1) we obtain a net loss function for every aggregate state:
Losst(zt+1) = r
b −
rb
[
1− Lt(zt+1)
]
1− Lt(1) = r
b
[
1− 1− Lt(zt+1)
1− Lt(1)
]
(5.8)
As we can see from equations (5.7) and (5.8), the cost of funds of the bank is
increasing in the riskiness of the portfolio and in turn, the portfolio loss increases
in the cost of funds for every aggregate state. The resulting interaction is the third
financial accelerator of this paper and works in combination with the previously
described amplification mechanisms. An increase of portfolio riskiness leads to
higher costs of funding for the bank driven by investors’ behaviour. In addition,
bank behaviour of interest rate setting passes the higher costs of funding to bor-
rowers which in turn become more prone to defaults and increase the riskiness of
the portfolio, thus closing the acceleration cycle.
The tightening of lending conditions to banks by investors is similar to the
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) financial accelerator. However, instead of imposing a
quantity constraint on the amount of funds that investors are willing to provide,
we derive an endogenous constraint in which investors are still willing to lend to
riskier banks but at a higher cost.
Just like the previous amplification channels, the one due to investors’ be-
1Namely, we haven’t assumed any preferential tax treatment or state insurance for
debt/deposits.
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haviour would also amplify the vulnerability of portfolio losses to aggregate shocks.
As a result, the absence of the channel would underestimate the portfolio loss dis-
tribution and hence undermine the calculation of sufficient capital requirements
and prudent bank regulation. Figure 5.9 plots the resulting loss rate distribution
f(L), once the risk premia required by investors is taken into account.
Figure 5.9: Loss rate distribution(lv = 0.7, ρ = 0.1 , ς = 0.18 , µ = 0.7)
From the figure above, we can track how the distribution of the loss rate f(L)
(in terms of forgone interest) is evolving, as we have expanded the economic struc-
ture of the model. Starting from the baseline model, by introducing borrowers’
default behaviour, banks’ interest rate setting and investors’ risk premia, we have
incorporated three different financial accelerators that taken independently or all
together increase the riskiness of the portfolio, leading to a distribution with less
likely small losses and more likely large losses.
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Equilibrium
Having derived the endogenous cost of funding for banks rbt , our model is
completed and we can define the equilibrium conditions. For a given portfolio ltv
before interest lv and capital of the bank k, our equilibrium is characterized by
the set of variables {r∗, ltv∗, Loss∗, f(Loss∗), re∗, rd∗, rb∗} that satisfy the following
conditions:
• loan interest rate r∗ set according to cost of funding rb∗ and the ltv before
interest lv - equation (4.6).
• conditional net loss Loss∗t+1(zt+1) with distribution f(Loss∗t+1) consistent
with the equilibrium cost of funding rb∗ and loan rate r∗ - equation (5.8).
• bank cost of funding rb∗ as a weighted sum of the cost of debt and equity
rd∗, re∗ which are consistent with the capital ratio of the bank k and the net
loss distribution f(Loss∗t+1) - equations (5.5) and (5.6).
Appendix 8.2 describes the algorithm used for computing the equilibrium.
So far, we have considered the provisioning and level of capital of the bank
as fixed. Furthermore, the simple provisioning rule employed so far completely
ignores aggregate risk and passes it on to borrowers. On the other hand, the
completed model allows to study how the interest rates, borrowers’ and bank’s
probability of default vary as we change the levels of provisioning and capital.
Is there an optimal level of provisioning and capital in terms of risk and lending
costs? We analyse the optimal properties of the model in the next section.
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6 Model Analysis
6.1 Provisioning
So far, under the employed provisioning and interest rate setting rule, we assumed
that the bank sets interest rates so that the revenues from lending rt(1−LAt ) under
provisioned loss rate LAt are enough to cover the costs of funds for the bank r
b
t . For
simplicity, we assumed, that during the provisioning stage, the bank completely
ignores aggregate risk and and provisions a loss rate LAt = Lt(E[zt+1]) = Lt(1),
for the most likely state of the world E[zt+1] = 1. Leading to interest rate rule:
rt =
rb
1− Lt(1) (6.1)
In addition, from the previous section, we saw that by ignoring aggregate risk
at the stage of provisioning, the bank passes this risk to its investors which in turn
require higher return for their investment. As a result, the higher cost of funds
is passed on to the lending rate and the final borrowers, thus leading to higher
leverage and risk.
In this section, we investigate what would happen if the bank considers both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk at the stage of provisioning, implying a provi-
sioned loss rate of LAt = E[Lt(zt+1)] =
∫
Lt(zt+1)f(L)dz and corresponding loan
rate setting:
rt =
rb
1− ∫ Lt(zt+1)f(L)dz (6.2)
As we will see later, the expected loss rate E[Lt(zt+1)] is higher than the loss
rate in the expected state Lt(E[zt+1]) due to the properties of the loss distribution.
This leads to higher provisioned loss rate by the bank and hence higher lending
rate to borrowers. Substituting the rate setting into the conditional net loss leads
to:
Losst(zt+1) = r
b
t − rt(1− Lt(zt+1)) = rbt −
rbt (1− Lt(zt+1))
1− ∫ Lt(zt+1)f(L)dz (6.3)
As a result, the expected net loss is zero E[Losst(zt+1)] = 0. Hence, substitut-
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ing it into the cost of funds equation (5.7) implies that the investors would require
a risk-free return for lending to the bank rbt = r
f .
In summary, if the bank disregards aggregate risk at the stage of provisioning
(Partial Provisioning) it would set lower spread from its cost of funds, however,
the aggregate risk would be passed on to investors which would set higher cost
of funds for the bank. On the other hand, if the bank considers all risks at the
stage of provisioning (Full Provisioning), it would set higher spread from its cost
of funds, however, its investors would receive a risk-free portfolio for which they
would require a risk-free return. In both types of provisioning, the final lending
rate to the borrower is the same and hence, borrower’s leverage and loss rate
distribution is unchanged. What changes is the level of provisioning and the cost
of funds for the bank.
What about bank probability of default? Under partial and full provisioning
the loss rate distribution is the same. However, under full provisioning the pro-
visioned threshold above which losses are absorbed by capital is higher. Hence,
for the same level of capital, the threshold above which losses are large enough to
lead to bank default is also higher. This leads to a lower probability of default of
the bank - PDb for the same level of capital - Figure 6.10.
Note that the partial provisioning case is not an unrealistic outcome. The de-
fault threshold of the bank also separates how the exposure to the loss distribution
is shared between shareholders and debtholders. Since shareholders’ liability is
limited to the level of capital and hence the default threshold, then a lower thresh-
old and higher default probability transfers risk from shareholders to debtholders.
Considering that the provisioning strategy depends on bank management which
is under direct control of shareholders and the possibility of unadequate pricing of
default risk by debtholders due to deposit insurance, banks may be incentivised
to provision lower level of losses.
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Figure 6.10: Bank default threshold under different provisioning
6.2 Quantifying Loss Underestimation
The model equilibrium from section 5 allows us to calculate some model statistics
after a baseline calibration. Moreover, we can compare the equilibrium charac-
teristics of the model with all three financial accelerators, under partial and full
provisioning, with the equilibrium implied by the Basel capital regulation and the
Vasicek (2002) loss distribution that does not consider accelerator effects.
Calibration
The model is calibrated to the US, given the fact that the limited liability
contract is more common in the US rather than the EU. We start the calibration
by setting the loan-to-value ratio: LTV = 0.7 to a value that is standard in
the literature. It is the main parameter that sets portfolio riskiness as it changes
individual PD and LGD and also the probability of default of the bank and hence,
we conduct robustness checks of the results for different values of the LTV.1 The
bank capital-asset ratio is set to the weighted average leverage ratio of the top US
banks k = 5.75%. The risk-free rate is set to the current US 12 month Treasury
bond yield rf = 1.15%.
1See Appendix 8.3.
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We then proceed by setting the standard deviation parameters determining
the distribution of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk: ρ = 15% and ς = 19%. The
former parameter governs the correlation between the collateral values and is set
to match the value set by the Basel regulation for mortgages. The latter param-
eter governs the aggregate level of risk in the economy and is set, so as to lead
to an unconditional individual probability of default PD = 4.19%. Finally, the
parameter for the costs of collateral repossession µ = 64% is set, so as to lead
to unconditional loss-given-default LGD = 40%. The calibrated value of the PD
is obtained as the long run average delinquency rate of US mortgages while the
value for the LGD is chosen as the value set under the Basel FIRB approach.1
Baseline Results
Under both partial and full provisioning, the final lending rate to the borrowers
is the same rt = 2.9%. However, under partial provisioning banks set lower
spread from their cost of funds rt− rbr = 2.9− 1.65 = 1.25%, but by setting lower
provisions, banks transfer higher risks to their investors which in turn charge them
a higher spread from the risk-free rate rbt − rf = 1.65 − 1.15 = 0.5%. Under full
provisioning, banks provision larger losses and charge a higher spread from their
cost of funds rt − rbr = 2.9 − 1.15 = 1.75% and as a result provide a risk-free
portfolio to their investors which require a risk-free return rbt = r
f = 1.15%. Since
the final lending rate is the same under both types of provisioning, then for a
given LTV, borrowers’ leverage and riskiness is the same leading to borrowers’
probability of default PD = 4.19% and loss-given-default LGD = 40% under
both partial and full provisioning. However, due to the higher default threshold
of the bank under full provisioning, bank probability of default is lower under full
provisioning: 1.23% than under partial provisioning 1.65%.
In addition, we can compare the equilibrium characteristics of the loss distri-
bution with the financial accelerators with the Basel (Vasicek, 2002) distribution
that does not consider such effects (Figure 5.9). This is can be done in two ways.
First, we can directly use the PD and LGD resulting from the starting LTV and
1For a detailed summary of the calibrated parameters see Appendix 8.4.
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the financial accelerators, as inputs into the Vasicek distribution employed by the
Basel capital regulation. This results in a bank probability of default of 0.98%.
Second, we can use the starting LTV without the application of the accelerators
to obtain simplified PD,LGD and corresponding Basel bank probability of default
estimate of 0.32%. The table below sumarizes the obtained results.
Table 6.1: Model results under baseline calibration
Variable Acceler., PP Acceler., FP Basel Basel/simple
lending rate rt 2.9% 2.9%
cost of funds rbt 1.65% 1.15% = r
f
borrower PD 4.19% 4.19% → 4.19% 3.0%
borrower LGD 40% 40% → 40% 39%
Bank PD 1.65% 1.23% 0.98% 0.32%
Reflecting on the results, it is important to note that using the simplified lower
PD and LGD values without the financial accelerators as inputs of the Basel for-
mula is not an unrealistic quantification. While our baseline unconditional PD
and LGD have been calibrated to match a 30 year average, in practice banks are
allowed to use as little as 5 yeas of default history for obtaining PD and LGD
estimates. In addition, the final lending rate to borrowers is not surprisingly
low, given the historically low risk-free rate and the strong assumptions of perfect
competition in the banking sector and risk neutral investors. Finally, while we
conduct robustness checks for different portfolio riskiness set by the LTV, in prac-
tice banks’ loan portfolios are divided into pools with similar characteristics and
hence, our LTV represents a crude average of the overall bank portfolio riskiness.
Taking this into account, we can conclude that non-recognizing the illustrated
financial accelerators can lead to an underestimation of the probability of default
of a bank of a magnitude between 1.3 and 5.2 times for a given level of capital.
And vice versa, if banks want to achieve a certain probability of default corre-
sponding to their target rating they would need higher amounts of costly capital.
Translated into bank ratings, our most conservative underestimation corresponds
to a downgrade with 1 notch from BB+ to BB and the most severe to a downgrade
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with 4 notches from BBB to BB.1 Furthermore, our results show robustness in
a wide range of portfolio riskiness with possible increase of the underestimation
effect for riskier portfolios.2
6.3 Cost of bank funds and risk-taking under Deposit In-
surance
In the previous section, we derived the cost of equity ret and debt r
b
t for the bank
by taking into account the risk to which equity and debt holders are exposed to,
by providing funds to the bank which has a portfolio with a given level of riskiness
- equations (6.4) and (6.5).
ret −
∫
kre
rb−r
Losst+1f(Loss)dz + kr
e
∫
rb
kre
f(Loss)dz
k
= rf (6.4)
rdt −
∫
rb
kre
(Losst+1 − kre)f(Loss)dz
1− k = r
f (6.5)
Furthermore, we showed that without any preferential treatment of debt or
equity the weighted sum of debt and equity gives an aggregate cost of funds for
the bank rbt that does not depend on the level of capital k leading to irrelevance
of the capital structure of the bank - equation (6.6).
rbt = kr
e
t + (1− k)rdt = rf +
∫ rb
rb−r
Losst+1f(Loss)dz (6.6)
This means that as bank capital is increasing the costs of equity and debt are
changing and offsetting the change of the funding composition. Figure 6.11 plots
the two costs and their weighted sum for different levels of capital.
1According to the Fitch ratings system for banks.
2See appendix 8.3.
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Figure 6.11: Cost of debt and equity for different levels of capital
From the figure above, we can see that the cost of debt rd declines with the
level of capital. This occurs since, as bank capital increases, the default threshold
of the bank increases and there are fewer states of the loss distribution for which
the bank defaults and debt holders suffer losses. Or in simpler words, debt holders
are exposed to smaller share of the loss distribution and as a result require lower
risk premium.
However, the result for the cost of equity is more controversial. While the
Modigliani-Miller theorem holds and the overall cost of funds rb does not depend
on capital, the cost of equity is lower than the cost of debt and is increasing with
the level of capital. This contradicts economic reality since capital is more costly
than debt and contradicts the literature that explains the observed data showing
that bank equity cost decreases with the level of capital.
To analyse those differences, we consider how bank performance affects the
return of investors. Unlike the loss rate Lt(zt+1), the net loss Losst+1 can take
negative values, i.e. the bank can make profits. The highest amount of profits
the bank can make is limited by the spread between the lending rate to borrowers
and borrowing rate from investors rt − rbt which occurs for a loss rate of zero (no
loans default). This is true since the net loss is:
Losst(zt+1) = r
b
t − rt(1− Lt(zt+1)) (6.7)
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Due to the behaviour of setting the lending rate rt, the bank would experience
zero net profits/losses at loss rate equal to the one provisioned Lt(zt+1) = L
A
t . For
loss rate higher than the provisioned the bank would experience net losses that
would be absorbed by equity holders’ capital. If capital is not enough to absorb
the losses then the bank would default and debt holders would also suffer.
Figure 6.12: Net Loss distribution (indicative level of capital - k)
As we showed in section (6.1), under full provisioning, the bank insures against
both types of risk and as a result the expected net loss is zero E[Losst(zt+1)] = 0
and the aggregate lender to the bank requires a risk-free return rbt = r
f . The
net loss can take both positive and negative values. However, equity holders are
exposed entirely to the negative realizations of the loss (profits) and partially to
the positive realizations (losses) - only up to the amount of capital. As a result,
the default threshold of the bank (red line in figure 6.12) is at the level of losses
equal to the level of capital. On the other hand, debt holders are exposed only to
the positive realizations of the loss above the default threshold - in the scenarios
in which the bank defaults and they lose their deposits.
As a result, equity holders would require lower than the risk-free return and as
capital increases they become exposed to a larger share of the positive realization
of the net loss and require higher return that converges to the risk-free rate for
very high levels of capital. On the other hand, debt holders are exposed to only
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positive realizations of the net loss and require higher than the risk-free return.
As capital increases, their exposure to risk decreases and their required return
also converges to the risk-free rate.
The reason for the counterfactually lower cost of equity than cost of debt lies
in the very few assumptions made so far. In particular, given our assumption of
risk neutral investors that do not have mean-variance preferences. Equity holders
which have higher mean and variance of their return than debt holders consider
only the first moment and as a result require lower premium. Note, however, that
this can be easily changed to match the empirical facts by introducing risk-averse
investors. Furthermore, none of our qualitative results of financial accelerator
mechanisms rely on the assumption of risk-neutrality. On the contrary, risk-
aversion would only make the aggregate investor requiring higher premium which
would reinforce the quantitative effect of the accelerators.
This however, would not change the puzzling result of equity costs that are
increasing with the level of capital. The explanation of this result of our model
is very simple. For a given portfolio riskiness defined by the LTV, the net loss
distribution is fixed and the level of capital determines the distribution of the
loss between debt holders and equity holders. Then with or without risk-averse
investors, a higher level of capital would expose equity holders to larger share of
the loss distribution and debt holders to a smaller share, which implies increasing
cost of equity with the level of capital.
Deposit Insurance
A main result of the empirical papers explaining the relationship between the
cost of equity and capital level relies on the assumption of risk-free debt due to
deposit insurance. If the underlying riskiness of bank assets βA, is be decomposed
into risk of equity βE and debt βD we obtain:
βA = kβE + (1− k)βD (6.8)
Then a riskless debt would imply βD = 0 and that for a given level of asset
riskiness, the equity riskiness is negatively related to the level of capital as for
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a higher levels of capital the same assets risk is distributed over a larger equity
cushion.
βE =
1
k
βA (6.9)
However, if deposits are guaranteed by the state and as a result perceived
by debt holders as risk-free, this does not mean that the deposits are in fact
riskless βD 6= 0. Because as a consequence of insuring deposits, the state bears
the risk to which these deposits are entitled which is then implicitly transferred to
taxpayers. Or in other words, transferring a larger share of the loss distribution
to debt holders does not make the underlying risk of the portfolio disappear -
leading to incorrect specification of equation (6.9).
Several papers1 estimate bank equity beta’s and then find a negative rela-
tionship between bank capital and equity beta and hence negative relationship
between bank capital and equity risk premium. However, none of those papers
accounts for the banks’ portfolio riskiness and as a result it is unclear whether
higher capital levels makes equity less risky or that higher capital induces banks
to engage in less risky lending.
At this stage, our paper can provide novel insight into the observed empiri-
cal results. Considering our conclusion that bank capital level, per se, does not
change portfolio riskiness but only the distribution of risk between equity and debt
holders. Then our model can potentially explain the observed empirical results in
the following way. As capital levels increase and equity holders are exposed to a
greater share of the portfolio risk, they are incentivised to reduce bank portfolio
riskiness. This incentive would be even stronger under deposit insurance, simply
because the lower is the level of capital, the larger share of the portfolio risk is
taken by the state while being priced at a constant risk-free rate. This would
make equity holders prone to allow risky lending, as the cost of funding of the
bank would be less responsive to it while at the same time receive higher margins
in the good times while being insured in the bad times - Figure 6.12.
While a thorough optimal capital analysis is out of the scope of this paper,
nevertheless its comprehensive structure can still provide valuable insight on the
1See Kashyap et al. (2010) and Miles et al. (2011).
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topic. The main conclusion is strongly in favour of higher capital requirements
especially under deposit insurance. In such circumstances, lower capital levels may
induce risky lending by banks and inconsistent perception of risk by society which
is sooner or later borne by taxpayers in the events of large crises. Moreover, the
benefits of extensively complicated risk-sensitive capital requirements under the
Basel regulations are in question, due to the natural incentives of equity holders
to enforce safer lending when having more ”skin in the game”.
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7 Conclusion
This paper started from the already established framework for bank capital regu-
lation and expanded it by introducing optimal agent behaviour leading to feedback
channels known as financial accelerators. The ASRF model employed by the Basel
capital regulation was extended by bridging the gap between the finance-risk lit-
erature and the economics of financial frictions.
First, the optimal default choice of borrowers was employed for deriving the
cost of repossessed collateral leading to a portfolio loss distribution that takes into
loss-given-default. The former showed that in bad states, not only that a larger
share of borrowers default but the bank repossesses cheaper collateral reinforcing
the losses.
Second, risk insurance by banks is introduced, leading to an interest rate
setting behaviour that requires higher rates from riskier borrowers with lower net
worth. As a result, the higher interest further reduces borrower net worth and
ability to repay closing the amplification cycle. In addition, the spread setting by
banks involves the process of provisioning which is an important building block
of bank behaviour.
Third, introducing required risk premia by investors allowed us to endogenise
the cost of funds for the bank and derive the net loss distribution. An amplification
channel resulted, as investors would require higher cost of funding from banks with
riskier portfolios further worsening the riskiness of the bank.
The resulting novel framework encompassed bank portfolio losses, interest rate
setting, provisioning and funding costs into a single regulatory consistent model.
Quantifying the effect of the introduced financial accelerators showed that non-
recognizing the illustrated financial accelerators can lead to an underestimation
of the probability of default of a bank of a magnitude between 1.3 and 5.2 times
for a given level of capital. And vice versa, if banks want to achieve a certain
probability of default corresponding to their target rating they would need higher
amounts of capital.
Finally, the extensive framework is used for gaining novel insight into the
question of bank capital level and cost of funding. A common understanding in
the literature is that under deposit insurance higher capital levels reduce equity
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riskiness. However, our model is able to illustrate that capital level, per se, does
not change portfolio riskiness but only how the underlying risk of the bank is
distributed between equity holders and debt holders. As a result, increasing cap-
ital levels leads to larger exposure to risk and higher required premium by equity
holders but only as long as we consider portfolio riskiness for fixed. In fact, under
deposit insurance, the lower is the level of capital the larger share of the portfolio
risk is taken by the state while still being priced at the risk-free rate by depositors.
As a result deposit insurance induces equity holders to invest as little ”skin in the
game” as possible exploiting the cheap insurance. Furthermore, higher capital
requirements and exposure to the portfolio risk by equity holders induces them to
require safer lending by the bank.
In summary, our results are strongly of favour of higher capital requirements.
First, the illustrated financial accelerators lead to much riskier financial system
than previously thought and second insufficient capital levels, under deposit in-
surance, can incentivise bankers to engage in riskier lending.
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8 Appendix
8.1 LGD - LTV relationship
The recovery rate in the event of default is:
Recovery(zt+1) =
µzt+1Et
(
ωit+1|ωit+1 < ltv
i
t
zt+1
)
ltvt
(8.1)
Using the relationship between conditional and partial expectation:
Et
(
ωit+1|ωit+1 <
ltvit
zt+1
)
=
∫ ltvtzt+1
0 ωf(ω)dω∫ ltvtzt+1
0 f(ω)dω
(8.2)
We can express the recovery rate as:
Recovery(zt+1) =
µzt+1
∫ ltvtzt+1
0 ωf(ω)dω
ltvt
∫ ltvtzt+1
0 f(ω)dω
=
µzt+1
∫ ltvtzt+1
0 ωf(ω)dω
ltvtPD(zt+1)
(8.3)
where f(ω) is the PDF of the log-normal distribution. The probability of
default PD(zt+1) is simply the CDF of the distribution evaluated at the ltv/zt+1
threshold, which is increasing in the ltv. If we denote the remaining part of the
recovery rate with
X(ltv) =
µzt+1
∫ ltvtzt+1
0 ωf(ω)dω
ltvt
(8.4)
then its derivative is:
dX(ltv)
dltv
=
µ
ltv
ltvf(ltv)− f(ltv)− µ
∫ ltv
0
ωf(ω)dω
(ltv)2
(8.5)
which simplifies to:
dX(ltv)
dltv
= (µ− 1)f(ltv)− (1− µ)
∫ ω¯j,a
0
ωf(ω)dω
(ω¯j,a)2
(8.6)
which is negative since µ < 1, meaning that X(ltv) is decreasing function of
the LTV. As a result the recovery rate is a decreasing function of the LTV.
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8.2 Equilibrium
For solving the equilibrium we use the following algorithm.
1. Set starting cost of funding equal to the risk-free rate: rb = rf
2. Find r satisfying:
rt =
rb
1− ∫ lvtrt
0
f(ω)dω +
µ
∫ lvtrt
0 ωf(ω)dω
lvtrt
(8.7)
3. Compute the portfolio loss rate for the domain of realizations of the aggre-
gate shock zt+1
Losst+1(zt+1) = r
b − rt
[
1− Lt(zt+1)
]
(8.8)
4. Find the PDF of the portfolio Loss - f(Losst+1)
5. Compute the costs of debt and equity:
ret = r
f +
∫
k
−∞
Losst+1f(Loss)dLoss
k
(8.9)
rdt = r
f +
∫
1
k
Losst+1
(1− k) f(Loss)dLoss (8.10)
6. Compute the costs of funds for the bank: rbnew = kr
e + (1− k)rd
7. If | rbnew − rb |< 1x10−8 then stop;
otherwise update rb = rbnew and continue from point 2.
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8.3 Robustness checks
Although that the model produces reasonable results for the baseline calibration,
this may not be true under different values for the parameter governing the port-
folio riskiness - the LTV. In order to verify that, we conduct robustness checks by
evaluating the model equilibrium for different values of the LTV. We evaluate the
individual unconditional PD and LGD both in the case of taking and not taking
into account the financial accelerators. The figure below plots the results.
Figure 8.13: Individual PD and LGD under different LTV values
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In addition, we compute the bank probability of default under: partial and full
provisioning and under the Basel formula with our without financial accelerators.
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Figure 8.14: Bank probability of default under different LTV values
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We are able to evaluate the equilibrium in the range of 0.5 < LTV < 0.77. For
lower LTV values the individual and bank probabilities of default become zero and
for higher values, our solution algorithm has hard time converging. Nevertheless,
in practice bank portfolios would be divided into pools of different riskiness and as
a result an aggregate LTV that is too high or too low is highly unlikely. Moreover,
banks’ credit policy or macroprudential regulation often has upper cap on the LTV
limit restricting extensively risky lending.
Taking this into account, we can see that for higher LTV values, both individ-
ual PD and LGD increase and this is more pronounced once the accelerator effects
are taken into account. An interesting observation is the low responsiveness of
the LGD to risk which seems counterfactual. A possible cause is the static cost
of collateral repossession that we have picked to match the data in the baseline
calibration. In practice, these costs would also vary with the business cycle and
riskiness and endogenising these costs is a possible direction of future research.
Bank probability of default also increases rapidly with the risk of the portfolio.
This is more pronounced for the settings taking into account the financial accel-
erator and less for the Basel case without accelerators. This leads to a possible
increase of the reported magnitude of bank probability of default underestimation
for riskier portfolios.
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8.4 Calibration
Table 8.2: Baseline parameters calibration
Param Value Description Source
LTV 70% loan-to-value ratio
Standard value in the literature
(Gerali et al., 2010),
subject to robustness checks.
k 5.75% bank capital-asset ratio
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
(2016) Weighted average
leverage ratio of top 8 US banks.
rf 1.15% risk-free rate
Bloomberg (2017)
US 12 month Treasury bond yield.
ρ 15%
Correlation between
collateral values.
Basel asset correlation for mortgages.
ς 19%
Aggregate level of risk
in the economy.
Set as to give the targeted
PD and LGD values.
PD 4.19%
Unconditional individual
probability of default.
Long run average delinquency rate of
US mortgages. Federal Reserve Board,
long run average 1987Q1 to 2016Q4.
LGD 40%
Unconditional individual
loss-given-default.
Fixed LGD value under the Basel
Foundation-IRB approach.
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